COMING IN FROM THE COLD: INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND PUBLIC OPINION ON DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET ECONOMY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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The political economy transformations of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have received a great deal of attention over the past decade. The focus of much research has been to examine the internal national reorientations of the countries with regard to the changes in political and economic conditions. The importance of the international reorientation of these countries toward Western Europe in general and the European Union in particular has been generally overlooked. This dissertation examines public opinion on the political and economic transformations within the framework of the direction of the international reorientations of the countries. The countries were divided into three categories, those that can expect to be invited to join the European Union in the next enlargement, those that can expect to join the European Union in a subsequent enlargement, and the countries not seeking European Union membership. Public opinion on democracy and the market economy and attitudinal factors that influence these opinions are compared in 16 countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The data are from the Central and East European Barometers 3-7 (1992 – 1996). The findings suggest that general opinions regarding satisfaction with democracy are not related to the status of the

country seeking membership in the European Union while support from the market economy does differ. When examining attitudinal factors that are related to satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy, differences emerged between the three categories of countries. These findings suggest that public opinion is in part shaped by the international orientations of the country and that changes in public opinion are important in understanding the political and economic transformation processes.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The 1980s and 1990s were periods of significant political and economic changes in Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the former Soviet Union signaled the end of the Cold War and announced to the world the long-term deterioration of the Soviet political economy. These events forced the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to initiate upon unprecedented transformations of their political economies. Many of the countries looked to the United States and Western Europe for guidance and assistance in their political and economic transformations toward democracy and the market economy.

As changes were occurring in parts of Central and Eastern Europe, changes were also underway in Western Europe. The final agreements were being made to transform the European Economic Community into the European Union. The further unification of the European Community into the European Union, coupled with the desire of many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to rejoin Europe after forty-plus years of separation, represented an unprecedented unification of Europe.

Many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have taken steps toward the establishment of democracies and market economies internally.

Additionally, these countries have sought to be integrated into the world market economy and to be recognized by the international community for their achievements of democratization. For these countries, Europe is the gateway to international political and economic integration into the world economy and world polity. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have pursued integration with the rest of Europe. As European countries, these former Socialist countries have the right to seek membership in the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty. Ten countries have started to work toward membership in the European Union, bringing about the possibility of a politically and economically unified Europe as never before achieved.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine public opinion on the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe within the context of the integration of these countries into the European Union. In order to address the general theme of this dissertation, four specific questions will be explored.

1. What are the public's opinions about democracy and the market economy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe?
2. Is there a difference in public opinion about democracy and public opinion about the market economy in the countries working to join the European Union compared to the countries that are not working to join the European Union?

3. How are political, economic and foreign relation opinions related to opinions about democracy and opinions about the market economy?
4. Does the status of seeking membership in the European Union influence the differences in the attitudinal factors that contribute to opinions about democracy and opinions about the market economy?

These questions are asked in order to understand the relationships between politics and economics and public opinion and institutional change.

Plan of Study

This dissertation is designed as a series of research papers that collectively seek to explore and answer the research questions posed in this chapter. Chapter 2 is a general review of the literature on the relationship between politics and economics and the importance and state of public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe. Particular attention is paid to public opinion on democracy and the market economy. Chapter 3 presents the major theoretical perspectives on the European Union integration. The theoretical framework used in this dissertation is presented. Chapter 4 is a general overview of the data and methods used for this dissertation.

Chapter 4 is the first research paper in this dissertation. Public satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy is examined in sixteen Central and Eastern European countries over a five-year time period. Comparisons of the public's opinions about democracy are made between the countries formally seeking European Union membership and those countries not

seeking European Union membership. Likewise, public opinion on the market economy is compared between the ten countries seeking membership into the European Union and the six countries not seeking European Union membership.

Based on the conclusions drawn in Chapter 4, Chapters 5 and 6 explore specific factors that contribute to public opinion on democracy and the market economy. Chapter 5 focuses on public opinion on democracy. In this chapter, I explore attitudes that contribute to satisfaction with democracy in sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1996. Five attitudinal factors are considered in this chapter. These are perceptions of human rights conditions, support for the market economy, prospective microeconomic expectations, retrospective microeconomic experiences and opinions about future national relationships to the European Union. The factors are considered for the sixteen countries individually, as well as on the countries pooled based on the status of their relationship to the European Union.

Chapter 6 is the final research paper included in this dissertation. It considers the factors that contribute to support for the transformation to a market economy. Again, five specific public opinions are examined as contributors to public opinion on the market economy. These are perceptions of human rights conditions, satisfaction with democracy, prospective microeconomic expectations, retrospective microeconomic experiences and opinions about the future national relations to the European Union. Analyses are completed on the sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe individually as well as based on

the status of the country's membership in the European Union. Comparisons are made between the countries based on their status of membership into the European Union.

In the concluding chapter (Chapter 7), I present a discussion of the results from each of the earlier chapters as well as a discussion of the results in light of the research questions presented in this chapter. The implications these results may have for the development of Central and Eastern Europe are discussed. Finally, future research ideas are offered.

Significance of the Study

This dissertation offers a significant contribution to the study of public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe in three important ways. First, I examine opinions about democracy and the market economy separately and with regard to their influence on each other and considering other related opinions. At the institutional level, scholars have long argued that there is a strong relationship between democracy and free market (Dahl 1989; Hayek 1944). At the same time, social scientists have been engaged in a heated debate as to whether a stable democracy and a well-functioning economy, with a commitment to core democratic and market economic values, require mass-level support (Slomcznski and Shabad 1997: 69). Certainly, the structural perils of the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe are important. As these structural conditions affect the general public, examinations of the mass support and motivations regarding the dual transformation processes are important.

Second, current theories of the political economy of transition and transformation cannot account for the variation in attitudes toward democracy and the market economy except to say that these opinions somehow reside in the political culture or specific historical conditions of that country and its people. Other research has presented a realist approach, attempting to avoid a theoretical debate altogether by reporting their findings without a theoretical foundation. The theoretical framework of this dissertation is to try to understand the patterns of public opinion within the context of the changing international conditions that have resulted because of the end of the Cold War.

The premise of this dissertation argues that in order to understand public opinion about the political and economic conditions in a country, particularly in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, one must consider the context of international relations. In particular, the relations of the Central and Eastern European countries and that of the supranational organization of the European Union need to be considered. This framework was selected because it provides a means by which to conceptualize patterns in the transformation process beyond that of individually specified national histories. It allows for public opinion to be related to a concrete, real situation and examination of specific institutional conditions.

What sets this dissertation apart from other research on public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe is the grounding of the understanding of public opinion within the political economy transformation and national integration into

the international community. Finally, specifically considering public opinion on democracy and the market economy within the context of the country's desire for integration into the European Union imposes a framework grounded in the countries' own self-imposed relation to the international community. Specifically avoided is the imposition of a categorization exclusively outside of the countries. By using the status of their seeking membership in the European Union, the countries are categorized by their own actions rather than some artificially imposed categorization.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews research applicable to the understanding of public opinion on the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe. First, there is brief discussion of economic and political development. This is followed by an examination of opinions about the links between national political and economic development and public opinion. A brief history of public opinion research in Central and Eastern Europe is presented, followed by an analysis of current public opinion research on politics and economics in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the development of the European Union and its importance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is discussed.

Political and Economic Development

Since its inception, sociology has wrestled with ideas of progress and development. Current understanding of the experiences of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can be framed within the larger debate on the relationships and complexities of political and economic development. These countries are undergoing a dual transformation of both politics and economics, moving away from state-centered socialism. Since their experience is that of a dual, political and economic, transformation, this presents an opportunity to

examine the relationships between politics and economics generally and democracy and a market economy specifically. Therefore, while the transformations of political economy in Central and Eastern Europe may be unique in the sense that these countries are experiencing dual transformations, these events are part of a larger discussion about progress and state development in general, and the interaction and development of democracy and the market economy in particular.

Many have argued that there is a link between democracy and capitalist economic development (e.g., Bollen 1979, 1983; Lipset 1959). The development of political institutions necessary for democracy is interdependent with the level of economic development (Cutright 1963, Cutright and Wiley 1969). At the institutional level, scholars have long argued that there is a strong relationship between democracy and free markets (Dahl 1989; Hayek 1944). Further, it is agreed that historical structures and institutional arrangements have long-term effects on the political development of a country (Moore 1966).

Despite support of the argument linking democracy to a market economy, democracy and the market are not necessarily maintained at the same level or with the same degree of commitment by the regime in power. Some have argued that democracy and the market economy do not necessarily advance one another. For example, O'Donnell (1979) asserted that democracy was discarded in the most economically advanced Latin American countries in favor of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in order to deepen industrialization. In these

cases, economic development superceded political development through the actions of the national leaders.

States do not exist in an international vacuum. The development of democracy and the market economy occurs as much within an international context as it does within the national context. The international community is important to national political and economic development because the state, as an entity, is positioned between international and domestic power relations (Skocpol 1979). Therefore, in addition to the national interaction of political and economic forces, international interactions must be understood to account for the political and economic development of a country.

For many countries that have attempted democratization and marketization, their political and economic transformations were undertaken as a single or sequential transformation process rather than as a dual transformation. In a single or sequential transformation, the changes in economic orientation occurred either separately, followed, or were preceded by the political transformation. This is contrasted with the cases of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where a dual transformation has occurred in which both the political and economic transformations were undertaken simultaneously, with each effecting the other. Balcerowicz (1995) identified the dual nature of the transformation in both the political and economic spheres. He noted that there have been asymmetrical changes between political and economic conditions despite the dual nature of the transformation processes. Further, he suggested

that the introduction of market liberalization under democratic conditions has been one of the peculiarities in the post-Soviet political economy transformations that had not been present in previous political or economic transformations. Therefore, the dual transformation of politics and economics makes the Central and Eastern European transformations inherently different from previous transformations.

The political and economic transformations in the former socialist countries present a complex situation of interactions between politics and economics and domestic and international power relations. It brings to issue the importance of historical factors, prior institutions, resource bases and public support for the transformation. The complexity is compounded by the fact that these countries have undergone a dual transformation of both political and economic conditions.

There has been a growing realization that the dual transformation from state-centered socialism and a command economy to democracy and a market economy may not be as simple as first imagined (Centeno 1994). In fact, the requirements to institutionalize democracy and measures to undertake the necessary economic reforms to develop a free market may be in opposition to each other. More specifically, newly democratizing countries face three distinct problems that can limit a country's ability to impose new economic policies. In a democracy, since citizens are more involved with the government by the process of voting as well as through other democratic activities, the public can oppose

new economic policy through collective action, distributive allocation and institutionalizing the interests of political groups (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). These means of opposition to policies and political actors, through the development of the democratic process, can severely hamper economic reforms that are necessary to strengthen the economy but unpopular due to social or political costs.

Likewise, the profound social costs of economic reform may serve to severely hamper the development of democracy. As has been the case in Belarus, as well as other countries, anti-democratic parties have been elected into office as a response to economic reform measures of the incumbent regime. In this way, democratic reforms have been reversed as a response to opposition to the economic reform measures.

There have been asymmetrical political and economic developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The political requirements of establishing a minimal democracy have been easier to achieve than the economic requirements (Logue and Hancock 2000). The reforms necessary for the development of a viable market economy require significant economic restructuring and institution building, much of which comes with high social costs. Each country has had to construct these reform measures in light of their own history and resources. Therefore, the development of a market economy in Central and Eastern Europe does not present a uniform model by which to judge the establishment of the market economies (Hancock and Logue 2000).

The difficulty in these transformation processes is compounded by the fact that, with the end of the Cold War, the whole world has been in transition. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have looked to the West and specifically the European Union for guidance. At the same time, the European Union itself has been in a state of economic and political transition. For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the changes in the European Union have made it “a moving target, which makes the national strategies of states like Slovenia extra complex and complicated” (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 805).

The lifting of the Iron Curtain exposed far more problems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe than were anticipated originally. While addressing the problems of corrupt and bankrupt political and economic institutions, the countries have had to work through their political and economic transformations in a variety of ways. The extent to which each country has transformed itself is highly variable (Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997). Some countries such as the Czech Republic and Estonia have made significant progress toward democratization and marketization, while other countries such as Belarus and Macedonia have made some progress toward democratization and marketization only to be caught in a reverse wave of democratization and marketization.

Despite the apparent differences between countries, two factors have been consistent for all of the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The first factor is that all of the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe have made at least tentative steps toward democracy and a

market economy. While the progress may not have lasted, and some countries, such as Belarus have retreated considerably, the fact remains that the political economy transformations have occurred. For some of these countries, this has been as close to an established democracy and a market economy as they will get at this time. For other countries, democratization and marketization have become firmly embedded and institutionalized. What is for certain is that none of these countries will be able to return to the political economy conditions of the past half century.

The second factor the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe share are the standards by which their progress toward democracy and the market economy are measured. Generally speaking, their progress is based on a model of the Western democracies and market economies. More specifically, the model of progress is found in Western Europe. For ten former socialist countries, the yardstick of Western Europe has been formalized into an explicit desire to join the European Union as member states.

While the institutional changes have been profound, the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe are more than just institutional reforms affecting the organization of the state. These reforms have macro and micro social consequences. For example, the transfers of state-owned enterprises into private hands have prompted profound changes and fundamental shifts in social, political and economic power (Supyan 2000). Institutional changes have been undertaken in order to integrate the countries

into the global market economy. The governments of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have carried out a number of economic reforms. These economic reforms, especially the “shock therapy” of the early 1990s, have had a deleterious effect on social conditions throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Although there were expectations that the steps of the transition, particularly the economic restructuring, would have serious social consequences, few expected that the social costs would be so high (Nelson 1997).

It was anticipated that the hardships brought about by the reforms, although severe, would be short in duration (Nelson 1997). The general publics in these countries appeared to understand that social costs were inevitable with the political and economic reform measures. What was not expected was the duration and severity of the hardships. The economic reforms, which were almost always launched by surprise, often received widespread initial public support. That support subsequently eroded as the nature of the social costs became apparent (Przeworski 1991).

If one thing is clear from these political and economic transformations, it is that the transformations have had profound social costs. At the structural level, profound changes have occurred during the processes of the political and economic transformations. The transformations have had significant social costs in terms of health (Barr and Field 1996, Chernichovsky and Potapchik 1999, Field 1995, Nekrassov 1996, Ryan 1994, Stroev et al. 1999, Walberg et al. 1998), the environment (Bowers 1993, Clark and Cole 1998, Dranomirescu et al.

1998, Kotz 1993, Stroev et al. 1999, Watkins and Rees 1999), employment (Godfrey 1995, Timar 1995, Vecernik 1992) and crime (Cebulak 1996, Sergeyev 1998, Williams and Rodeheaver 1998, 2000), to name a few. With the high social costs of the economic (and political) transformation, concern has grown that if the social costs are too high for too long, the general public will grow dissatisfied with the transformation. Since in many of these countries the publics now live in a democracy, they have the ability to voice their disapproval by voting leaders into power that promise an end to the economic reforms, thereby stopping economic integration into the world market. Belarus is one example where this appears to have occurred.

Despite the social costs of the political and economic transformation, retreat to pre-transformation conditions is not an option. The pursuit of the democracy and the market economy are important for these countries. Democracy has become the single, legitimized form of governing in the eyes of the international community (Zakaria 1997). Likewise, integration into the world market economy is viewed as the only legitimate economic form. Furthermore, with the end of the Soviet Union, there are no longer economic alternatives for these countries. Therefore, the economic and political transformations, with their inherent social consequences, were and are inevitable.

With the exception of Poland, each country in Central and Eastern Europe experienced political and economic change instigated primarily from the ‘top-down’ where those in power instituted the initial political and economic changes.

In the political arena, the role of the elite is clearly important, but democracy ultimately requires consent of the masses. Popular support is a necessary condition for the lasting transformation toward democracy (Miller et al. 1993). Additionally, the economic transformations require the consent of the masses if they are to be allowed the necessary time to develop and to operate efficiently.

Due to the inherent connections of politics to economics and the belief that economic unrest can lead to political change (Przeworski 1991), public opinion and confidence about the transformation are at the foundations of the full development of a market economy. Furthermore, “it is generally agreed that public opinion and popular sovereignty are the foundations of liberal democracy” (Bennett 1993: 101). The institutional changes, both political and economic, have had an effect on the political, economic and social conditions of the general public. When institutions and social conditions change, corresponding changes occur in underlying group structures, ideological codes and opinion formations. These changes occur in clear and predictable ways (Bennett 1993: 101). One means by which to examine the changes resulting from the political economy transformation is through the use of public opinion research.

Public Opinion Research

Social scientists have been engaged in a heated debate as to whether a stable democracy and a well-functioning market economy, with a commitment to core democratic and market values, requires mass-level support (Slomcznski and Shabad 1997: 69). Understanding public opinions about democracy and the

market economy are important because political and economic transformations are difficult and carry with them enormous social costs. These costs are most clearly seen in the declines of economic performance, standard of living and public health and safety. It is the general publics of the transforming countries that must bear the brunt of these costs. The fear of many that support the marketization and democratization processes in the Central and Eastern European countries is that the problems such as health, safety and economic well-being may become so great that they result in the possibility of a reversal in public support for democracy (Miller, Reisinger and Helsi 1998: 328) and the market economy.

The study of public opinion has a long history in Western social thought. In the classical seventeenth- and eighteenth-century works of David Hume and John Locke, public opinion meant the social pressure to conform (Noelle-Neumann 1979). It was viewed as an inhibitor of full citizens' involvement. In more recent times, public opinion has been linked directly with democracy. In the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there were conflicting meanings of public opinion. It has served as a tool to control the population as well as a means to shape social policy. As the Central and Eastern European countries have moved away from state-centered socialism there has been growing interest in public opinion research from both within the region as well as from the West.

Western interest in public opinion and survey research in Central and Eastern Europe dates back to the 1950s, with the pioneering study by Alex Inkeles (1950), *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*. In this work he argued that the Bolshevik theory in the Soviet Union did not disregard public opinion, rather, the identification of public opinion was used to mold, lead and control the masses. This is clearly more in line with thinkers such as Hume and Locke. During this period in the Soviet Union, information gathering was not approached scientifically and often relied on coercive tactics. The results of research on public opinion being used in this manner in the Soviet Union were to produce the situations of societies characterized by high-coercion and low-information (Apter 1965) where public opinion gathering merely reinforced what the state expected to hear. One of the by-products of such an approach was that the official conception of reality was imposed upon the public and reflected back to the leadership. The most serious consequence of this situation was a lack of adequate information regarding public opinion provided to the leadership (Brzezinski 1956). This led to unrecognized social needs in the public and an emphasis on a one-way flow of information from the center of power to the public at large (Sicinski 1967).

Conner and Gitelman's (1977) edited a volume entitled *Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems*. In this book, public opinion was explored in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Hungary. These chapters presented a descriptive analysis of the conditions of public opinion in the countries but did not

utilize political culture or any other theoretical perspective from which to interpret the data. The theme of the book was to present the idea that there was a history of public opinion data collection and public opinion research but that data collection and research results were limited due to the interference of the socialist governments.

Gitelman (1977) presented a brief overview of the development of public opinion research in the various “communist political systems.” He argued that at different points in time, the Eastern Bloc countries moved in and out of public opinion stages. During the totalitarian stage, public opinion was supportive of the views of those in power and limited to specific designated issues. This was consistent with the above discussion on public opinion as public control. As the restraints on issues and results were lessened, public opinion played a slightly different role, being both supportive and permissive. In this stage public opinion, to a small degree, was considered important in policy-making decisions. Finally, from time to time and on selected issues only, some countries supported reform movements where public opinion played a more decisive role in public policy. Gitelman’s main argument was that public opinion in these countries has served different functions at different points in time. From Gitelman’s work, it is clear that many of the Eastern and Central European countries had varying degrees of use and support for public opinion research, but that the research failed to reach the level of methodological sophistication found in public opinion research in the West.

In 1981, another serious examination of the condition of survey research and public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe was undertaken in the edited volume *Survey Research and Public Attitudes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Welsh 1981). This volume explored the specific conditions of survey research in eight countries (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania). This collection of information presented a general introduction to the breadth of survey research in these countries. General problems identified in all of the countries included a lack of national surveys, reliance on major daily and periodical presses for data and the questionable quality of the data. Again, governmental pressures restricted the development of public opinion research on par with that of the West.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became possible to move beyond anecdotes, limited data and overarching governmental supervision toward research quality data comparable to that found in the West. The burning issue that has received the most attention was to ask people what they were doing and thinking about the transformation processes around them. Since the overt start of the political and economic transformations away from socialism, there has been growing interest in public opinion research throughout Central and Eastern Europe. For example, evidence of this growing interest in this includes the two multinational survey series that have been conducted, in a somewhat yearly fashion, in select Central and Eastern

European countries. Both of these survey series have focused on public opinion regarding the social, political and economic changes underway since the end of the Cold War.

The first post-Cold War multinational survey of Central and Eastern Europe was the Central and Eastern European Barometer (conducted by the Commission of the European Communities). This has been conducted in selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe every year since 1990. The other multinational survey series is the New Democracies Barometer (conducted by the Paul Lazarfeld Society under the direction of Christian Haerpfer and Richard Rose). It has been conducted in selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1991, 1992, 1993/94, 1995 and 1998. These, in addition to a number of national and regional surveys, have provided a new level of sophistication in research on public perceptions of the conditions in Central and Eastern European.

Public Opinion on Democracy and the Market Economy in Central and Eastern Europe

Following Dahl (1971) and others (Dalton 1988; Hahn 1991), it is assumed that democratization and marketization require the growth of certain orientations, beliefs and values conducive to democracy and a market economy. These are assumed to develop from historical and cultural traditions of the country. The imposition of communist rule in the mid-1940s largely ignored the diverse historical and cultural traditions of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

Under the Soviet Union, the goal was to transform these publics into societies of new socialists. In the end the effort failed. The question for many scholars remains “the extent to which Central and East Europeans are likely to embrace democratic values and beliefs after more than 40 years of socialist rule and against the backdrop of quite different historical and cultural experiences” (McIntosh and Mac Iver 1992: 379) from that of the West. Added to this question, is a question about the acceptance of the market economy in light of the values and beliefs of more than 40 years of socialist rule and the historical and cultural experiences. The challenge for scholars is to understand the complexity of the publics support and understanding of the two sides of this dual transformation processes.

It has been argued that economic conditions influence political and social attitudes (Rose and Haerpfer 1994). There is widespread agreement that the deteriorating economic conditions in the Soviet Union prior to the recognized start of the political economy transformation contributed to both elite and mass support for the economic changes in the former socialist countries (Duch 1993). The problem is that the costs of the political and economic transformation toward democracy and the market economy may be too much for the general public to bear. The fear is that the reaction of the public will lead to decreasing support and a reverse wave away from democracy and a market economy.

The transformations in the Central and Eastern countries are as much economic as political. It is difficult enough to establish democratic institutions and

norms, but it is far more difficult to establish the economic institutions and reforms necessary for a functioning market economy. The economic transformations are further complicated because it is the economic changes that have produced the greatest social costs. The market reforms have resulted in serious short-term dislocations and hardships (Klein and Pomer 2001) which the general public has had to endure.

One of the problems of a dual transformation is that changes in the economic and political conditions can be difficult to differentiate. For example, McIntosh and MacIver (1992) found that the public in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia demonstrated support for fundamental democratic values but that the majority defined democracy in primarily economic terms. This supports the argument that democracy and the market economy are linked in the minds of people but also suggests that people are confounding these concepts. By confounding these concepts, the public may hold one (most probably democracy) responsible for problems and hardships created by the other (most probably the market economy).

The effects of economic institutional reform require that the general population bear the heaviest burden of the reforms. Some have argued that public support for institutional reforms may withstand economic chaos for only a certain period of time, after which citizens begin to blame democracy and capitalism for their plight (Przeworski 1991). As the erosion of the popular base of support for democratization is related to poor performance of the regime

(Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990, Schumpeter 1942), it affects the ability of the new regimes to deliver the economic goods. If economic catastrophe threatens support for democratic institutions, it will have similar, if not an exaggerated, effects on support for economic reforms (Duch 1993).

To attempt to understand the public's perceptions of and reactions to the political and economic changes, there has been a great deal of interest in public opinion in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A number of studies have explored attitudes toward democracy with mixed results. For example, Grey et al. (1995) reported that 52.4% of the Russian respondents in their study found democracy to be broadly satisfactory, while in the same survey 46.7% felt that Russia was not yet ready for democracy.

Wyman (1994) reported the findings of a number of surveys conducted in Russia from 1991 through 1994 and found that support for democracy varied with the wording of the question. Despite the effects of wording, a substantial percentage of respondents in each survey chose non-democratic options over democratic options. Since the citizens of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have lived under non-democratic regimes, their selection of those over democratic alternatives is provocative. Following in this line of research on the support of undemocratic alternatives, Rose (1997, 2001) considered the support of undemocratic alternatives using the New Democracies Barometer surveys. Rose (1997) found that, on average, 67% of the citizens of seven countries in

Central and Eastern Europe rejected authoritarian alternatives to democracy. In Russia, only 45% rejected authoritarian alternatives.

The Churchill Hypothesis (Hofferbert and Klingmann 1999; Mishler and Rose 1996; Rose 1995; Rose and Mishler 1996; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998) tests the idea that democracy, although not the best form of government, is preferable to other forms. Central and Eastern Europe offers an opportunity to test this hypothesis because the adult populations have lived under two, and in some cases three, regime types. People are not asked for their support of democracy, rather they are asked to choose among alternative regimes. Their results suggest that while support for democracy may not be high, it is higher than support for any alternative form of governing.

Miller, Reisinger and Hesli (1998) examined election outcomes with the level of support for democratization and a market economy among the masses and elites in the 1992 and 1995 elections in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. They found that the link between support for democratization and attitudes towards market norms was more important than the like between support for democratization and democratic norms in the 1992 and 1995 elections. Indeed, they found the relationship between support for democratic reformers and democratic principles to be very weak while the relationship between support for democratic reformers and support for the market was fairly strong.

Kluegel, Mason and Wegener (1999) focus on economic justice attitudes in Czech Republic, the former East Germany, Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria to

examine the development of a solid market economy. They stressed the importance of both a structural and individual level of analysis. Their findings suggest that the theory of legitimation of the market (as is found in the West) does apply to post-communist countries. Further, that the changes in the market and in social justice are functions of collective and individual level factors.

Duch (1993, 1995) looked for identifiable pockets of citizenry that either supported or opposed democracy and the market economy. He found that the bases of support for democracy and markets are located in the more highly educated members of society (Duch 1993). Additionally, he was unable to identify a pocket of "unsophisticated citizenry" that would "respond to economic catastrophe by embracing antimarket or antidemocratic solutions" (Duch 1995: 122). Duch (1995) found support for a free market related to gender, age, education, and prospective and retrospective economic performance in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Beyond characteristics of the supporters of the democratic transformation, research has been conducted that explores specific factors that may be seen as contributing to general and specific attitudes toward democracy. For example, Kunioka and Woller (1999) explored the effects of social capital and economic performance on preferences for parliamentary or authoritarian governments in Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Ukraine. Using the New Democracy Barometer III, they found that the indicators of social capital (e.g., institutional trust, viewing minorities and/or immigrants as threats,

order versus freedom, patience versus quick results and town size) were statistically more important than were future or current economic perceptions in a preference for parliament over a strong leader.

One of the most frequently cited complaints about the conditions under the Soviets was the lack of respect for individual human rights. Many of the émigré surveys of the Cold War period suggest that this was a serious problem under the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe (Gleitman and Greenbaum 1960, Kracauer and Berkman 1956). Following in this line of argument, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) examined attitudes toward human rights conditions in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s and found them to be related to support for democratic regimes and institutions.

Preferences for democracy and to a lesser degree capitalism are rather widespread in Central and Eastern Europe (Duch 1993, Gibson and Duch 1993). Support for the transformation to a market economy has been examined in a number of ways. Using data collected from a survey of European USSR in 1990, Duch (1993) tested different explanations for attitudes towards free-market reforms. He found that there was a free-market culture developing that resembles social democracy, rather than laissez-faire capitalism. Democratic values and support for free markets are mutually reinforcing, suggesting that support for democracy makes a very important contribution to support for free-market reform (Duch 1993: 590).

Slomczynski and Shabad (1997) conducted a survey of Polish students aged 13 to 14 and a corresponding 'cohort' of their parents and teachers to examine the relative levels of support for democracy and a market economy. They found that support for democracy was greater for the adults. Support for the market economy was greater for the students. Their findings suggest a generalized disconnect between the generations in terms of the expectations about the transformation, but such limited survey data could not be generalized.

Duch (1993) has called attention to the need to examine the supporting sets of beliefs and attitudes about the structural changes implemented in the transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe. To that end, this project examines public opinion about democracy and the market economy in Central and Eastern Europe. The use of public opinion is supported within the context of democracy, as public opinion can be said to shape democracy (Miller et al. 1993). Since politics and economics are assumed to be linked, public opinion should be expected to be shape the market economy.

One of the recurring problems found in many of the studies of public opinion in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has been the selection of countries to be included in the studies. Often the countries are selected based simply on availability. While this problem cannot be avoided completely, there are means by which to better conceptualize the countries included in a project. To date, little work has been done to categorize the countries in a meaningful way that can shed light on patterns and similarities in the countries as they undergo

their transformation process. Although, as Kaldor and Vejvoda (1997) argue, the extent to which each country has transformed itself is highly variable. It could be argued that the task for sociologists is to examine the variability for patterns that may emerge and shed light on the transformation processes.

The categorization of the countries included in a study is a means by which to create a heuristic device to assist in understanding social reality. It is acknowledged that categories do not act. Rather, the categories created serve as an ideal type by which to gage social reality. The development of a heuristic device to search for patterns was a method used by Weber (1968) which both differentiated sociology from history and provided a means by which to explore social reality.

Some attempts have been made to create a framework from which to understand patterns in public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe since the start of the political and economic transformations. For example, to conceptualize the similarities and pattern in public opinion, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were divided into categories of free, partially free and unfree, based on the Freedom House scale of civil and political rights (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose 2001). The findings suggest that the countries in these studies considered to be free (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) were making the greatest strides in the percentage of the population generally positive about the democratic regimes. Rose (2001) reported that 63% of the respondents in the countries that Freedom House categorized as “free” opposed

undemocratic alternatives to democracy, while 43% of the respondents in the countries considered “partly free” or “not free” opposed the undemocratic alternatives to democracy. The problem is that these studies (Rose 2001; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998) contained data on nine countries, only one of which was classified as ‘not free’. Additionally, the means by which they chose to categorize the countries was based on an externally defined division (i.e., Freedom House). Although Rose el al. (1998) and Rose (2001) did use a categorization in their attempts to discern patterns in public opinion in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, their selection of this as a framework has a number of limitations.

Conclusion

Overall, the literature suggests that there is a relationship between politics and economics, and specifically that there is a relationship between democracy and market economy. The support for the presence of a relationship between the two conditions is found in the institutional research and public opinion research. Further, there is support for the conclusion that there is a relationship between institutional change and public opinion.

It has been argued that public opinion should be studied with regard to the political and economic changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In considering public opinion about the transformation processes, much of the work to date is descriptive in nature, reporting the varying levels of support for either democracy of the market economy. Some work has been done that goes

beyond description toward a more complete understanding of the complexity public opinion within the context of the political economy transformation processes. The findings of these studies suggest that economic and political opinions are related and influence each other. Further work is needed to extract a more meaningful understanding of the specific factors that influence public opinion on democracy and the market economy.

A second weakness in the research on public opinion on democracy and the market economy in Central and Eastern Europe is the lack of theoretical or conceptual framework of many studies. The question becomes, how does one study public opinion and gain insight into these processes with so many countries with such diverse national experiences and resources? The answer lies in creating a conceptual framework from which to explore potential patterns in public opinion.

In Chapter 3, the competing theories of European Union integration will be presented. This is followed by a general discussion of the theoretical framework of this dissertation. Based on the literature in this area, a conceptual framework is proposed that would allow for the examination of public opinion on political, economic and foreign relations conditions within the a contextual framework of the international reorientation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe seeking membership in the European Union.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION ON POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

The theoretical framework of this dissertation is based on premise that public opinion is important to and influence by the international reorientations of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe undergoing political and economic transformations in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union. This is based on two important assumptions. First and foremost, the political and economic transformations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are nascent international reorientations. While the transformations are occurring within the national contexts of the individual states, it is within the greater context of the international arena that the political economy transformations can be contextualized and understood. Second, and equally important, the development of a solid and viable political culture contributes to the consolidation of the political and economic transformations. It is through this that the foundations of the political and economic transformations can be solidified and institutionalized. In this section, I will explore the assumptions I have made about the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, I will present the theoretical framework to understand public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe regarding the political and economic transformations.

International (Re)orientations

The Cold War and Post-Cold War periods have been characterized by series of international integrations into various supranational bodies. Pentland (1973: 21) defines international political integration as "*a process whereby a group of people, organized initially in two or more independent nation-states, come to constitute a political whole which can in some sense be described as a community*" (italics in the original). Some of these organizations have been linked directly to Cold War security such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact. Other supranational organizations have regional orientations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Organization of American States (OAS). Organizations such as these often have important economic roles to play in their specific region of the world. This chapter will focus on the European Union and potential enlargement of the European Union to include some of the Central and Eastern European countries that were former members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

The European Union represents a supranational organization of nation-states. The European Union started as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1958, and was composed of six nations: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The first enlargement occurred in 1973, as Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom were integrated into the European Community. Greece joined in 1981. Portugal

and Spain were integrated into the European Community in 1986. In 1995, the European Union enlarged to include Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Central and Eastern European Integration into the European Union

Although aware of the reform efforts underway in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, the end of communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union from 1989-1991, came as a surprise to many political leaders and experts in the West (Van Oudenaren 2000). On it face, the political and economic changes represent a simple end to the Cold War. At a deeper level, the changes that started as a result of the end of the Soviet Union, represent a profound reorientation of these countries in the international arena.

At the same time that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were undergoing disintegration and political and economic re-orientations, much of the rest of Europe was undergoing a profound change. It was at this time that the European Economic Community was transformed into the European Community. The European Union came into being on November 1, 1993, when the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) came into force.

During this period of political and economic change, for both the former Soviet countries and the countries of the European Community, the European Community was cautious in their relations toward the countries that had belonged to the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The European Community limited the aid it provided to the former Socialist countries to practical technical and financial assistance to support the reform efforts.

Additionally, tentative steps were made toward normalizing trade relations between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the rest of Europe (Gower 1999: 3).

At the start, the European Union was extremely reluctant to make any specific commitments to the principle of enlargement, let alone to set a date for the formal accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union. This changed by 1993, when the Copenhagen European Council established the pre-accession strategies and accession criteria. It is no longer a question of *if* the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will be allowed to enter the European Union. It is now a matter of *when* the countries will be integrated into the European Union (European Union 2001: 10).

Accession into the European Union required that the candidate countries meet political and economic goals as well as demonstrate the ability to meet the obligations of membership (European Union 2001: 10). The political requirements included the achievement of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect and protection of minorities. The existence of a functioning market economy, stable enough to cope with the market forces and competitive pressures from within the European Union were some of the key economic requirements (Archer 2000, 196-198).

The pre-accession plans were not as simple as may appear. First, since no plan was in place when the political and economic transformations of Central and Eastern Europe became apparent to the rest of the world, the strategies

were developed as their absence became apparent. Second, the social and economic disparities between the current European Union member states and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are greater than those found during any enlargement of the European Union (Brusis 2000). Finally, the European Union presents a moving target of political and economic development to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that must not only catch up, but must also be in a position to effectively compete (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999).

Despite the difficulties of achieving an invitation for membership into the European Union, a number of former Soviet countries have expressed an interested in working towards membership. In 1994, starting with Hungary, then Poland, the first Europe Agreements were ratified. By 1996, a total of ten former members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance started to work formally towards the goal of integration into the European Union. At the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, the European Council agreed to start on the process of accession negotiations and to reinforce the pre-accession strategy for membership.

In March of 1998, at the First Europe Council, the accession process was launched formally with the adoption of accession partnerships and the opening of accession negotiations with the countries of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. These five countries were identified as the ‘frontrunners’ in the race toward integration into the European Union and could expect, with adequate progress, to become member states in the next

enlargement of the European Union. In December 2000, formal accession negotiations were started with the remaining five countries that had ratified the Europe Agreements, including Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and the Slovak Republic.

The process of integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union is important for a number of reasons. First and foremost, since the beginning of the fundamental political and economic changes in the late 1980s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have considered integration to be one of the main tools of achieving political and economic transformation (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 816). Differences in the successes of the transformations have emerged between the countries that are seeking membership in the European Union and the countries that are not seeking membership. Despite the progress made by many of the countries to meet the requirements for membership as identified by the European Council, none of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been invited to join the European Union as full members.

As the political and economic transformation occurred in Central and Eastern Europe, at the national level each country experienced the transformation in a distinct manner. As Stark (1992) has argued, there is no single model of the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the apparent distinction of each country's transformation, there is an overarching commonality between each of the countries. Each country experienced a shift

away from a single and unified political economy of state-centered socialism toward varying degrees of participation economically in a market economy and politically in some nominal form of democracy. This requires a reorientation of the

Political Culture

A great deal of work has been done under the rubric of political culture theory (Reisinger 1995). At the core, Almond (1990: 143-144) summarized the basic, accepted ideas of political culture. Political culture consists of the set of subjective orientations to politics in a national or sub-national population. Political culture has a number of components including cognitive, affective and evaluative. These components produce knowledge and beliefs about political reality that include feelings with respect and commitment to politics and political values. The content of political culture is the result of childhood and adult socialization, education, media exposure, and experiences with government. Political culture can constrain but does not determine political and governmental structure and performance. There is an interaction between culture and structure.

In recent years there has been a rekindled interest in political culture directly related to the political economy transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. A series of studies has examined mass values and attitudes of these transforming countries in order to advance hypothesis of 'political culture' influence on the prospect of democratic consolidation (Reisinger 1995: 347).

Political culture is "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It

provides the subjective orientation to politics" (Pye and Verba 1965: 513). By extension, economic culture is the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which economic action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to economics. Together political culture and economic culture come to form a foundation of a subjective orientation to the culture of political economy. It presents the set of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which political and economic interaction takes place.

At the foundation of understanding the political and economic culture of a society are the fundamental conceptualizations of key ideas on the political and economic features of that society. The conceptualizations of democracy and market economy can be understood as the building-blocks of the values, beliefs, attitudes and opinions that form political and economic culture in its entirety in a given society. While it may seem trivial to separate political and economic culture from each other, in fact politics and economics, although intertwined are not equivalents. Indeed, one of the reasons to examine the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe is to explore the effects and consequences of the interaction of the dual political and economic transformation.

It is clear that Almond (1990) views political culture of the masses as exercising influence on the structure and performance and of governments. Indeed, public opinion and the political culture that it represents may be an important precondition to democratic transition. Indeed, it may become a

dynamic force in the transition or may become a serious hindrance that may prevent or complicate the transition (Melville 1993: 56). Likewise, there is a need for an economic culture that may provide an important foundation for economic transformations. Therefore, political culture and economic culture represent "broader tectonic shifts" (Melville 1993: 56) in the political and economic reorientation of a country. The more secure the masses are in the development and redefining of the political culture toward democracy and a market economy, the more likely that political culture will serve as a dynamic force for change rather than a hindrance to it.

At the foundation of the political culture framework is argument that the political culture of a society will shape that society. This is not to diminish or neglect the presence of other factors that also contribute to the shaping of a society. Political culture theorists have argued for a greater understanding of the interaction of societal structures and institutions with political culture (Lane 1992). One means by which to do this it to examine political culture in the context of the international reorientation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the Soviet Union. There is a link between public opinion and political culture. Public opinion is an appropriate vehicle by which to examine political culture. It "is a primary indicator of the state of a particular society's political culture and the features, trends and dynamics that characterize it" (Melville 1993: 60).

Theoretical Framework

The transformation process underway in Central and Eastern Europe is not only a political change, but carries with it a concurrent economic transformation. The challenge then is to examine political culture as it transforms concurrently with the economic transformations during the institutional change of the political economy. Adding to the complexity of the transformation process is the international reorientation these countries away from the defunct Soviet Union. Some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are moving toward membership in the European Union, while others, undergoing this same transformation processes, are not seeking to join the European Union.

This difference between the countries that are moving toward integration into the European Union and those that are not is a pivotal distinction between countries. Nationally, the countries may be attempting to achieve the same goal in political and economic transformation, but their international orientations and intentions are of great apparent importance to their national transformation processes. This international orientation toward the European Union and the degree of formal invitation by the European Union to these countries is the single-most important criteria for distinguishing between these two groups of countries. Therefore, this difference becomes the cornerstone for examining patterns in public opinion in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The fundamental framework for the examination of the public opinion on the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe is to

look for patterns in public opinion that are related to the international reorientation of these countries. In order to do this, there needs to be a means by which to conceptualize the divisions between the countries and therefore create categories to work with that would provide insight into the occurrence of patterns in public opinion. The categorization needs to be neutral and not affect the probability that data will be collected for that country. Additionally, the categorization needs to be historically relevant to the situations of these countries. Finally, the categorization should be relatively self-imposed by the countries to avoid an externally imposed bias. This is important because a self-imposed categorization reflects the country's own perception of their conditions within the transformation processes.

A number of classificatory devices could meet the criteria identified above and would allow for the searching of patterns in public opinion in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. One option is to consider the foreign relations changes that the countries are attempting within the international community. Therefore, public opinion would be examined within the context of the changing international alliances of the countries. The very fact that the Soviet Union no longer exists forces this change on each of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Each country has had to make significant changes in this area. One option within this context is to examine public opinion in the countries based on the country's desire for integration into the European Union. Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation, the framework for understanding public opinion in

the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is based on their interest and status of seeking membership in the European Union.

A classificatory system that would meet the stated requirements is that of the status of the country seeking membership in the European Union. All the countries in Central and Eastern Europe what wish to join the European Union may apply for membership based on their geographical location in Europe. The problem is it is not as simple as geography. There are a number of political and economic requirements that must be met by these countries (Preston 1997). These changes require massive structural adjustments. The structural adjustments that are necessary for the developing and maintaining the political and economic transformations can be costly (Nelson 1997). Therefore, because the transformations of political economy are complicated and costly, only some of the countries will be successful enough in their transformations to be invited into the European Union. At the same time, comparisons can be made between the countries seeking and not seeking membership in the European Union. Further, since not all attempts at political and economic transformations will be equally successful, even the countries that are formally seeking membership in the European Union will be invited to join at different times. Therefore, comparing the countries based on the status of seeking membership in the European Union will be useful in discerning patterns of public opinion.

The public opinion factors that will be examined relate to elements that can expect to be part of a transforming political and economic culture in the

countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Specifically, public opinion on political, economic and foreign relations will be examined in light of the status of seeking membership in the European Union. The two political public opinion conditions are satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of human rights conditions. There are three economic opinions, support for the transformation to a market economy, retrospective microeconomic opinions and prospective microeconomic opinions. The foreign relations opinion specifically focuses on opinions about the orientation of their country to the European Union. Specific hypotheses are presented and discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

DATA AND METHODS

In this chapter, I will provide a discussion of the datasets and general discussion of the selection of variables. A brief discussion of the methods to be used is included. Additionally, the operationalization of variables is presented in this chapter. Specific hypotheses will be discussed in each of the three substantive chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).

Data

The data used in this dissertation are from the Central and Eastern European Barometers 3-7, published annually from 1992 through 1996 (Cunningham 1996; Reif and Cunningham 1992, 1993, 1994; Reif et al. 1995). The data were collected on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities, Directorate General X, Audiovisual, Information, Communication, Culture, “Surveys, Research Analysis, (Eurobarometer)” Unit. The data were made available through the Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

Sample and Data Collection

The Central and Eastern European Barometers were conducted via face-to-face interviews in the respondent’s home. All respondents were citizens of the

country and 15 years of age or older. To select the respondents, probability sampling procedures were followed to sample the entire population within the national borders. The standard procedure for the selection of the respondents started with the selection of sampling points (for example, from a geographical division of the country into its major socio-economic areas). Within these initial sampling points, smaller electoral or administrative districts were selected. Approximately ten interviews were conducted within each sampling point.

The individual respondents were selected via one of four methods. The first method used to select the respondents was a double clustered random address sample. The person 15 years of age or older having the next birthday in the household was selected. For the second method, selection was based on random selection from a list of the electorate (usually no more than three years old). Third, respondents were randomly selected by address from a published or commissioned list, with the specific individuals selected by a random method. Finally, respondents were selected by starting with a random route from a selected starting point. In these cases, the individual respondents were identified through a random method. Quotas were imposed to ensure that people below the age of enfranchisement were represented.

The Central and Eastern European Barometers were conducted in the Fall of each year over approximately a 2 to 3 week period in each country. The specific countries varied from year to year and slight modifications in data collection were necessary in some countries. Specific information on the

collection of data for each Central and Eastern European Barometer is provided on Appendix A.

For the purpose of this paper, analysis is limited to those countries for which data are available for the five-year period, 1992 through 1996. The sixteen countries are Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The number of respondents in each country for each year is found on Table 1.

Selected Variables

Six variables were selected from the Central and Eastern European Barometers 3-6. Political, economic and foreign relations variables were selected to be analyzed in this dissertation. In this section, I will discuss each variable in general. In the substantive chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), each variable used will be discussed in relation to the specific research questions and hypotheses addressed in that chapter.

One of the variables included in this dissertation is that of public opinion on democracy. Specifically, satisfaction with democracy is used. This variable was selected for two reasons. First, democratic institutions were initiated in all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe prior to the first year included in this study. Although reforms were still underway, for the most part, at least a loosely formed democratic form of governing had been established in all of these countries. Second, satisfaction with democracy was more consistently worded

and available in each of the years included in this study. Alternative questions about public opinion on democracy changed wording and placement relative to other question, whereas this question did not.

To measure satisfaction with democracy, respondents are asked the following question: “On the whole are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing?” The response categories are “satisfied,” “fairly satisfied,” “not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied.”

A second political public opinion variable is included in this study. The variable considers perceived human rights conditions within the countries. A human rights variable is included for two reasons. First, it is included because of the use of a human rights framework by Rose et al. (1998) and Rose (2001) to examine public opinion on democracy. In these studies, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were divided into categories of free, partially free and unfree, based on the Freedom House scale of civil and political rights (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose 2001). They found that the populations in the countries rated as ‘free’ were generally positive about the democratic regimes. This suggests that human rights may be important an important factor to consider the formation of public opinion on the political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe.

Additionally, perceived human rights conditions are included because it is expected that this may be one of the areas in which people are able to see more

immediate changes in the post-Soviet regimes. As Rose (1997) suggests, the totalitarian practices and institutions such as censorship and shoot-to-kill border guards can be done away with rather quickly. Therefore, it would be expected that human rights conditions, particularly civil and political rights, would be some of the first noticeable changes within the political transformations. The variable measuring perceived human rights condition is based on the question, “To what degree do you believe that there is respect for individual human rights in (our country)?” The response categories are “a lot of respect for individual human rights,” “some respect,” “not much respect” and “no respect at all.”

Three economic variables are included in this dissertation. The first is that of support for the market economy. In all of the countries included in this study, initial economic reform measures have been implemented. While some countries have been marginally successful in the economic transformation, for the most part only limited reforms, most with very high social costs, had been implemented in the first year included in this study. Further, the ideology and institution building necessary for the establishment of a market economy are a greater sea change than changes implemented in the political arena for the citizens of the former socialist countries.

Since the economic transformations are still very much in their infancy in these countries in the first years included in the study, support for market reforms is included as the measure of public opinion on the economy. To measure support for the market economy, respondents are asked to report their opinion on

the market economy in their country. This variable, market economy support, is measured on the question, “Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that is one that is largely free from state control is right or wrong for (our country)?” The response categories are “right” and “wrong.”

The second two economic variables are prospective and retrospective microeconomic measures. The two variables are included because these consider the effects of the macroeconomic changes on the perceived microeconomic conditions of the people in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Household microeconomic perceptions are selected over individual microeconomic perceptions because of the socio-economic living arrangements of the people in these countries. Simply stated, people are most likely to live in households with two or more adults engaged in some employment or pension-drawing activities. Prospective microeconomic expectations is measured with the question, “Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will . . .?” The response categories are “get a lot better,” “get a little better,” “stay the same,” “get a little worse” and “get a lot worse.” Additionally, the respondents were asked about their retrospective opinions on their household economic conditions over the past year. For this variable, the question asks, “Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation of your household has . . . got a lot better, got a little better, stayed the same, got a little worse, got a lot worse?”

Finally, public opinion on the future relationship of the respondent's country to the European Union is selected because of the framework to be used to categorize the countries based on the countries' status of seeking membership in the European Union. The opinions about their country's future being joined closely to the European Union is measured with the question, "As things now stand, with which of the following do you see (our country's) future most closely tied up?" The response categories are "The United States of America," The European Union," "Other European countries like Norway and Switzerland, which remain outside of the European Union," "Other Central and Eastern European countries," "Russia or other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States," "Turkey" and "Japan / South Korea."

The six variables are used in the next three chapters and form the foundation of an overarching model of public opinion on democracy and the market economy. A frequency distribution of all of the variables is found in Appendix B. The frequency distributions are broken-down by country and year.

Methods

A number of methods are used in the substantive chapters in this dissertation. For each of these three chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), the method or methods are selected based on the research question being addressed and the hypotheses being tested. Specifically, univariate analyses, non-parametric tests, measures of association and regression techniques are used in this dissertation.

Univariate Analyses

In chapter 4, frequency distributions were reported on two variables, satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy for the five years of this study. These were examined to look for patterns in public opinion on democracy and the market economy in the sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe. To look for patterns, the frequency distributions of public opinion in the sixteen countries were compared based on their status of seeking membership in the European Union.

Non-Parametric Tests

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric test appropriate for use with ordinal data. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests whether two independent samples represent two distinct populations. In Chapter 4, this test is used to compare public opinion on democracy and the market economy in the countries seeking membership in the European Union and the countries not seeking membership in the European Union.

Measures of Association

Measures of association are used to examine the strength and direction of the relationship between two variables. Correlation matrices were created in Chapters 5 and 6 to examine the association between the five predictor variables used in each of those chapters. This is done to examine the strength and direction of the relationship between the predictor variables in each model prior to using a multivariate technique.

Regression Techniques

Multinominal logistic regression and ordinal regression were attempted since the variables were collected at an ordinal level of measurement originally. In running the diagnostics for the analysis, a number of cells between the predictor and predicted variables were very small. This presented a problem for the multinominal and ordinal regression analysis because it resulted in inflated and logically unacceptable regression coefficients. To correct for the problem, the variable response categories are collapsed so that each cell will be large enough to allow for analysis.

The steps taken to correct for the small cell size are as follows. First, the two household economic variables had their categories collapsed. Specifically, the response categories for the variable of future household economic expectations are collapsed into two categories of improved and not improved. The responses of “getting a lot better” or “getting a little better” are considered to indicate improved expectations. The remaining response categories are considered to not be expecting improved household economic conditions over the next 12 months. Likewise, the response categories for household economic experiences over the past 12 months are collapsed into a dichotomous variable indicating either improvement or no improvement in household economic conditions over the past 12 months. Improved conditions were those where the respondents reported that their household economic conditions got better, either a lot or a little. The responses that indicated that the household economic

conditions had stayed the same or worsened composed the category of no improvement in household economic conditions over the past 12 months.

The variable on the perceived future of the respondent's country with the European Union was collapsed into a dichotomous variable. Specifically, the responses were divided into two categories. The first category is composed of the response that the future of the respondent's country is with the European Union. All other responses were collapsed into the residual category of 'other.'

The perceived human rights condition variable presented a problem as there were very few responses in the "no respect at all" category. Therefore, this variable is collapsed into two categories. The first category is labeled "respect for human rights" and is composed of the original responses of "a lot of respect" and "some respect." The second category, "no respect for human rights," is composed of the original response categories of "not much respect" and "no respect at all."

Finally, to fully resolve the problem of small cells, the variable measuring satisfaction with democracy was recoded. Specifically, the original responses were re-categorized as "satisfied" and "not satisfied." The satisfied category includes all responses of either "satisfied" or "fairly satisfied." The responses of "not very satisfied" and "not at all satisfied" are placed into the "not satisfied" category.

With the variables in dichotomous form, multinominal logistic regression and ordinal regression are inappropriate. Logistic regression is selected as an

appropriate procedure due to the dichotomous nature of the variables. This technique is used in Chapters 5 and 6 to test the model of predictor and predicted variables. Logistic regressions are run for each of the sixteen countries for the year 1996 to see which variables are important to public opinion on democracy (Chapter 5) and the market economy (Chapter 6). The individual country models are examined for patterns in statistical significance of the component variables in the models in the countries based on the status of the country seeking membership in the European Union. Additionally, the individual country models are compared with regard to goodness-of-fit and the explanatory power of the model for each category of countries.

In addition to the logistic regressions of each of the individual countries, logistic regressions are run on the countries pooled into the categories based on the status of their seeking membership in the European Union. The logistic regressions of the pooled countries are compared based on the strength of the individual components of the model, as well as the general explanatory power of the models.

CHAPTER 5

THE EXTENT OF PUBLIC SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND SUPPORT FOR THE MARKET ECONOMY IN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

In any democracy or market economy, public opinion matters. It matters in a democracy, for it is a means by which the representatives of the public come to understand the general needs, beliefs and opinions of those they represent. Likewise, public opinion in a market economy is important. Support and confidence in the market contributes to economic stability and growth.

Public opinion on democracy and the market economy are explored in this chapter. The purpose is to identify the extent of public opinion on democracy and the market economy in sixteen former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Using the Central and Eastern European Barometers for the years 1992 to 1996, this chapter provides a baseline of information on political and economic attitudes. As a framework to understand public opinion in these countries, comparisons are made between countries seeking membership in the European Union and the countries not seeking membership in the European Union. Public opinion in these sixteen countries is compared based on the status of the relationship of the country to the European Union. This will provide an understanding of the development of similarities and differences in public opinion

on two of the most apparent elements of the political and economic transformations of these countries.

The sixteen countries in this chapter are divided into two groups (see Table 2). The first group consists of the ten countries seeking membership in the European Union. These countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. These countries are considered to have made the most significant progress toward adopting democratic and market institutions. The second group of countries is composed of the countries not seeking formal integration into the European Union. For some of these countries, membership may be a future goal, while for others it is a highly unlikely goal. There are six countries included in this category, Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Macedonia, Russia and Ukraine.

Literature Review

The Cold War division of Europe ended in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. This and the events to follow took Western Europe and the rest of the world by surprise. At that time the general expectations were for rapid and successful transformations away from the political economies of the former socialist countries. Visions emerged of a unified Europe. It was expected that the countries would be able to navigate away from an authoritarian polity and command economy directly to democracy and a market economy. Despite the optimism and rhetoric, the economic, political and policy voids quickly became apparent.

The countries of Western Europe were unprepared for the challenges of transforming the political and economic landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, Europe as a whole was undergoing changes at this time. In Western Europe, the European Economic Community was coming together to form the European Union. During this period of political and economic change, the European Community was cautious in their relations towards the countries that had belonged to the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The European Community limited its offerings to practical technical and financial assistance to support the reforms as well as some progress towards normalizing trade relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Gower 1999: 3).

As time passed, the difficulties of the transformation processes for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have become much more apparent. At the same time, the European Union has gradually developed a broad policy strategy that made it possible, by the end of 1997, to identify states to be considered for future accession into the European Union. For ten former socialist countries, membership in the European Union has become the target, albeit a moving one (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 802) for successful political and economic development.

If anything has become apparent in this transformation process, it is the variety of economic and political paths upon which the former socialist countries have embarked. The political and economic transformations have occurred in

Central and Eastern Europe at the national level, with each country experiencing the transformation in a distinctive manner. As Stark (1992) has argued, there is no single model for the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the apparent uniqueness of each country's transformation, there is an overarching commonality between many of the countries. Each country shifted away from a single and unified political economy grounded in state-centered socialism toward varying degrees of participation in a market economy and a nominal form of democracy.

In all countries that have made the transition to democracy and a market economy, at least a portion of the elite supported these reforms. The further consolidation of the democracy and a market economy requires a degree of support by the citizens of the state (Fleron and Ahl 1998). The transformations to democracy and a market economy have started. A great deal of research has examined the political and economic transformation at the state level (Handcock and Logue 2000, Kaldor and Vejvoda 1999, Klein and Pomer 2001, Przeworski 1991). An issue that needs to be examined is the degree of public opinion on democracy and the market economy that has developed in the citizens of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

There has been a great deal of interest in public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe. A number of studies have explored attitudes toward democracy. For example, Grey et al. (1995) reported that 52.4% of the Russian respondents in their study found democracy to be broadly satisfactory, while in the same

survey 46.7% felt that Russia was not yet ready for democracy. Wyman (1997) reported the findings of a number of surveys conducted in Russia from 1991 through 1994. He found that support for democracy varied with the wording of the question. Despite the effects of wording, a substantial percentage of respondents in each survey chose non-democratic options.

The realist argument of the Churchill Hypothesis (Rose et al. 1998) states that democracy may be the worst form of governing but is preferable to all the rest. Studies suggest that the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe support democratic regimes as the lesser of other regime evils (Hofferbert and Klingmann 1999; Mishler and Rose 1996; Rose 1995, 1997; Rose and Mishler 1996; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998).

Rose (1997, 2001) considered the extent of support for undemocratic alternatives using the New Democracies Barometer surveys. He found that on average 67% of the citizens of seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe rejected authoritarian alternatives to democracy (Rose 1997). By contrast, in Russia, only 45% rejected the authoritarian alternatives. Rose (2001) reported that 63% of the respondents in the countries that Freedom House categorized as “free” opposed undemocratic alternatives to democracy. While only 43% the respondents in the countries considered to be “partly free” or “not free” by Freedom House were opposed to undemocratic alternatives to democracy.

Miller, Reisinger and Hesli (1998) examined election outcomes with the level of support for democratization and a market economy among the masses

and elites in the 1992 and 1995 elections in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. They found that attitudes toward market norms (e.g., individual responsibility, approval of private enterprise, opposition to regulated incomes, approval of business influence and pursuit of economic reform) were more important than attitudes toward democratic norms (e.g., approval of popular participation, organized opposition party competition and minority rights) in the 1992 and 1995 elections. Indeed, they found the link between support for democratic reformers and democratic principles to be very weak while the relationship between support for democratic reformers and support for the market to be fairly strong.

Duch (1993, 1995) looked for identifiable pockets of citizenry in Central and Eastern Europe that either supported or rejected democracy and the market economy. Bases of support for democracy and the market were found in the more highly educated members of society (Duch 1993). He was unable to identify a pocket of "unsophisticated citizenry that will respond to economic catastrophe by embracing antimarket or antidemocratic solutions" (Duch 1995: 122). Therefore, it can be concluded that while there is a base of support for democratic and market transformations, there does not appear to be a base of support for a transformation to some alternative political and economic condition.

Kunioka and Woller (1999) explored the effects of social capital and economic performance on preferences for parliamentary or authoritarian governments in Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Ukraine. Using the New Democracy Barometer III, they found that

indicators of social capital (e.g., institutional trust, viewing minorities and/or immigrants as threats, order versus freedom, patience versus quick results and town size) were statistically more important than were future or current economic perceptions in terms of the impact on preference for parliament over a single strong leader. A problem is that they failed to measure any form of satisfaction or support for democracy that may influence support for a parliament.

One of the most frequently cited complaints about conditions within the Soviet Union was the lack of respect for individual human rights. Many of the émigré surveys conducting during the Cold War period suggest that this was viewed as a serious problem under the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe (Gleitman and Greenbaum 1960, Kracauer and Berkman 1956). Following in this line of argument, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) examined attitudes toward human rights conditions in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s and found them to be related to support for democratic regimes and institutions. According to a 1990 survey of the European portion of the USSR, perceptions of the government were significantly related to conventional and unconventional (actual and hypothetical) political participation (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998).

Preferences for democracy and to a lesser degree capitalism are rather widespread in the region (Duch 1993, Gibson and Duch 1993). The greater variation in the degree of support for capitalism and the market economy suggest that this is an important element of the transformation processes to consider.

Support for the transformation to a market economy has been examined in a number of ways. Duch (1993) explicitly examined the development of an economic culture in Central and Eastern Europe. He developed the concept of a 'free market culture' in which "preferences for free-market reform reflect an acceptance on the part of individuals of certain basic premises of free-market mechanisms" (Duch 1993: 590). Using data collected from a survey of European USSR in 1990, he (Duch 1993: 590) tested different explanations for attitudes towards free-market reforms. He found that there is a

> . . . nascent free-market culture in the Soviet Union that makes a modest contribution to support for free-market reforms. The free-market culture that is developing in the former Soviet Union resembles that of social democracy, rather than laissez-faire capitalism. Democratic values and support for free markets are mutually reinforcing, suggesting that support for democracy makes a very important contribution to support for free-market reform.

Duch (1995) found that in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, support for a free market related to gender, age, education, and prospective and retrospective economic performance. In Russia, of the respondents that felt the state should exercise a high level of support for production and the provision of social good, 34.1% supported the transition to a market economy (Grey et al. 1995).

In general, the research on Central and Eastern European public opinion on democracy and the market economy suggests that there is support, albeit small at times, for both democracy and a market economy. The publics in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe do not express a desire to return to the past forms of political economy. The support for both the economic and political transformations appeared to be generally concentrated within certain segments of society. Yet opposition to the various aspects of the political and economic transformation appears to have no concentrated base of public support.

Despite the general conclusions that can be made regarding public support for the political and economic transformations, the research discussed above has some general shortcomings that need to be addressed. In most cases, with possible exception of Rose et al. (1998), only a few countries were studied at a time. The countries selected at often based on convenience and without real-world justifications. Since each country is addressing the needs of the transformation process differently, using these studies to generalize about all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is questionable. Yet understanding trends and generalizing patterns are important if models of political economy transformation are to be developed.

One option is to categorize the countries based on some criteria and then examine the public opinion on democracy within that context. Rose et al. (1998) categorized the countries of Central and Eastern Europe based on Freedom House rankings. Unfortunately, their analysis is limited to countries that are free

or partially free, leaving the unfree countries undiscussed. There needs to be a similar analysis of public opinion on the market economy which is framed within some context in which all of the categories of the framework are included.

To address these two problems, this chapter includes sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The countries are divided into two categories, based on a real-world situation, the relation of that country to the European Union. Public opinions in the countries are tested to see if this categorization identifies two separate populations. Therefore, this chapter will address the problems of too few countries included in the studies as well as the problem of a lack of logical categorization of these countries.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

In response to the discussion above, two research questions are addressed in this chapter. This is done to examine the extent of public opinion on democracy and the market economy and to see if public opinions differ in the countries that are seeking accession into the European Union from public opinion in the countries that are not seeking accession into the European Union. It is expected that the political milieu of working to enter the European Union should have an effect on mass public opinion that differs from the political milieu of the countries not seeking membership in the European Union.

The first research question asks, what is the public's opinion about democracy and the market economy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe? The other research questions addressed in this chapter consider the

differences in public opinion between the countries seeking European Union membership and the countries not seeking European Union membership and whether this changes over time. The questions are: 1) is there a difference in public opinion about democracy or about the market economy in the countries working to join the European Union compared to the countries not working to join the European Union? 2) Do these differences increase over time? Four hypotheses are derived from these research questions.

H1: *Satisfaction with democracy will be greater in the countries seeking membership in the European Union than in countries not seeking European Union membership.*

H2: *Support for a market economy will be greater in the countries seeking membership in the European Union than in countries not seeking European Union membership.*

H3: *Overtime, there are increasing differences in public opinion about democracy between the countries seeking membership in the European Union and the countries not seeking membership in the European Union.*

H4: *Overtime, there are increasing differences in public opinion about the market economy between the countries seeking membership in the European Union and the countries not seeking membership in the European Union.*

Data and Methods

The data for this chapter are from the Central and Eastern European Barometers 3-7, published annually from 1992 through 1996 (Cunningham 1996; Reif and Cunningham 1992, 1993, 1994; Reif et al. 1995; available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research). The Central and Eastern European Barometers are conducted as face-to-face interviews with respondents in their homes. The respondents are selected via standard sampling

procedures to derive a random probability sample of the entire population within the national borders. The standard procedure starts with the selection of sampling points and from within these sampling points, smaller electoral or administrative districts are selected. In most cases, ten interviews are conducted around each sampling point. The individual respondents are selected using one of four methods to insure a representative sample.

The specific countries included in the Central and Eastern European Barometer varied from year to year. For the purpose of this paper, analysis is limited to those countries for which data are available for the five-year period, 1992 through 1996. The sixteen countries are Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The countries are divided into two categories, those seeking European Union membership and those not seeking European Union membership. Table 2 is a listing of the countries divided based on the status of their seeking membership in the European Union.

Selected Variables

Two variables are used in this chapter, one for public opinion on democracy and one for public opinion on the market economy. These variables are each based on a single question from the Central and Eastern European Barometers 3-7. Although the questions may not be ideal, they are very useful in that they are asked in each country and in each year of this study. The variable

on public opinion about democracy focuses on the degree of satisfaction with democracy. The economic variable explores support for the transformation to a market economy.

Satisfaction with democracy is measured with the question, “On the whole are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing?” The responses categories are coded as “satisfied”, “fairly satisfied”, “not very satisfied”, and “not at all satisfied”. The frequency distributions of the respondents reporting to be satisfied with democracy include the original response categories of “satisfied” and “fairly satisfied”.

Support for participation in a market economy is measured using the question, “Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that is one that is largely free from state control is right or wrong for (our country)?” The response categories are “right” and “wrong.”

Methods

The analysis for this paper starts with general frequency distributions on satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy for each country for each year of the study. Table 3 is a frequency distribution of the combined percentages of respondents reporting to either be “satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with democracy. Table 4 covers the percentage of respondents in the sixteen countries for each year who reported supporting movement toward the market economy.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for two independent samples is employed to test the difference in opinions reported in the surveys between the respondents in the ten countries seeking membership in the European Union and respondents in the six countries that are not seeking membership. The procedure tests two independent samples to see if they represent two different populations. The test is based on the principle that if "there is a significant difference at any point along the two cumulative frequency distributions, the researcher can conclude there is a high likelihood the samples are derived from different populations" (Sheskin 2000: 319). In order to run this test at the national level, each of the above mentioned frequency tables were used to create the dataset for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.

Results

In this section, public opinions in the countries are presented in two ways. First, the individual countries are compared. To do this, the frequency distributions for satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy are discussed on each country for each of the five years in the study. The countries are then grouped based on their status of seeking membership in the European Union. For this, the countries are compared over the five years.

Satisfaction with Democracy Compared by Individual Countries

To examine satisfaction with democracy generally, the response percentages for the respondents reporting to be either satisfied or fairly satisfied

were combined. The percentages are shown in Table 3. Appendix B contains the complete frequency distributions of all of the response categories.

In 1992, in the Czech Republic the percentage of respondents either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy was 39.6%. In 1993, the percentage rose to 49.7%. In 1994, 45.1% of the respondents were satisfied with democracy. In 1995, satisfaction was at 48.1%. In 1996, 42.0% reported that they were satisfied with democracy in the Czech Republic.

In Estonia in 1992, 29.9% of the respondents were either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The percentage increased to 41.0% in 1993. Approximately 36.0% percent of the respondents reported being satisfied with democracy in 1994. This increased to 39.6% in 1995, and increased again in 1996, to 42.2% of the respondents.

For the Hungarian respondents, 24.1% reported being satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy in 1992. In 1993, 21.4% of the respondents were satisfied. The percentage of respondents peaked at 27.6% satisfied with democracy in 1994. The numbers dropped to a low of 20.6% in 1995. In 1996, 22.0% of the respondents reported being satisfied with democracy.

In 1992 in Poland, 36.0% of the respondents were satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. This percentage rose to 44.0% in 1993 only to drop in 1994 to 27.4%. In 1995, over half of the respondents (56.8%) reported they were satisfied with democracy. In 1996, 48.5% of the respondents reported satisfaction with democracy.

In the first year of the study, 1992, almost half of the Slovenians (49.9%) reported being satisfied with democracy. The percentage dropped to 36.8% in 1993 and 35.0% in 1994. The percentage of Slovenians that reported to be satisfied with democracy increased to 38.2% and 43.8% in 1995 and 1996 respectively.

In Bulgaria, in 1992, 39.9% of the respondents reported as being either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The percentage dropped to 23.1% in 1993 and 4.0% in 1994. In 1995, 14% of Bulgarians were satisfied with democracy. The percentage dropped again in 1996, to 6.2%.

In Latvia, satisfaction with democracy was at a low of 17.5% in 1995. The following year, 1993, 33.7% of the respondents reported being either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. In 1994, the percentage satisfied with democracy dropped to 27.0%. In 1995 and 1996, 30.6% and 28.8% of the respondents respectively reported to be satisfied with democracy.

In Lithuania from 1992 to 1996, there was a general decline in satisfaction with democracy. In 1992, over half of the Lithuanians (51.7%) reported being either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The percentage dropped in 1993, 1994 and 1995 to 38.1%, 35.9% and 27.2% respectively. In 1996, one-third of Lithuanians (33.3%) were satisfied with democracy.

Romanian satisfaction with democracy generally increased over the five-year time span of this study. In 1992, 29.3% of the Romanians were satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. This increased in 1993 to 34.4%. There was a

decline in 1994 to 31.0%, followed by increased in satisfaction with democracy in 1995 and 1996 to 38.4% and 56.1% respectively.

The percentage of Slovakian respondents who reported to be satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy in 1992 was 24.1%. In 1993, about one in five respondent (20.7%) reported being satisfied with democracy. The percentage fell to 17.3% in 1994. In 1995, 28.5% of Slovakians reported satisfaction with democracy. In 1996, 23.0% reported satisfaction with democracy.

In Albania, satisfaction with democracy was greater overall than in any of the country in this study. There was a gradual decrease in support for democracy from 1992 to 1994, starting with 43.3% of the respondents, decreasing to 41.7% in 1993 and 34.3% in 1994. The percentage satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy increased dramatically in 1995 to 61.7%. Again, the percentage increased in 1996, to over three-quarters (76.5%) of the respondents.

In each year of the study, Armenian satisfaction with democracy never rose above one-fifth of the respondents. In 1992, 14.3% of the respondents reported being either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The percentage dropped to 6.4% in 1993. In 1994, only one-in-ten (10.0%) reported being satisfied with democracy. In 1995 and 1996, 19.6% and 19.7% respectively, of respondents reported being satisfied with democracy.

In Belarus in 1992, 12.2% of the respondents were either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. In 1993, the percentage rose to 16.2%. In 1994, 13.4% of the respondents were satisfied with democracy. In 1995 and 1996, the

percentage of Belarusians satisfied with democracy was 15.4% and 20.3% respectively.

In Macedonia in 1992 over fifty percent (51.1%) of the respondents were either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The percentage of respondents who were satisfied with democracy decreased in 1993 and 1994 to 46.8% and 35.8% respectively. Satisfaction the democracy among the Macedonians then increased in 1995 and 1996 to 39.7% and 40.9% respectively.

Satisfaction with democracy in Russia generally declined from 1992 to 1996. In 1992, 13.0% of the respondents were satisfied with democracy. In 1993, 17.0% were satisfied or fairly satisfied. In 1994, satisfaction with democracy dropped to 8.0%. In 1995, satisfaction dropped to a low of 6.6%. In 1996, 8.6% of the respondents reported being either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy.

In Ukraine, 20.9% were satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The percentage of respondents satisfied with democracy dropped to 16.9% in 1993. Eighteen percent were satisfied with democracy in 1994. In 1995, 17.1% of the respondents were satisfied with democracy. In 1996, 20.8% of the respondents were satisfied with democracy.

Support for the Market Economy Compared by Individual Countries

Table 4 shows the percentages of respondents who supported the transformation to a market economy in their country. Compared to the percentage of respondents reporting to be satisfied with democracy, much

greater percentages of the respondents supported the movement toward a market economy overall.

The support for the movement toward a market economy showed a steady decline from 1992 to 1996 in the Czech Republic. Starting in 1992, 62.8% of the respondents reported that they supported the movement toward a market economy. Support dropped to 59.1% in 1993, 57.3% in 1994 and 54.8% in 1995. In 1996, support for the transition to a market economy reached a low of 52.5%.

In Estonia, support for the market economy was at 62.4% in 1992. In the second year of this study, support rose to 68.1% only to fall to 58.7% in 1994. There was a rise in support in 1995 to 62.1% and a slight rise in 1996 to 62.9%

Support for the movement toward a market economy had a general decline in Hungary. In 1992, Approximately three-quarters of the respondents (75.6%) supported the transition to a market economy. Public support for the transition to a market economy in Hungary dropped to 64.8% and 65.3% in 1993 and 1994, respectively. In 1995, support further dropped to 54.4%. In 1996, support for a market economy was at 55.6%.

In the Central and Eastern European Barometer 3 (1992) support for a market economy was at 69.6% in Poland. The following year, support rose to 72.0%. In 1994, 68.9% of the respondents supported participation in a market economy. Support rose to a five-year high in 1995 with 81.2% of the respondents having reported support for participation in a market economy. Support for the market economy dropped to 75.4% in 1996.

In Slovenia, support for participation in a market economy was at its highest level in 1992 with 73.9% of the respondents. In 1993, support dropped almost twenty percentage points to 52.9%. In 1994, 62.3% of the respondents reported support for participation in a market economy. Approximately 55.0% of the respondents reported support for participation in a market economy in both 1995 and 1996.

In Bulgaria in 1992, 73.4% of the respondents reported believing that the movement toward a market economy was right for their country. Support fell to 65.6% and 48.2% respectively in 1993 and 1994. In 1995, support for the movement to a market economy rose to 55.0%. In 1996, support rose again to 58.8% of Bulgarians.

In Latvia, the 1992 level of support for a market economy was 46.7%. Support rose to 55.4% in 1993 only to fall the next year to 48.7%. In 1995, the percentage of respondents reporting to support the movement toward a market economy increased to 52.3%. This was followed by another increase in 1996 to 56.4% of respondents supporting a market economy in Latvia.

Support for the transition to a market economy in Lithuania showed a general decline from 1992 to 1996. In 1992, support for a market economy was at 78.2%. In 1993, support for a market economy declined to 73.2% of the respondents. In 1994, there was a further fall in support to 59.5% of the Lithuanian respondents. In 1995, 59.5% of the respondents supported the

transition to a market economy. In 1996, support reached a low of 57.4% of Lithuanians.

Romanian support for participation in a market economy in 1992 was 73.0%. Support fell to 68.6% in 1993. In 1994 and 1995, 77.5% and 77.3%, respectively, of the respondents reported supporting participation in the market economy. Support again rose in 1996 to a high of 85.2% of the respondents supported the transition to a market economy.

Support for Slovakian participation in a market economy was at 57.3% of the respondents to the Central and Eastern European Barometer 3 in 1992. Support dropped to half (50.0%) of the respondents in 1993. From 1994 to 1996, support for participation in a market economy remained at approximately half the population, at 50.9%, 50.1% and 51.1% in 1994, 1995 and 1996 respectively.

In 1992, 78.3% of Albanians reported support for participation in a market economy. In 1993, support was at 77.4%. Support was 72.0% in 1994. In 1995 and 1996 support for participation in the market economy was 83.3% and 83.5% respectively.

The Armenians reported a 39.6% level of support for participation in a market economy in 1992. In 1993, support reached a five-year low at 25.4%. Approximately 26.0% of the respondents reported support for participation in a market economy in 1994. Support rose to 44.2% in 1995, only to fall to 26.4% in 1996.

Support for participation in a market economy was 38.2% in Belarus in 1992. In 1993, support was at 38.0%, and in 1994 support for the market economy was 34.9% of the respondents. In the following two Central and Eastern European Barometers (1996 and 1997), support rose to 42.3% and 47.3% respectively.

In Macedonia, support for participation in a market economy rose generally over the five-year period. In 1992, 36.9% of the respondents reported support for participation in a market economy. Support increased to 38.6% of the respondents in 1993. Support continued to increase to 40.7% and 52.5% in 1994 and 1995, respectively. In 1996, support for participation in a market economy was at 52.4%

In Russia in 1992, support for participation in a market economy was just below fifty percent at 49.4% of the Russian respondents. In 1993, the percentage of respondents reporting support for participation in a market economy dropped to 36.6%. Again, in 1994, support dropped further to 27.0%. Support reached a low of 23.4% in 1995. In 1996, support rose to 29.6%

There was a general decline in support for participation in a market economy in Ukraine from 1992 to 1996. In 1992, 47.1% of the respondents reported support for Ukrainian participation in a market economy. In 1993 and 1994, 37.6% and 38.9% of the respondents reported support, respectively. In 1995, support for participation reached a low of 30.2%. Approximately 32.0% of the respondents in 1996, reported support for participation in a market economy.

Comparison of Public Opinion in Countries Pooled Based on European Union Membership Status

A clear pattern does not emerge in public opinion on either satisfaction with democracy or support for a market economy based solely on examining the public opinion frequency distributions. A statistical test is needed to examine whether there is, in fact, a difference between the two groups of countries. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic tests for the presence of two populations that may or may not be apparent when examining the frequency distributions. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is employed as a non-parametric test with ordinal data to evaluate whether two independent samples represent two different populations. In the case of this study, the two independent samples consist of the samples from those countries in Central and Eastern Europe seeking membership in the European Union and those countries of Central and Eastern Europe not seeking European Union membership. It is expected that there is a difference in the development of public opinion on democracy and the market economy in the Central and Eastern European countries that is related to their status of seeking membership in the European Union. The purpose of this test is to confirm or refute the existence of two distinct populations. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are found in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5 shows the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, using the cumulative frequency distribution of the respondents who indicated that they are either “satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with democracy. In the first year, 1992, the

absolute value of the most extreme differences is 0.567 with the greatest vertical difference between the two populations having a positive value of 0.133 and a negative value of -0.567. The value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.097, which is not significant statistically at $p < 0.05$. Therefore, the frequency distribution of the public opinion of satisfaction with democracy in the countries seeking membership into the European Union is consistent with the frequency distribution of public opinion on satisfaction with democracy for the countries not seeking European Union membership. Therefore, statistically in 1992, these two sets of countries represent a single population rather than two separate populations.

The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the frequency of satisfaction with democracy in 1993 have an extreme difference in the cumulative probability distributions of -0.667 and +0.133. The absolute value is 0.667. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.129. Although this approaches statistical significance, it does not reach the set requirement of $p < 0.05$. Therefore, the differences in the probability distributions of the two groups of countries are no larger than would be expected by chance if the two groups of countries were derived from the same population.

In 1994, the absolute value of the extreme differences was 0.467 with a cumulative probability distribution range of +0.100 to -0.467. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 0.904 with a $p < 0.388$. This was not significant statistically and therefore, the null hypothesis, that there is not a difference between the two groups of countries, must fail to be rejected. It can be concluded that the

distribution of satisfaction with democracy in the countries seeking entry into the European Union and in the countries not seeking entry into the European Union differ no more than would be expected by chance.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z in 1995 was 1.097. The absolute value of the extreme differences is 0.567 with the positive extreme difference of +0.167 and the negative extreme difference of -0.567. This is not significant statistically. Therefore, it can be concluded that the distribution of public opinion on satisfaction with democracy in the countries seeking European Union membership is consistent with the distribution satisfaction with democracy in the countries not seeking membership in the European Union.

In 1996, the positive extreme difference in the distributions is 0.167 and the negative extreme value is -0.567 with an absolute value of 0.567. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.097, which does not reach the threshold for statistical significance. Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. It must be concluded that at no point is the greatest vertical distance between the cumulative probability distributions of the two groups of countries any larger than would be expected due to chance alone if the two groups are derived from the same population.

Table 6 shows the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic for the frequency distributions of support the market economy for each of the five years in this study. In 1992, the extreme differences are +0.167 and -0.733 with an absolute value of 0.733. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.420, which is significant

statistically at $p < 0.05$. Therefore, at the point of maximum deviation separating the two cumulative probability distributions, the cumulative probability distribution for the countries seeking entry into the European Union is significantly greater than the cumulative probability distribution of the countries not seeking membership in the European Union.

In 1993, the absolute value of the extreme difference is 0.833 with a positive difference of 0.167 and a negative difference of -0.833. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.614, which is significant statistically at $p < 0.05$. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected and the research hypothesis tentatively accepted. This means that the distribution of support for the market economy in the countries seeking entry is not consistent, and is significantly greater, than the distribution of support for the market economy in the countries not seeking European Union membership.

In 1994, the absolute value of the most extreme difference is 0.833 with a positive difference of 0.167 and a negative difference of -0.833. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.614, which is significant statistically at $p < 0.05$. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis tentatively accepted. Therefore, public support for the market economy in the countries seeking entry into the European Union is not consistent with the distribution of support for the market economy in the countries not seeking European Union membership.

In 1995, the absolute value of the most extreme difference is 0.667 with a positive difference of 0.167 and a negative difference of -0.667. The Kolmogorov-

Smirnov Z is 1.291, which is significant statistically at $p < 0.05$. At this level of significance, the null hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis tentatively accepted. Therefore at the point of maximum deviation separating the two cumulative probability distributions, the cumulative probability of support for the market economy in the countries seeking entry into the European Union is significantly greater than the cumulative probability distribution of the countries not seeking entry into the European Union.

In 1996, the most extreme differences are +0.167 and -0.733 with an absolute value of 0.733. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.420, which is significant statistically at $p < 0.05$. Therefore, at the point of maximum deviation separating the two cumulative probability distributions, support for the market economy in the countries seeking entry into the European Union is significantly greater than support for the market economy in the countries not seeking membership in the European Union.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the extent of satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy were explored for the sixteen countries individually as well as based on their status of seeking membership in the European Union. Four hypotheses were tested in this chapter and will be discussed in this section.

The first and second hypotheses considered in this chapter focused on the satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy being greater in the countries seeking entry into the European Union. In the case of satisfaction

with democracy, there is no significant statistical difference between public opinion in the countries seeking membership in the European Union and the public opinion in countries not seeking European Union membership. However, the results of the Kolmogorv-Smirnov test suggest that when the countries are divided based on their status of seeking membership in the European Union, there does appear to be significant difference between the two sets of countries with regard to public support for the market economy.

Support for a market economy is greater in countries seeking entry into the European Union. For the countries not seeking entry into the European Union, there is less support for participation in a market economy generally. Only one country, Albania, had support above seventy percent for the five years of this study. The only other country to come close to that level of support for participation in a market economy was Macedonia. In that case, Macedonian support for participation in a market economy reached just above fifty percent in 2 years (1995 and 1996) of the study. Over that five-year period, support for a market economy was significant statistically but a definite pattern did not emerge.

The third and fourth hypotheses considered the differences in public opinion between the two sets of countries over time. The expectation was that these populations would become more distinct through the transformation process. In both public opinion on democracy and public opinion on the market economy, these hypotheses are not supported. In both cases, no clear pattern

emerged over time and certainly so pattern of increasing differences between the two groups of countries.

There are three possible explanations for the findings of no change over time in the public opinion between the two groups of countries. First, there may not be a pattern over time because there is no difference in public opinion on democracy and the market economy between these two groups of countries. The second reason that a pattern did not emerge could be due to the short duration of the study, which was not long enough to allow a pattern to emerge. Finally, the years included in the study may be so close to the beginning of the political and economic transformations, that the countries were still very similar. If this is the case, then as time passes, patterns of differences may emerge. Regardless of the reason, further examination of public opinion on democracy and the market should be pursued because with such a small time-period, no final conclusions can be made.

The findings of this study suggest that satisfaction with democracy do not differ based on the status of that country with regard to the European Union. This is unexpected considering that the countries seeking integration into the European Union are considered to be the more democratized of the two groups of countries. Indeed to enter into formal negotiations for accession into the European Union significant substantive steps toward democracy have had to have established in these countries. Yet their citizens are no more or less satisfied with democracy than are the citizens of the countries which are

considered by the international community to have made much less progress in democratization.

There was a difference found in public support of the transition to a market economy between the countries seeking and not seeking European Union membership. At the national level, the countries seeking integration into the European Union have had greater success in their transformation to a market economy than the countries not seeking European Union membership. This suggests that the citizens of the countries working toward membership in the European Union support the market reforms necessary for the economic transformation to meet the European Union requirements for full membership. Further, the support for the market economy was greater in the countries seeking membership in the European Union than was support for the market economy in the countries not seeking European Union membership.

In conclusion, the differences in public opinion between the countries seeking membership in the European Union and the countries not seeking membership in the European Union lies in the attitudes related to the economic conditions and not in the attitudes related to the political conditions. Studying the countries of Central and Eastern Europe using the division based on real international relations appears to be a useful tool in developing an understanding of the transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, more emphasis should be placed on understanding public opinion about the economic conditions, as these appear to be more responsive and possibly more

important to the integration of the specific country into the international community than are public opinions about politics. The next two chapters will continue to explore public opinion about democracy and the market economy in Central and Eastern Europe.

CHAPTER 6

Public Opinion on Political, Economic and Foreign Relations Conditions as Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

The political and economic transformations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s have resulted in profound changes in the lives of the citizens in these countries. A great deal of work has been done to examine macro-level political conditions of the transformations. Observations of micro-level political factors are a necessary complement to the study of the macro-level transformation processes (Rose and Haerpfer 1994: 6). One specific area in need of examination is the public's opinions regarding the political transformation in their country. This chapter explores attitudinal factors that contribute to public opinions about democracy for the citizens of sixteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the previous chapter, using the Central and Eastern European Barometers 3 - 7 (Cunningham 1996, Reif and Cunningham 1992, 1993, 1994, Reif et al. 1995), the percentage of people who are satisfied with democracy varied from country to country and from year to year. For the most part, over the five-year time period, there is a great degree of consistency from year to year within each country. There are much greater differences found between

countries. In the previous chapter, no clear patterns of variation in the satisfaction with democracy emerged between the groups of countries. For example, in 1996 in Bulgaria 6.2% of the population was satisfied with democracy. In that same year, in Bulgaria's neighbor to the north, Romania, 56.1% of the population reported satisfaction with democracy. One of the most striking disparities in public satisfaction with democracy was found between the two countries that once composed Czechoslovakia. In 1996, satisfaction with democracy in the Czech Republic is 42.0% while in Slovakia, satisfaction is at 23.0%.

In this chapter, public opinion about democracy is considered in light of two factors. First, attitudes about democracy are rather consistent from year to year in most countries. This could suggest that these attitudes may be clustered around other attitudes relevant to the transformation processes. Because of the believed inherent link between political and economic conditions, both political and economic opinions should be considered as potentially relevant to public opinion about democracy. Additionally, one of the most significant aspects of the change in Central and Eastern European countries has been in the international arena. A significant and marked realignment has occurred in many of these countries. The result is a reorientation of foreign policy to the West in general and toward Western Europe and the European Union in particular.

The second factor to consider is the framework used to search for patterns in public opinion. Despite the lack of significance found in satisfaction with democracy between the countries seeking European Union membership and

those countries not seeking European Union membership, conceptualizing the countries in this manner may still be fruitful but may need further refinement. It has to be understood that not all attempts at membership into the European Union are equal. Some countries have a better chance at meeting the requirements for European Union membership than do other countries. To draw out the differences may require further division of the countries based not only on whether they are seeking membership but the expected success of their seeking membership. To that end, for this chapter and the next, the countries have been divided into three groups, based on the status of their seeking membership in the European Union. Table 7 lists the specific countries grouped according to their status on seeking membership in the European Union.

The first group of countries consists of five of the ten countries that are seeking membership into the European Union. These countries have been involved in formal accession negotiations since 1998 and are expected to be integrated into the European Union in the first enlargement. The second category consists of the five countries seeking membership in the European Union that started formal accession negotiations in 2000. These countries can expect to be integrated into the European Union in the second wave of enlargement. The final category is composed of those countries that are not seeking membership into the European Union. Each country in this group, as countries within Europe, have the right to petition for admission into the European Union, but to date, none have sought European Union membership.

Literature Review

Today, Europe is divided primarily between the countries with stable democracies and countries that are working, more or less, toward becoming democracies. The former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe have all made some strides toward democracy, but the paths are not unidirectional. As in any wave of democratization, reverse waves can be expected (Huntington 1991). One problem that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe face is that, although, the totalitarian practices and institutions such as censorship and shoot-to-kill border guards can be done away with rather quickly, democracy can take years to become widely accepted by the masses (Rose 1997: 96). This lack of acceptance could challenge the development of a stable democracy because popular support is a necessary condition for the long-term development of democracy (Miller et al. 1993).

It cannot be expected that once a country takes steps toward democracy that it will necessarily become an established democracy. As Linz and Stepan (1996) stress, the totalitarian legacy of the post-communist countries of the 1990s is far more unfavorable to democratization than was the authoritarian legacy of Southern Europe and Latin America of the 1970s and 1980s. Linz and Stephan (1996) offer the example of Franco, who prior to his death provided for the development of foundational democratic institutions that would provide a path toward democracy. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe had no such structural foundations in place that would or could aid the democratization

process despite the apparent political and economic deterioration that had long been in the making. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been forced to choose their own paths of political transformation. Subsequently, these countries' responses to the transformation toward democracy have displayed no single, common pattern (Rose 1997: 94).

For all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the initial steps of the transformation process have been a movement away from a socialist polity toward democracy in its various forms. Some countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary have made significant and continued progress toward democracy. Other countries such as Belarus appear to have made tacit rejections of democratic principles and have shifted toward a more totalitarian form of government.

Bennett (1993: 101) argues that "it is generally agreed that public opinion and popular sovereignty are the foundations of liberal democracy." Since public opinion may be the foundation to democracy, it should not be taken for granted and ignored, especially in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which have experienced both political and economic change. While the transformation to democracy may have been relatively uneventful, the economic transformations have resulted in severe economic costs. The effects of the economic reforms have required that the general populations bear a heavy burden from the economic reforms. In turn, an erosion of the popular base of support for

democratization would be related to poor economic performance by the regime (Schumpeter 1942, Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990). It is feared that public support for institutional reforms may withstand economic chaos for only a certain period of time, after which the citizens may begin to blame democracy and capitalism for their plight (Przeworski 1991). The result could be an economic catastrophe threatening support for democratic institutions (Duch 1993). It is clear that a number of scholars (Bennett 1993, Schumpeter 1942, Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990, Przeworski 1991, Duch 1993) are concerned about the public's linking of the conditions of democracy and the market economy. The fear is that the performance of one effects support for the other. Understanding public opinion about democracy is important to understanding the relationships between structural change (economic or political) and public reaction to that change.

Before considering the relationship between politics and economics in public opinion, the first step has been to develop a basic understanding of the state of public opinion about democracy. Looking specifically at Russia, Grey et al. (1995) reported that 52.4% of the Russian respondents in their study found democracy to be broadly satisfactory. In the same survey 46.7% of the respondents felt that Russia was not yet ready for democracy. Wyman (1994) reported the findings of a number of surveys conducted in Russia from 1991 through 1994. He found that a substantial percentage of respondents in each survey chose non-democratic options over democratic options. Since the citizens of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have lived under non-democratic

regimes, their selection of non-democratic regimes over democratic alternatives is provocative.

The support for either democracy or its political alternatives is examined using the Churchill Hypothesis (Hofferbert and Klingmann 1999, Mishler and Rose 1996, Rose 1995, Rose and Mishler 1996, Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998). The thesis of this hypothesis is based on a quote by Winston Churchill, basically stating that democracy is the worst form of government except for all of the rest. The Churchill Hypothesis examines support for democracy relative to support for alternative forms of governing. Central and Eastern Europe offer an opportunity to test this hypothesis because the adult populations have lived under two, and in some cases three, regime types. The people are not asked about their support of democracy, rather they are asked to choose among alternative regimes, both democratic and non-democratic.

In one of the studies which tested the Churchill Hypothesis, Rose (1997) found that, on average, 67% of the citizens of seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe rejected authoritarian alternatives to democracy. In Russia, only 45% rejected the authoritarian alternatives. In general the results of testing the Churchill Hypothesis suggest that while support for democracy may not be high, it is higher than support for any alternative form of governing (Hofferbert and Klingmann 1999, Mishler and Rose 1996, Rose 1995, Rose and Mishler 1996, Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998).

Beyond the search for public support of various types of political regimes, another political condition that has been examined in relation to public opinion on democracy is that of human rights conditions. For example, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) examined attitudes toward human rights conditions in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. They found that satisfaction with human rights conditions is related to support for democratic regimes and institutions.

The public's opinion about any subject has both supporters and detractors. Duch (1993, 1995) looked for identifiable pockets of citizenry that either supported or opposed democracy. Bases of support for democracy are found in the more highly educated members of society (Duch 1993). Opposition to democracy appears to be more diffuse. Duch (1995) found no identifiable pockets of "unsophisticated citizenry" that could be expected to undermine democratization by responding "to economic catastrophe by embracing antimarket or antidemocratic solutions" (Duch 1995: 122).

There is a good deal of work done in the area of public opinion research that finds a general lack of support for democracy. The problem is that these studies examine support for democracy in principle while not examining satisfaction with the political reforms in relation to support for other changes in the country. Further, the above studies simply provided either bivariate or univariate descriptions of public opinion regarding democracy. They fail to consider the interaction of political and economic factors and how these might shape public opinion about democracy, whether there is a great deal or a little

support. It is widely assumed that there is a relationship between economic and political conditions (Lipset 1959, Bollen 1979, 1983, Dahl 1989 and Hayek 1944), including economic and political public opinion (Przeworski 1991, Miller Reisinger and Helsi 1998, Duch 1993).

The influence of economics on public opinion about democracy should be examined further. It is expected that the economic conditions in these countries will influence political and social attitudes (Rose and Haerpfer 1994). Some studies have considered the importance of the relationship between political and economic conditions.

Miller, Reisinger and Hesli (1998) examined election outcomes and the level of support for democratization and marketization among the masses and elites in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania during the 1992 and 1995 elections. They found that the relationship between public support for the candidates for democratic reform and democratic principles to be very weak while the relationship between support for democratic reformers and support for the market to be fairly strong. This suggests that the electorate supporting the market economy voiced their support for the economic reforms by electing democratic reform candidates into office.

Kunioka and Woller (1999) explored the effects of social capital and economic performance on preferences for parliamentary or authoritarian governments in Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Ukraine. They found that the indicators of social capital (e.g., institutional

trust, viewing minorities and/or immigrants as threats, order versus freedom, patience versus quick results and town size) are statistically more important than are future or current economic perceptions on a preference for parliament over a strong leader.

Based on the research on the public's opinion about democracy, it is clear that public support and satisfaction with democracy is related to both political and economic factors. The problem with many of the studies is that they are limited by technique and scope. The major technical limitation is that most of the studies used descriptive and bivariate analysis of public opinion about democracy. While these are important in understanding public support and satisfaction with the democratic transformation, more sophisticated analysis are needed to understand the relationship between political, economic and other conditions, attitudes and opinions about democracy.

A second limitation is the numbers of countries included in the studies. By examining a few countries only, it is difficult to find meaningful patterns in public opinion. Therefore, each and every country becomes a unique case. Each country does have its own history, but the geography of being part of Europe, the experience of Soviet domination and the challenges of the political and economic transformations of the past decade or so, have created the potential for as many similarities are there are differences. Further, a byproduct of the economic and political transformations to the market economy and democracy should include the homogenization of these countries, at least on the international stage.

Patterns and comparisons of the transformation processes can be done only when as many countries as possible are included in the analysis.

Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) and Rose (2001) used eight countries in Central and Eastern Europe to look for patterns in public opinion about democracy. To conceptualize the similarities and pattern in public opinion, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are divided into categories of free, partially free and unfree, based on the Freedom House scale of civil and political rights (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998, Rose 2001). The findings suggest that the countries categorized as free (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) have the greatest percentage of the population that are generally positive about the democratic regimes. Rose (2001) reported that 63% of the respondents in the countries that Freedom House categorized as “free” opposed undemocratic alternatives to democracy. While 43% the respondents in the countries considered “partly free” or “not free” opposed the undemocratic alternatives to democracy.

Although Rose el al. (1998) and Rose (2001) did use a categorization in their attempts to discern patterns in public opinion in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, their selection had a number of limitations. First, the limited number of countries for which data are available is problematic. Specifically, the studies (Rose 2001, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998) contain data on nine countries, only one of which is classified as ‘not free’. Additionally, a second criticism is that they chose to categorize the countries based on an externally

defined criterion, the Freedom House rating. By using an externally defined criterion, the perceptions of the people and the regime within the country are discounted.

In general, future research on public opinion about democracy needs to build upon the research that has been done to date. Specifically, research should, when appropriate, be multivariate. This would allow for the inclusion of political, economic, as well as other factors in the examination of public opinion about democracy. Additionally, the research should be as inclusive as possible with regard to the number of the countries included. This will allow for the examination of patterns in public opinion and it will allow for a better understanding of the conditions in the Central and Eastern European countries. Finally, the groupings of countries must be conceptually framed so that conditions can be examined in the context of real world conditions. This chapter seeks to meet the shortcoming of past research to provide a multivariate analysis of public opinion in sixteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe within the framework of the status of these countries seeking membership in the European Union.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

In this chapter the research question posed is: How are opinions on political, economic and foreign relations conditions related to public opinion on democracy? And, does the status of seeking membership in the European Union account for differences in public opinion between the countries of Central and

Eastern Europe? The opinion of the political conditions is that of perceived respect for human rights by the state. Support for the market economy and retrospective and prospective microeconomic opinions are the opinions about the economic conditions included in this chapter. Finally, the opinion about their country's future foreign relations to the European Union is included. These factors are examined in sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe with respect to each countries status of seeking membership in the European Union. The attitudinal factors and respective hypotheses are discussed in turn.

First, individual's perceptions of human rights conditions are included as a factor contributing to one's satisfaction with democracy. While, this has not been directly considered in other public opinion research on Central and Eastern Europe, human rights have been found to be important conceptually in the democratization process in these countries. One example is the use of the Freedom House Ratings to categorize the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Rose et al. 1998, Hoferbert and Klingmann 1999).

In the cases of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the transformations are as much economic as political. Often it is the economic reforms that have been seen as producing the greatest social costs and finding the greatest amount of resistance and debate. Since, economic conditions influence political and social attitudes (Rose and Haerpfer 1994), three hypotheses have been included that consider various aspects of public opinion and concern about the economy. First, general support for the transformation to

the market economy is considered. This is included because it is a general measure of the attitudes toward the fundamental shift in economic orientation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The other two attitudes concerning economics are the perceptions of past and future household economic conditions. Household economic conditions are selected because the majority of the people in these countries live in households with more than one income earner. Short-term (12 months) past and future perceptions are included to see if satisfaction with democracy is related to the more immediate economic concerns rather than some larger understanding of the transformations as would be expected to be found in public opinion on the market economy generally.

Part and parcel with the internal economic and political transformations within the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there are profound transformations and realignments in external (international) relations. Since the beginning of fundamental political and economic changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have considered integration into the European Union to be one of the main tools of achieving transformation (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 805). The European Union requires that all countries granted membership have a functioning democratic government and a sufficiently strong market economy.

The movement toward integration with the European Union is the hallmark of one of the most profound realignments in foreign relations in the 20th century. While the governments of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe have

stated their intentions to seek or not seek membership in the European Union, general public support for this realignment of international relations has not been examined. Because functioning democratic governments and market economies require support and confidence of the people, public support for this symbol of the transformation processes needs to be considered. Therefore, a hypothesis is included in this paper to examine the contribution that the public's perceptions of the future foreign relations of their country to the European Union has on satisfaction with democracy.

The final hypothesis in this chapter considers the conceptual framework used to look for patterns in public opinion about democracy. The framework is that of the status of countries seeking membership in the European Union. By 1996, ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe expressed an interest and had met enough of the political and economic reforms necessary to be considered as potential candidates for membership into the European Union. During the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, five potential candidates for membership are selected and intensive negotiations with the European Union regarding accession are started. These five 'frontrunners' represent the countries that have most successfully traversed the course to democracy and the market economy by international standards. The second group of countries has sought membership in the European Union but did not start formal negotiations until 2000. These countries are most likely to be included in the second wave of European Union enlargement. The remaining countries included in this

dissertation have not sought membership in the European Union. The final hypothesis in this chapter considers the effects that being a “frontrunner,” and therefore most likely to be included in the first wave of European Union enlargement, has on the public’s opinion about democracy.

The six hypotheses tested in this chapter are:

H1: Individuals who believe there is respect for human rights in their country are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than are individuals who believe there is a lack of respect for human rights in their country.

H2: Individuals who support the transformation to a market economy in their country are more likely to be satisfied with democracy in their country than are individuals who oppose the transformation to a market economy in their country.

H3: Individuals who believe their household economic conditions will improve over the next 12 months are more likely to report satisfaction with democracy than are individuals who believe their economic conditions will not improve.

H4: Individuals who perceive their household economic conditions to have improved over the past 12 months are more likely to report satisfaction with democracy than are individuals who perceive their household economic conditions to have not improved over the past 12 months.

H5: Individuals who believe their country’s future is closely linked to the European Union are more likely to report satisfaction with democracy than are individuals who do not believe their country’s future is linked to the European Union.

H6: Satisfaction with democracy will be better explained in the countries which are most likely to be granted admission into the European Union in the next enlargement than in the countries not likely to be granted admission into the European Union in the next enlargement or the countries not seeking entry into the European Union.

The first five hypotheses are tested in each of the sixteen countries individually and in the countries pooled based on the status of their seeking membership in the European Union. The final hypothesis is tested on the pooled

countries. Together, these six hypotheses should shed light on the dynamics of public satisfaction with democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The data and methods used to test the hypotheses are discussed in the next section.

Data and Methods

The data for this chapter are from the 1996 Central and Eastern European Barometer 7 (Cunningham 1996, made available through the Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social Research and collected on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities). Data collection for the Central and Eastern European Barometer 7 was conducted from November 1st to the 29th 1996, in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The survey is a fully representative national sample of the population over the age of 15 years. A multi-stage random probability sample is used in each country. There are slight variations in the sample design to account for the individual characteristics and population structures of the specific country. The total number of respondents from the sixteen selected countries is 16,876.

Selected Variables

Six variables are used in this study. Each variable is based on a question asked in the 1996 Central and Eastern European Barometer in each of the sixteen countries. The questions are written in English, translated into the appropriate languages and then translated back into English. This is done to

ensure the consistency of the meaning of the questions. The interviews are held in the language of the respondent.

A single predicted variable and five predictor variables are included in the model examining the attitudinal factors related to satisfaction with democracy. The predicted variable in this study is satisfaction with democracy. To measure this, the respondents are asked the following question: “On the whole are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing?” For the purposes of analysis[1], the original responses are categorized into “satisfied” and “not satisfied”. The satisfied category included all responses of either “satisfied” or “fairly satisfied”. The responses of “not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied” are placed into the “not satisfied” category.

The five predictor variables are perceptions of human rights conditions, prospective microeconomic expectations, retrospective microeconomic experiences and opinions about foreign relations. The variable measuring perceived human rights conditions is based on the question, “To what degree do you believe that there is respect for individual human rights in (our country)?” The response categories are “a lot of respect for individual human rights,” “some respect,” “not much respect” and “no respect at all.” This variable is collapsed into two categories. The first category, labeled “respect for human rights”, is

[1] Multinominal logit regression and ordinal regression were attempted since the variables were collected at the ordinal level of measurement originally. In running the diagnostics for the analysis, a number of cells were very small. This presented a problem for the multinominal and ordinal regression analysis because it resulted in inflated and logically unacceptable regression coefficients. To correct this problem fully, the predicted and

composed of the original responses of “a lot of respect” and “some respect.” The second category, “no respect for human rights”, is composed of the original response categories of “not much respect” and “no respect at all.”

Respondents are asked to report their opinion about the transformation to a market economy in their country. This variable, market economy support, is based on the question, “Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that is one that is largely free from state control is right or wrong for (our country)?” The response categories are “right” and “wrong.”

Prospective microeconomic expectations are measured with the question, “Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will . . . get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse or get a lot worse?” The responses to this question are collapsed into two categories of improved and not improved. The responses of “getting a lot better” or “getting a little better” are considered to indicate improved expectations. The remaining response categories indicate an expectation of improvement in the household economic conditions over the next 12 months.

The respondents are asked their opinions about their household economic conditions over the past 12 months. The question is asked, “Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation of your household has . . . ?” The response categories are “got a lot better,” “got a little better,” “stayed the same,” “got a little worse” and “got a lot worse.” The response categories for this variable

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predictor variables were collapsed into dichotomous variables. With all of the variables

are collapsed into dichotomous categories indicating either improvement or no improvement in household economic conditions over the past 12 months. Improved conditions are those where the respondents reported that their household economic conditions got better, either a lot or a little. The responses that indicated the household economic conditions had stayed the same or worsened are collapsed into the category of no improvement.

The final predictor variable is constructed from opinions on the future relations of the respondent's country to the European Union. These opinions are measured with the question, "As things now stand, with which of the following do you see (our country's) future most closely tied up?" The original response categories are "The United States of America," The European Union," "Other European countries like Norway and Switzerland, which remain outside of the European Union," "Other Central and Eastern European countries," "Russia or other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States," "Turkey" and "Japan / South Korea." The responses are collapsed into dichotomous categories of "European Union" and "other."

Methods

Correlation analysis is conducted on the predictor variables as part of the diagnostics preparing for the use of a multivariate technique. The research question guiding this chapter calls for a multivariate analysis to include factors that may contribute to satisfaction with democracy. The most appropriate

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reduced to this form, logistic regression was selected as an appropriate procedure.

analysis would have been ordinal regression due to the ordinal level of measurement of the data. This was attempted but some of the ordinal categories had too few responses to run that form of regression analysis properly. Therefore, the categories of answers of the original variables are collapsed as indicated above. Two separate sets of logistic regression runs are completed using the variables discussed. The first set of logistic regression analyses is run on each of the sixteen countries individually in order to test the hypotheses for each country. The second set of logistic regression analyses are conducted for the combined responses of the citizens in the countries in each category. These three logistic regressions are run to test the final hypothesis discussed above.

Results

Table 8 shows the correlation matrix of the five predictor variables in the model. The highest degree of correlation (as is expected) is found between past and future household economic conditions with a Pearson's r of 0.373. For the other predictor variables, the correlations are positive and below 0.247. All of the correlations are significant statistically but, due to the size of the sample, this is of little importance due to the moderate to low values of the correlations.

The Frontrunner Countries for Membership in the European Union

Table 9 shows the results of the logistic regressions of the five countries which expect to be admitted into the European Union in the first wave of enlargements. The table shows that the perceived human rights conditions are significant statistically for all of the countries in this group. In each of these

countries, the odds of reporting satisfaction with democracy are between 2.5 and 4.5 times greater for individuals who perceive good human rights conditions compared to individual that perceive poor human rights conditions. All else being equal, in three of the five countries (Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia), perceptions of human rights conditions are the single best predictor of satisfaction with democracy.

Two economic variables performed well in the model for each of the five countries expected to be in the first wave of enlargement. The variables indicating support for the market economy and future household economic expectations are significant statistically. For example, in Poland, the odds reporting satisfaction with democracy are 3.795 times greater for individuals who support the transition to a market economy compared to the individuals who did not support the transition to a market economy. While in that same country, Poland, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.266 times greater for individuals who expected their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to individuals who expected their household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen over that same time period.

Past household economic experiences are significant statistically in all but one country, Hungary. For the remaining four countries, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are between 1.8 times greater (Slovenia) and 2.7 times greater (Poland) for individuals who believed their household economic conditions had improved over the past 12 months compared to individuals who

believed their household economic conditions had remained the same or worsened.

Finally, the perceived future of the individual's country with the European Union is significant statistically in the Czech Republic only. In that country, the odds that the citizens are satisfied with democracy are 1.8 times greater for citizens that believed the future of the Czech Republic is with the European Union compared to the individuals who did not believe the future of the Czech Republic is with the European. Although not significant statistically, in Hungary and Poland, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are inversely related to a belief that the future of their respective countries lies with the European Union.

On the whole, the model explaining satisfaction with democracy performed well in all of the frontrunner countries. The percent of cells predicted correctly ranged from 67.6% in Slovenia to 78.1% in Hungary suggesting a relatively high goodness-of-fit of the model in each of the countries. The percentage of variability in the predicted variable explained by the predictor variables in the model is low in Hungary with a Nagelkerke R^2 of 14.1%. The percentage of variability in the predicted variable explained by the predictor variables is better in the model for public opinion in the Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic case, the Nagelkerke R^2 is 0.357, meaning that 35.7% of the variability in the predicted variable is explained by the predictor variables.

The Second Wave Countries Seeking European Union Membership

The five countries seeking European Union that expect to be included in the second wave of enlargement are Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia. As is done with the frontrunner countries for European Union integration, a separate logistic regression is run on each of these countries. Table 10 shows the results of these logistic regressions.

The models of public opinion are significant statistically for each of the five countries. The percentage of cells predicted correctly ranged from 94.1% in Bulgaria to 67.8% in Romania. Overall the model did not perform as well in the second wave countries as it had in the frontrunner countries. The variability in the predicted variable explained by the predictor variables is as low as 10.0%, suggesting that very little is explained. The percentage of variability is as high as 30.3% explained, which is much stronger. As is the case for public opinion in the frontrunner countries, the model performed differently in each of the countries but there are overall similarities and patterns that emerged.

The single most important predictor variable to explain satisfaction with democracy is support for the market economy. This economic public opinion variable is significant statistically in all five countries. Support for the market economy increased the odds of satisfaction with democracy by 2.956 for the Latvians that supported the market economy compared to Latvians that did not support the market economy.

Perceived human rights conditions are significant statistically in four of the five second wave countries. The only country that this variable is not significant statistically is Bulgaria. For the remaining four countries, perceptions of human rights are the single most important factor in explaining satisfaction with democracy. For example, in Lithuania the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 10.104 times greater for Lithuanians who perceived positive human rights conditions compared to individuals who perceived negative human rights conditions.

Past household economic perceptions are significant statistically in four of the five countries. Again, Hungary is the exception. For the other four countries, public opinion on satisfaction with democracy is between 2.4 (Slovakia) and 1.689 (Romania) times greater for individuals who reported their household economic conditions had improved over the past 12 months compared to those that reported their household economic conditions had remained the same or worsened.

Future household economic expectations are significant statistically in three of the five countries. The countries where these are significant statistically are Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania. In Romania, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 6.2 times greater for individuals who expected their household economic conditions to improve compared to individuals who expected their household economic conditions to remain the same or worsen. In Latvia, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.1 times greater for individuals who

expected their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months. Finally, in Hungary, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 3.3 times greater for the Hungarians that expected their household economic conditions to improve compared to the Hungarians that did not expect their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months.

The people's perceived future of their country with the European Union is significant statistically in three of the five countries (Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia). The relationship between satisfaction with democracy and the perception of their respective countries is positive in Lithuania and Romania. In these countries the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 1.8 and 2.1 times greater, respectively, for the individuals who reported that the future of their country is with the European Union as opposed to some other entity. In the case of Slovakia (and Hungary, although that relationship is not significant statistically) the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 0.7 times less for individuals who perceived the future of Slovakia is with the European Union.

The Countries Not Seeking Entry into the European Union

There are six countries included in this analysis that are not under consideration for membership in the European Union. These countries are Albania, Armenia, Macedonia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The logistic regression results are shown in Tables 11a and 11b. The patterns for Belarus and Russia appear to differ from that of the other four countries. Specifically, at least four of the predictor variables are significant statistically in Albania,

Armenia, Macedonia and Ukraine (all five are significant statistically in the Ukraine) while only two of the five predictor variables are significant statistically for Belarus and Russia.

Perceived human rights conditions are significant statistically in all six of the countries not seeking European Union membership. In Albania, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 8.8 times greater for individuals who reported good human rights conditions compared to those that reported poor human rights conditions. In Armenia, Macedonia, Belarus and Russia, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are between 4 and 5 times greater for individuals in each of these countries that perceived good human rights conditions compared to individuals who perceived poor human rights conditions. Finally, for Ukrainians, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.9 times greater for those that reported good human rights conditions compared to those that reported poor human rights conditions.

In all but one of the countries not seeking entry into the European Union, support for the market economy is significant statistically. The only exception is Belarus. For Belarussians, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 5.9 times greater for individuals who support the transformation to a market economy compared to Belarussians that did not support the economic transition. For the remaining five countries, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are between 2.1 and 3.0 times greater for their respective citizens in these countries that are

supportive of the economic transformation to a market economy compared to those that are not support of the transformation to a market economy.

Future household economic expectations are significant statistically in five of the six countries not seeking European Union membership. In Armenia, Macedonia, Belarus and Ukraine, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are between 1.5 and 2.0 times greater for individuals in these countries that expected their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to those individuals who expected their household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen over the next 12 months. In Albania, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 3.7 times greater for individuals who expected their household economic conditions to improve compared to the individuals who expected their household economic conditions to not improve.

Past household economic experiences are significant statistically in four of the six countries. In Albania, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 4.1 times greater for individuals who believed that their economic experience over the past 12 months improved compared to those individuals who did not perceived their economic conditions to have improved. In Macedonia, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.4 times greater for individuals whose household economic conditions improved over the past 12 months. In the Ukraine and in Macedonia, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 1.8 times greater for Ukrainians that reported their household economic conditions to

improve compared to individuals who reported their household economic conditions to have stayed the same or worsened.

For the variable on perceived future of their country with the European Union, only in the Ukraine is this significant statistically. In the country of Ukraine, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.2 times greater for individuals who believed the future of the Ukraine is with the European Union compared to individuals who did not believe that future of the Ukraine is with the European Union. Although not significant statistically, it should be noted that the relationship between perceptions about the future of the country with the European Union and satisfaction with democracy is negative in Armenia, Macedonia, Belarus and Russia.

Comparisons Based on Countries Grouped by Status of Membership in the European Union

In the above sections, a logistic regression is run on each of the countries included in this study. The countries are categorized based on the status of their membership with the European Union. One of the most striking findings suggests that each country has a different pattern in the model, although commonalities do appear to exist. This suggests that the factors that contribute to that satisfaction with democracy differ from country to country. In order to examine if there is a pattern in the public opinion of countries, logistic regressions are run on each of the groupings of countries. Table 12 shows the results of the logistic regressions for the country groupings.

The five predictor variables are significant statistically for the five countries expecting to join the European Union in the first wave of enlargement. The odds of being satisfied with democracy in the countries expected to be in the first wave of European Union enlargement are 3.1 times greater for individuals who perceived good human rights conditions compared to those individuals who did not perceive good human rights. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.4 times greater for individuals who supported the transformation to a market economy compared to those individuals who did not support the transition to a market economy. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 1.7 times greater for individuals who expected their future household economic conditions to improve compared to individuals who expected their household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.3 times greater for individuals who reported that their household economic conditions had improved over the past 12 months compared to individuals who reported their household economic conditions had not improved. Regarding the perceived future of their country with the European Union, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 1.4 times greater for individuals who perceived the future of their country with the European Union compared to individuals who perceived the future of their country to not be with the European Union. The model for the first-wave countries is significant statistically with a chi-square of 753.005. The model predicted correctly 70.3% of the cells. The

Nagelkerke R^2 suggested that 25% of the variance in the predicted variable is explained by the predictor variable.

The second logistic regression is on the public opinion in the five countries that are seeking admission into the European Union and are likely to be included in the second wave of enlargements. For these countries, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 3.2 times greater for individuals who perceived good human rights conditions compared to individuals who did not perceive good human rights conditions. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.6 times greater for individuals who supported the transition to a market economy compared to individuals who did not support the transition to a market economy. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.6 times greater for individuals who expected their household economic condition to improve over the next 12 months compared to individuals that expected household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.3 times greater for individuals who experienced improved household economic conditions over the past 12 months compared to individuals who experienced stagnant or worsening economic conditions over the pervious 12 months. The model for the second wave countries is significant statistically with a chi-square of 749.555. Seventy-four percent of the cells are predicted correctly. Twenty-six percent of the variation in the predicted variable is explained by the predictor variables.

The final group is the countries that are not seeking membership in the European Union. The five predictor variables are significant statistically. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 5.8 times greater for individuals who perceived their countries to have good human rights conditions compared to individuals who perceived human rights conditions in their country to be poor. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.7 times greater for individuals who supported the transition to a market economy compared to individuals who did not support the transition to a market economy in their country. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.3 times greater for individuals who expected their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months and 2.7 times greater for individuals who experienced improved household economic conditions to have improved over the past 12 months. Finally, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 1.8 times greater for individuals who perceived the future of their country to be with the European Union compared with individuals who did not perceive the future of their country to be with the European Union. The model is significant statistically with a chi-square of 1889.095. The percentage of cells predicted correctly is 81.2%. Forty-nine percent of the variation in the predicted variable is explained by the predictor variables.

Discussion

The above analyses suggest many points that warrant discussion. First and foremost is that satisfaction with democracy is complex and that the factors that shape this opinion differ from country to country. Second, the difference

found in examining public opinion in each country individually may be masked when combining public opinion in a number of countries. Third, the framework from which the countries are examined provides insights into the patterns of public opinion of the political and economic transformation processes. This suggests that people are considering not only their own conditions, but also considering the changing role that their country has in the international community.

The first point in this conclusion is that public opinion is a complex and multidimensional phenomena. It is not simple or clean to examine these sorts of things. Despite that, public opinion is important for a well functioning democracy and a market economy, so it warrants further examination.

In this chapter, I examined attitudinal factors and their relationship to satisfaction with democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The countries are examined individually and with respect to their status on seeking membership in the European Union. The general model proposed in this chapter performed well for most of the countries in the study. Overall, it suggests that the five factors do contribute to satisfaction with democracy. The model does perform differently in each country, with the explanatory power being clearly stronger in some countries than in others. Dividing the countries into the three categories appears to be a somewhat useful heuristic device in identifying patterns and understanding of satisfaction with democracy.

First, examining the strength of the public opinion on human rights conditions, and therefore drawing conclusions on the hypotheses discussed at the onset of this chapter, it is clear that perceptions of human rights conditions are important to satisfaction with democracy. In each of the sixteen countries in the study, perceptions of human rights conditions are significant statistically and often demonstrated the greatest explanatory power, holding the other variables equal. This occurred for all of the countries, regardless of their status of seeking membership in the European Union.

The importance of the perceptions of human rights conditions to satisfaction with democracy suggests that the respondents may conceptualize democracy in terms of liberal democracy rather than as a pared-down nominal democracy. In this sense, they would be interpreting democracy along a Western European model where democracy and human rights are linked rather than other forms of democracy, where democracy is limited simply to the right to vote and fails to meet the standards of a liberal democracy.

The three economic variables appear to be important, with support for the transformation to a market economy the most important of the three conditions in most countries. Support for the market economy is an important factor in satisfaction with democracy in all but one country (Hungary). This suggests that attitudes about economic conditions influence attitudes about democracy. Prospective and retrospective microeconomic expectations are each important in 11 countries (although not always in the same countries). For every country that

is not a frontrunner for seeking membership into the European, perceived household economic conditions over the past 12 months influenced satisfaction with democracy, while expectations for future microeconomic conditions is important three of the five times. In total, in eight of the eleven times that household economic conditions are important, both the past 12 months and the future 12 months are significant.

McIntosh and MacIver (1992) found that the people Central and Eastern Europe defined their opinions on democracy based, in part, on economic terms. The findings on public opinion about economic conditions suggest that there is an important connection between economic and political conditions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It has been suggested that there is a connection between the two at the institutional level. Lipset (1959) and Bollen (1979, 1983), for example, found a connection between democracy and the market economy. The results of this chapter reinforce the understanding of the relationships between politics and economics at the level of public opinion.

The variable with the least explanatory power is the opinion on the future with the European Union. In only six of the sixteen countries this is found to be significant. Three of the six countries are ‘frontrunner’ candidates for European Union membership. In only one of the countries that is not a candidate but is still seeking membership into the European Union is this variable a significant factor in satisfaction with democracy.

In comparing the countries based on their status for membership in the European Union, the explanatory power of the model is greatest for the countries that are the frontrunner candidates for accession into the European Union. The countries seeking membership and the countries not seeking membership faired about the same. One interesting item is that the variability in the model is better explained in the countries not seeking membership into the European Union than in the two sets of countries seeking membership. Therefore, the final hypothesis must be rejected.

Overall, it is clear from this chapter that attitudes about economics, human rights and foreign relations are important to the formation of attitudes about democracy. The model performs well in most of the countries but different patterns did emerge between the groups of countries. These patterns were more apparent when the countries were examined individually than when the countries were pooled together.

Based on the analysis of this chapter and the previous chapter, public opinion on economic conditions is clearly important. One conclusion that can be drawn is that public opinion on politics and economics are related. Factors that influence public opinion on the transition to a market economy are examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7

Public Opinion on Political, Economic and Foreign Relations Conditions as Predictors of Support for the Market Economy in Central and Eastern Europe

After the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was expected that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would make rapid and successful strides toward Western standards of a market economy. The belief in the West was that the citizens of these countries would embrace the ideology of a market economy, thereby rejecting forty-plus years of experience with a command economy. The social costs which would result from the economic reforms were thought to be the short-term costs of economic development. The experience of the past decade has challenged these original expectations. The transformation from a command economy to a market economy has been far more difficult than many first imagined.

While it is clear that all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have made strides away from the Soviet era command economy, functional and stable market economies have been difficult to establish. Additionally the social costs associated with the economic reform measures have been much greater than anticipated (Nelson 1997). It has been the general public that has had to

bear the social hardship produced by the collapse of the command economy and the reforms necessary to establish a market economy.

While there is a need to study the structural changes necessary to develop a market economy, Duch (1993) argues that to understand these changes there must be accompaning research on the beliefs and values of the masses with regard to the market economy. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the public opinion of the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe regarding the transition to a market economy. Specifically, this chapter explores five political, economic, and foreign relation attitudinal factors that may contribute to public opinion on the transformation to a market economy. The factors include the perception of human rights conditions, satisfaction with democracy, prospective and retrospective microeconomic conditions and perception of the future foreign relations with regard to the European Union. These factors are examined in sixteen countries individually and with regard to their country's status in seeking membership with the European Union. Table 7 lists the specific countries included for analysis in this paper.

This chapter focuses on public opinion about the economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe for three reasons. First, public opinion research on the political economy transformations in Central and Eastern Europe has tended to focus on the political transformation and neglected the economic transformation. Second, as the more neglected side of the transformation, research to understand public opinion, and particularly public support, for the

economic changes needs to be conducted. This is important because the greatest social costs are incurred in the process of economic reforms of the transformation process. It has been argued that public dissatisfaction with the economic reforms may result in public disapproval of the political changes. Potentially, the result of public dissatisfaction or disapproval of the transformation could be due to a rejection of the political changes because of the hardships imposed by the economic reforms (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990, Przeworski 1991, Schumpeter 1942).

Literature Review

There is widespread agreement that the deteriorating economic conditions within the former Socialist countries contributed to both the elite and mass support for economic change (Duch 1993). The resulting transformations in Central and Eastern Europe have been as much economic as political, but it is the economic changes that have produced the greatest social costs. It is the market reforms that have resulted in serious short-term dislocations and hardships (International Monetary Fund et al. 1991) which the general public has had to bear. Clearly, the structural economic reforms necessary for the transformation from a command economy to a market economy are quite costly.

At a minimum, when a government embarks upon this form of economic transformation, temporary economic deterioration is inevitable. Unemployment rises as the responsibility of finding and maintaining employment is shifted from the state to the citizen (Duch 1993: 595). Under a market economy, individuals

must contend with the real possibility of unemployment, which official statistics suggest was nonexistent prior to 1992 (Cook 1990, Sanjian 1990). Inflation increases and goods become scarce as adjustments in production are made. As price controls are lifted, prices for consumer goods rise. All of these macro-level economic adjustments have micro-level implications. Indeed, opposition to the market liberalization reforms was expected due to the inevitable rise in consumer prices (Sachs and Lipton 1990, Shiller, Boycko and Korobov 1991). The potential problem, as Przeworski (1991) argues, is that a temporary deterioration of the material conditions of the masses may be sufficient to undermine the political and economic reforms.

Kluegel, Mason and Wegener (1999) examined the relationship between macro-level and micro-level functioning of the economy. They stressed the importance of both a structural and individual level of analysis in understanding the development of a solid market economy. Their article focused on economic justice attitudes in the Czech Republic, the former East Germany, Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria. The findings suggested that the theory of legitimation of the market, as is found in the West, applied to post-communist countries. Furthermore, changes in the market and in social justice were found to be functions of collective and individual level factors.

Cross-national and comparative research on the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe have focused on the development of the market economy in comparison to established market economies. In an

early study, Shiller et al. (1991) conducted a telephone survey of Muscovites and New Yorkers regarding their attitudes towards the free market. They found that the Russia and American respondents were similar in their attitudes toward fairness, income inequality and their understanding of the working of markets.

Miller, Reisinger and Hesli (1998) examined election outcomes with the level of support for democratization and a market economy among the masses and elites in the 1992 and 1995 elections in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. They found attitudes towards market norms were more important than democratic norms in the 1992 and 1995 elections in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. In those elections, the link between support for the democratic reformers and support for the market was fairly strong.

Slomczynski and Shabad (1997) studies Polish students aged 13 to 14 and a corresponding ‘cohort’ of their parents and teachers to examine the relative levels of support for democracy and a market economy. They found support for democracy was greater for the adults in the study while market economy support was greater for the students. This suggested that the base of support for the economic transformation may be found in the younger people in society.

Duch (1993) explicitly examined the development of an economic culture in Central and Eastern Europe. He developed the concept of a “free market culture” in which “preferences for free-market reform reflect an acceptance on the part of individuals of certain basic premises of free-market mechanisms” (Duch 1993: 590). Using data collected from a survey of European USSR in 1990, he

tested different explanations for attitudes towards free-market reforms. He found that there is a free-market culture in the Soviet Union that makes modest contributions to support for free-market reforms. The free market culture resembles social democracy, rather than laissez-faire capitalism.

The previous research on public opinions about various aspects of the economic transformation suggests the importance of support for the economic conditions to the people undergoing the transformation processes. The economic reforms that are a part of the transformation process have profound social costs. It is feared that a public backlash against these social costs may result in a reversal of the progress of democratization in these countries. The research also suggests that this may not be the case. The citizens of Central and Eastern Europe may, in fact, be willing to support the economic reforms of the transformation despite the social costs. One area that does need to be examined is the relationship of other attitudes that may be related to public opinion on the market economy. By examining these, a better understanding of the foundation of public support for the market economy can be gained.

Hypotheses

It has been argued that preferences for democracy and capitalism are shaped by similar factors (Duch 1993). The following five hypotheses are tested in this chapter on each of the sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe individually and on the countries grouped based on their status for membership in the European Union. These were selected based on their apparent

significance to opinions about the market economy found in other research and on their significance to public opinion on democracy as discussed in the previous chapter. These hypotheses cover political, microeconomic and foreign relation opinions and should be influential in attitudes that are supportive of the transformation toward a market economy.

H3.1: *Individuals who believe there is respect for human rights are more likely to support participation in a market economy than are individuals who believe there is not respect for human rights.*

H3.2: *Individuals who are satisfied with democracy are more likely to support the transition to the market economy than are individuals who are not satisfied with democracy*.

H3.3: *Individuals who believe their future microeconomic conditions will improve are more likely to support the transition to a market economy than are individuals who believe their future microeconomic conditions will not improve*.

H3.4: *Individuals who believe their microeconomic conditions have improved are more likely to support the transition to a market economy than are individuals who believe their economic conditions have not improved*.

H3.5: *Individuals who believe that their country's future is closely linked to the European Union are more likely to support the transition to a market economy than are individuals who believe the future of their country is linked with an entity other than the European Union*.

In addition to the above five hypotheses, a final hypothesis examines public opinion in light of the country's status for membership into the European Union. Since the beginning of fundamental political and economic changes in the late 1980s, some have considered integration into the European Union to be one of the main tools of achieving transformation (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 816). It is expected that the citizens of the Central and Eastern Europe would be influenced by how successful their country has been with regard to integration into the

European Union. This would work to shape public opinion about the transformations in general and public support for the market economy in particular.

H3.6: *The general model tested through the above hypotheses will demonstrate greater explanatory power in the countries most likely to be granted admission into the European Union during the next enlargement compared to other countries.*

Public opinion is important to understanding the political and economic changes in Central and Eastern Europe. It is expected that these hypotheses will be supported most strongly in the countries that expect to be included in the first wave of European Union enlargements. Further, it is expected that these hypotheses will receive the least support in the countries that are not seeking European Union membership. This framework of the status of seeking membership in the European Union should provide insights into the patterns of public opinion toward the economic transformation process.

Data and Methods

Data for this chapter are from the Central and Eastern European Barometer 7 (Cunningham 1996). The data were collected on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities in sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Central and Easter European Barometer 7 was conducted as a face-to-face interview with respondents, age 15 years and older, in their place of residence. It was conducted in each of the sixteen countries between November 1 and November 29, 1996. The survey is a fully representative national sample using a multi-stage random probability sample for each country.

There were slight variations in the sample design to account for the individual characteristics and population structures in the specific country (see Appendix A for details). The total number of respondents interviewed from the sixteen selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe was 16,876.

Selected Variables

There are five predictor and one predicted variables in the model of public support for the market economy. The predicted variable is support for the market economy. The respondents were asked to report their opinions about the transition to a market economy in their country. This variable, market economy support, is based on the question, “Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that is one that is largely free from state control, is right or wrong for (our country)?” The response categories are “right” and “wrong.”

The five predictor variables in the model are the perception of human rights conditions, satisfaction with democracy, future household economic expectations, past household economic experiences and opinions on the future of their country with the European Union. The first predictor variable is perceived human rights conditions. The measure of perceived human rights condition is based on the question, “To what degree do you believe that there is respect for individual human rights in (our country)?” The response categories are “a lot of respect for individual human rights,” “some respect,” “not much respect” and “no respect at all.” These response categories are collapsed into two categories. The first category, labeled “respect for human rights,” is composed of the original

responses of “a lot of respect” and “some respect.” The second category, “no respect for human rights,” is composed of the original response categories of “not much respect” and “no respect at all.”

The second predictor variable in this study is satisfaction with democracy. To measure this, the respondents were asked the following question: “On the whole are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing?” The response categories are “satisfied,” “fairly satisfied,” “not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied.” For the purposes of analysis, the original responses are categorized into “satisfied” and “not satisfied.” The satisfied category includes all responses of either “satisfied” or “fairly satisfied.” The responses of “not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied” are placed into the “not satisfied” category.

Respondents are asked about their prospective microeconomic expectations. This is measured with the question, “Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will . . . get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse and get a lot worse?” The five possible responses are collapsed into two categories of expecting improvement and not expecting improvement. The responses of “getting a lot better” or “getting a little better” are considered to be expectations of improvement. The remaining response categories are considered as expecting no improvement in household economic conditions over the next 12 months.

The respondents are asked about their retrospective microeconomic experience over the past 12 months. For this variable, the question asks, “Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation of your household has . . . got a lot better, got a little better, stayed the same, got a little worse, got a lot worse?” These responses are collapsed into a dichotomous variable indicating either improvement or no improvement in their household economic conditions over the past 12 months. Improved conditions are those where the respondents reported their household economic conditions to have gotten a little or a lot better. The responses that indicated their household economic conditions had stayed the same or worsened composed the category of no improvement in household economic conditions.

The final predictor variable is the opinion of the future relationship of their country to the European Union. The opinions about their country’s future being linked closely to the European Union are measured with the question, “As things now stand, with which of the following do you see (our country’s) future most closely tied up?” The response categories are “The United States of America,” The European Union,” “Other European countries like Norway and Switzerland, which remain outside of the European Union,” “Other Central and Eastern European countries,” “Russia or other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States,” “Turkey” and “Japan / South Korea.” These responses are collapsed into a dichotomous variable of “European Union” and “other.”

Methods

The analysis for this chapter is conducted using logistic regression. Logistic regression is an appropriate technique due to the level of measurement of the predictor variables. The predictor variables are collapsed into dichotomous variables due to a number of cells containing very few responses (particularly in the two household economic condition variables). A separate logistic regression analysis is completed for each of the sixteen countries in the study. This is done to test the hypotheses for each country. Additionally, the countries are divided into three categories. First, are the countries seeking entry into the European Union which are most likely to be granted membership in the next enlargement. The second category is composed of the countries seeking membership into the European Union that will not be granted membership with the next enlargement. The final category is composed of the countries not seeking membership into the European Union. A logistic regression is completed on each of the categories and the findings are compared.

Results

A correlation matrix is produced on the predictor variables in this study. The results are displayed in Table 13. Generally the correlations between the predictor variables are modest and positive. The highest degree of correlation is found between perceived human rights and satisfaction with democracy with a Pearson's r of 0.388. Technically, all of the relationships are significant statistically. Since the values of the correlations are relatively modest and the

number of cases is very large, the level of significance is due more to the size of the sample rather than actual relationships between the variables.

The Frontrunner Countries for Membership in the European Union

The results of the logistic regression analyses on the five countries most likely to be granted membership into the European Union during the next enlargement is found on Table 14. Satisfaction with democracy is significant statistically in the five front-runner countries. In the case of the Czech Republic, the odds of supporting the transition to the market economy are 3.5 times greater for citizens of the Czech Republic that report being satisfied with democracy compared to those that report not being satisfied with democracy. The odds of supporting the transition to the market economy in Estonia is 1.9 times greater for individuals who are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are not satisfied with democracy. In Hungary, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.3 times greater for Hungarians who are satisfied with democracy compared to Hungarians who are not satisfied with democracy. In Poland, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 3.9 times greater when individuals are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are not satisfied with democracy. Finally, in Slovenia the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.7 times greater for Slovenians that are satisfied with democracy compared to Slovenians that are not satisfied with democracy.

In all five of the countries most likely to be admitted into the European Union in the next enlargement, the public's perception of the future of their country with the European Union is significant statistically. In the Czech Republic, the odds of supporting the move toward the market economy is 1.8 times greater for individuals who believe that the future of the Czech Republic is with the European Union compared to those that believe that the future of the Czech Republic is with some other entity. In Estonia and Hungary, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater when the respondents report that the future of their country is with the European Union compared to individuals who report the future is not with the European Union. In Poland, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.4 times greater for the individuals who believe the future of Poland to be with the European Union. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy in Slovenia are 2.1 times greater for individuals who believe that the future of Slovenia lies with the European Union.

Perception of respect for human rights is significant statistically in four of the five front-runner countries. In the Czech Republic, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.2 times greater for individuals who believe there is respect for human rights in the Czech Republic compared to individuals who believe there is little or no respect for human rights in the Czech Republic. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are between 1.6 and 1.7 times greater for the respondents in Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia who

perceive there to be respect for human rights compared to individuals who perceive a lack of respect for human rights in these countries.

In three of the front-runners for membership in the European Union, future household economic expectations are significant statistically. The three countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. In the Czech Republic, all else being equal, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy is 1.8 times greater for individuals who expected their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to individuals who expected their household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen over the next 12 months. In the case of Hungary, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.2 times greater for individuals who expected their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to individuals who expected their household economic conditions to not improve over the next year. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.1 times greater for Slovenians that expect their household economic conditions to improve compared to Slovenians that do not expect their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months.

Perceptions of the respondents of their past household economic conditions are significant statistically in Estonia only. In that country, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.7 times greater for individuals who report that their household economic conditions had improved

over the past 12 months compared to individuals who report that their household economic conditions has stayed the same or worsened over the part 12 months.

In all five of the countries, the model is significant statistically although the amount of variance explained is not particularly great. In four of the countries (Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) the percentage of variance in the predicted variable explained by the predictor variables is between 12% and 14%. For the Czech Republic, the percentage of variance in the predicted variable explained by the predictor variables is 28%. The percentage of the cells predicted correctly range from a low of 61.4% in Slovenia to a high of 78.3% in Poland.

The Second Wave Countries Seeking European Union Membership

Table 15 shows the results of the logistic regression of the five countries expected to be in the second wave of European Union enlargement. In the cases of the five countries that are most likely to be included in the second wave of European Union enlargements, only the variable on satisfaction with democracy is significant statistically in all five countries. In Bulgaria, the odds of being supportive of the transition to a market economy are 2.4 times greater for individuals who are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are not satisfied with democracy. In Latvia, the odds are 2.9 times greater that the Latvians who are satisfied with democracy are supportive of the transition to a market economy. In Lithuania and Slovakia, the odds that the respective citizens in these countries are supportive of the transition to a market economy are 1.8

times greater for the citizens of each country that are satisfied with democracy compared to those citizens that are not satisfied with democracy. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.3 times greater for Romanians that are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are not satisfied with democracy.

The public perception of the future of their country with the European Union is significant statistically in four of the five countries. In Bulgaria, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.7 times greater for individuals who believe that the future of Bulgaria is with the European Union compared to those that do not believe that the future of Bulgaria is with the European Union. In Latvia and Slovakia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy in their respective countries is 2.0 times greater for individuals who believe the future of their country lies with the European Union compared to those individuals who do not believe the future of their country is with the European Union. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy in Romania are 2.4 times greater for individuals who believe the future of Romania is with the European Union compared to those individuals who believe the future of the European Union is not with Romania.

In three of the second wave countries, the perception of human rights conditions is an important predictor to support for the transition to a market economy. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.8 times greater for the citizens of Latvia and Romania who perceive respect for

human rights in their countries compared to the citizens of each country that perceive a lack of respect for human rights in their country. In Lithuania, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.3 times greater for the Lithuanians that perceive respect for human rights in Lithuania compared to those that do not perceive respect for human rights in Lithuania.

Perceptions of household economic conditions, future or past, are significant statistically in four of the five countries in this category. In three of the five countries (Lithuania, Romanian and Slovakia) the future household economic expectations are significant statistically. In Lithuania, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater for individuals who expect their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to the individuals who expect their household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen over the next 12 months. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.8 times greater for Romanians that expect an improvement in their household economic conditions compared to those that expect no improvement in their household economic conditions. The odds are 2.5 times greater in Slovakia that an individual supported the transition to a market economy if the individual expects an improvement in their household economic conditions over the next 12 months compared to the individuals who expect their household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen over the next 12 months. In Latvia, the past household economic experience is significant statistically. In that country, the odds of supporting the transition to a market

economy are 2.1 times greater for the individuals who report their economic conditions to have had improved over the past 12 months compared to individuals who report their household economic conditions to have stayed the same or worsened over the past 12 months.

Although the model is significant statistically in all five countries in this category, the amount of variance in the predicated variable explained by the predictor variables is low. The greatest amount of variance explained is 17.2%. The percentage of cells predicted correctly range from 61.6% to 87.6%.

The Countries Not Seeking European Union Membership

Tables 16a and 16b show the results of the logistic regressions for the six countries not seeking membership in the European Union included in this analysis. For these countries, no variable is significant statistically in all of the countries. Three variables are significant statistically in five of the six countries. In one of the countries (Belarus) the model is not significant statistically.

Public perceptions of human rights conditions are significant statistically in all of the countries in this category expect Belarus. In Albania, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.8 times greater for individuals who perceive that there is respect for human rights in Albania compared to those individuals who do not perceive that there is respect for human rights in Albania. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.6 times greater for the Armenians that perceive respect for human rights compared to the Armenians that perceive a lack of respect for

human rights. In Macedonia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater for the individuals who report respect for human rights compared to the individuals who report a lack of respect for human rights. In Russia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.1 times greater for individuals who perceive respect for human rights in Russia compared to individuals who perceived a lack of respect for human rights in Russia. Finally, in Ukraine, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.9 times greater for those that perceive respect for human rights compared to those that perceive little or no respect for human rights in Ukraine.

Satisfaction with democracy is significant statistically in five of the six countries in this group. In Albania and the Ukraine, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.3 times greater for the individuals in these countries who are satisfied with democracy compared to those individuals who are not satisfied with democracy. In Armenia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.9 times greater for the Armenians that are satisfied with democracy compared to the Armenians that are not satisfied with democracy. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.1 times greater in Macedonia for the individuals who are satisfied with democracy compared to the individuals who are not satisfied with democracy. In Russia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 5.7 times greater for individuals who are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are not satisfied with democracy.

Future household economic expectations are significant statistically in five of the six countries. In Albania, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 3.2 times greater for the individuals who expect their household economic conditions to improve compared to those individuals who expect their household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.5 times greater for the Armenians that expect improvement in their household economic conditions over the next 12 months compared to the Armenians that do not expect improvement in their household economic conditions. In Macedonia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater for the individuals who expect their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to those individuals who expect their household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen over that same time period. For the Russians, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.5 times greater for individuals who expect their household economic conditions to improve in the next year compared to the individuals who do not expect their household economic conditions to improve over the next year. Finally, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy in the Ukraine are 1.8 times greater for individuals who expect improvement in their household economic conditions over the next 12 months compared to those individuals who expect no improvement in their household economic conditions over the next 12 months.

Past household economic experiences are significant statistically in three of the six countries not seeking membership in the European Union. In Armenia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater for individuals who reported their household economic conditions have improved over the past 12 months compared to the individuals who reported that their household economic conditions have not improved in the past 12 months. In Russia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.5 times greater for the Russians that report that their household economic conditions have improved over the past 12 months compared to the Russians that reported that their household economic conditions have stayed the same or worsened over that time period. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy in Macedonia are 2.2 times greater for individuals who perceive their household economic conditions to have improved over the past 12 months compared to the individuals who do not perceive their household economic conditions to have improved over the past 12 months.

The model is significant statistically in five of the countries in this group. Those countries are Albania, Armenia, Macedonia, Russia and the Ukraine. Although the model is significant statistically, it is very weak in explaining the variance of the predicted variable with the predictor variables. The amount of variance explained ranges from 13.8% to 21.7%. The percentage of cells predicted correctly ranges from 64.5% in Macedonia to 86.6% in Albania.

Comparisons Based on Countries Grouped by Status of Membership in the European Union

Table 17 compares the logistic regression results from the countries grouped according to their status of seeking membership in the European Union. For the frontrunner countries and the countries not seeking membership in the European Union, all of the predictor variables are significant statistically. For the countries expected to be included in the second wave of European Union enlargement, all of the variables except for past household economic experiences are significant statistically. All three of the models are significant statistically.

For the frontrunners to membership in the European Union, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater for the individuals in these countries that perceive respect for human rights compared to individuals who do not perceive respect for human rights. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy in these countries are 2.4 times greater for the individuals who are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are not satisfied with democracy. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.5 times greater for the individuals who expect their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to the individuals who expect their household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen. With regard to their household economic conditions over the past 12 months, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.4 times

greater if the person experienced improved household economic conditions compared to the person that did not experience improved household economic conditions. Finally The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.7 times greater for individuals who believe that the future of their country to be with the European Union compared to individuals who do not believe that the future of their country is with the European Union. For these countries collectively, the model explains 15.3% of the variance in the predicted variable with the predictor variables.

For the countries that are expected to be included into the European Union in the second wave of enlargements, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.3 times greater for the individuals who perceive respect for human rights compared to individuals who do not perceive there to be respect for human rights. Collectively, in the second wave countries the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.6 times greater for individuals who report being satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who report being dissatisfied with democracy. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.2 times greater for individuals who expect their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to the individuals who do not expect improvement in their household economic conditions. The odds of supporting the transitions to a market economy are 2 times greater for the respondents that believe the future of their country lies with the European Union compared to the respondents that believe the future of

their country is not with the European Union. The percentage of cells predicted correctly is 69.4%. The percentage of the variance in the predicted variable explained by the predictor variables is low at 16.4%.

The six countries not seeking entry into the European Union composed the grouping for final logistic regression. For this group, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.9 times greater for the individuals who perceived respect for human rights in their country compared to individuals who do not perceive respect for human rights in their country. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.7 times greater for the individuals who reported being satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who reported not being satisfied with democracy. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.8 times greater for the individuals who expected their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to the individuals who expected their household economic conditions stay the same or worsen over the next 12 months. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.9 times greater for the individuals who reported improvement in their household economic conditions compared to individuals who reported no improvement in their household economic conditions over the past 12 months. Finally, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.8 times greater for individuals who believe that the future of their country is with the European Union compared to individuals who believe the future of their country is not with the European Union. Seventy one percent of the

cells are predicted correctly. The percentage of variance in the predicted variable explained by the predictor variables is 29.4%. The implications of the findings reported from this table, as well as in the other tables in this chapter, are discussed in the next section.

Discussion

The results of the analysis of the data in this chapter present a very complicated but interesting picture of the foundation of public support for the transition to a market economy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In this section, I will discuss each hypothesis in turn. This is followed by a section on the general conclusions that can be drawn from the findings in this chapter.

The first hypothesis considered the importance of the public's perception of human rights conditions to support for the market economy. Starting with the individual country logistic regressions, in twelve of the sixteen countries, this relationship is significant statistically. Additionally it is significant statistically in all three of the logistic regressions of the collective public opinions in the countries grouped based on the status of their seeking membership in the European Union.

The importance of human rights conditions to the transformation is used as a means by which to categorize the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to examine support for democracy (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998, Hofferbert and Klingmann 1999, Mishler and Rose 1996, Rose 1995, and Rose and Mishler 1996). The results of this chapter suggest that human rights are important to

public opinion on the other half of the transformation process, that of the transformation to a market economy. As Rose (1997: 96) pointed out, ending shot-to-kill border guard orders and censorship have been some of the easier and more quickly accomplished first steps in the transformation processes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These conditions relate directly to the status of respect for human rights. The findings in this chapter suggest that the perceptions of respect for human rights conditions are linked positively to support for the economic transformation.

As human rights conditions are a responsibility of the state, they can be understood as related directly to the political changes in these countries. The fact that perceptions of respect for human rights and support for the market economy are related reinforces the relationship that scholars believe to exist between political and economic conditions. The fact that human rights would be related and, in some of the cases, be the single strongest predictor variable, suggests that the changes in human rights conditions may be one of the more noticeable aspects of the transformation processes. As a benchmark of transition, it is linked to other, less clear and certainly more painful aspects of the transformation, that of the movement toward a market economy.

The other political variable included in the analysis in this chapter is that of satisfaction with democracy. Satisfaction with democracy is significant statistically in fifteen countries in which the model is significant statistically and in the three logistic regressions of the countries grouped based on status of seeking

membership in the European Union. The importance of this second political variable in the model further reinforces the argument about the connection between political and economic conditions. While many (Lipset 1959, Bollen 1979, 1983, Dahl 1989, and Hayek 1944) have argued that there is a relationship between market development and democracy at the institutional level, research in this chapter suggests that there is a relationship between democracy and the market economy public opinion.

There are positive and negative implications to the linking of public opinion on democracy and the market economy. In the positive, this suggests that building democracy in these countries could further build support for the economic transformations and thereby, build tolerance for the social consequences of the economic reform measures. How long and how strongly this would be the case, would be an important question to investigate. This leads to the more negative potential of the public linking the political and economic conditions, the belief that economic unrest could lead to political change (Przeworski 1991). One possibility is that the problems of economic well-being may become so great that the public may reverse its support for democracy (Miller, Reisinger and Helsi 1998: 328). One option that may be exercised by the public is the electing of anti-democratic and anti-market parties into office, as has been the case in Belarus. The direct result of this action in the political side of the transformation would be a reverse wave of democratization. There may be

subsequent ramifications in the economic development as a reverse in marketization may occur as well.

The two economic conditions included in the model performed well, although not as well as the political variables. Public opinion on expectations of the future household economic conditions over the next 12 months is significant statistically in 11 of the 15 countries in which the model is significant statistically. Additionally, it is significant statistically in all three of the logistic regressions of the countries pooled based on their status of seeking membership in the European Union. Public opinion on their household economic conditions over the past 12 months is statistically in only five of the 15 countries in which the model is significant statistically. Additionally, it is significant statistically in the pooled countries that are front-runners in seeking European Union membership and in the logistic regression of the pooled countries not seeking membership in the European Union. The findings and differences in the performance of these two economic variables and their relations to support for the economic transition in these countries have some interesting implications to understanding the political economy transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.

One of the most important findings in this chapter suggests that the public in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are looking forward rather than backward. Is unknown if this is a constant or temporary situation and would require the inclusion of more years into the study. What this does suggest is that when the people are anticipating improving conditions, they are more likely to

continue to support the transition to a market economy in their country. Therefore, with either expectations of economic stagnation or worsening conditions, there is an expectation that this will erode support for the transformation to a market economy.

While it does appear that people are looking forward to improving conditions and these are linked to support for the economic transformation, in the countries that are not seeking membership in the European Union, the past appears to be important. Specifically, public perception of past economic conditions appears to the most important factor to support for the market economy in the countries not seeking membership in the European Union. Of the five countries in this group where the model is significant statistically, public opinion on household economic experience is significant statistically in 3 of the 5 countries. In the other two categories, this variable is significant statistically in only one country each.

In explaining public support for the market economy, the strength of the economic variables, all else being equal, is much weaker than the strength of either of the political variables, all else being equal. This suggests that support for the market economy may be more closely linked to political factors and less driven by the perceptions of economic conditions. This may mean that the public is willing to endure a degree of economic hardship as long as progress is made in the development of democracy and human rights conditions.

The final variable that is examined in relation to support for the market economy is the public's perception of the future of their country with the European Union. This variable is significant statistically in 11 of the 15 countries. Also, it is significant in all three of the logistic regressions on the countries pooled based on their status of seeking membership in the European Union. The variable performed best in the countries seeking membership in the European Union, both first and second wave groups.

The significance of the belief that the future of their country is linked to the European Union to public opinion on support for the market economy suggests that the public, particularly the public in the countries seeking membership in the European Union, links their future foreign relations and place within the world political economy to that of their support for the economic transformation. This variable captures one of the most significant, obvious and often overlooked aspects of the transformations in the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Specifically, these countries have experienced an international reorientation toward Europe that is part and parcel of the whole political economy transformation. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe had been isolated from the rest of Europe for half a century. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent dismantling of the Soviet Union demanded a shift in the international relations of these countries. For many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the expected international reorientation is to look toward Europe first for guidance and then for integration.

Integration into the European Union is one of the main tools in achieving the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 816). Indeed, as Przeworski (1991) suggests that the main reason to hope that Eastern Europe will escape the politics, economics and culture of poor capitalism is its geography. The central premise of the rallying cry, 'there is only one Europe' is that the Eastern European countries have been only temporarily separated from the rest of Europe. It is argued that these countries need "to find their rightful place in the European family of nations." Przeworski 1991: 190). The results from this chapter suggest that public opinion supports this and sees the economic transformation as linked positively to the national movement toward the European Union.

Rose and Haerpfer (1994) argue that economic conditions influence political and social attitudes. From this chapter it is clear that political, economic and foreign relations attitudes influence support for the market economy. The results from this chapter indicate two things. First, for the general public, the perception of the European Union as the future body of international integration for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is important to the support of the market economy. This suggests that the actions taken at the international level regarding accession into the European Union will influence how people perceive the economic transformation processes. Therefore, attention must be given to public perceptions and expectations of the long-term future of their country with the European Union.

The second conclusion that can be drawn is that public opinion on political conditions and economic conditions are linked. The relationship between the two is clearly complex and mutually reinforcing. Public dissatisfaction with one can be expected to affect the other. But, the outcome of dissatisfaction is not necessarily revolution. It could be a more insidious development of illiberal democracy and weak capitalism where human rights are not institutionalized. It could even result in the return to totalitarianism and the suspension of the rule of law has been established. The formation of illiberal democracy and disregard for human rights accompanied by weak and / or crony capitalism will work to keep Europe divided as surely as the Iron Curtain did. Further, these conditions would relegate the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to Third World status.

While the implications of the findings in this chapter are intriguing, much work needs to be done before definitive answers and conclusions can be offered. Future research on public opinion for the market economy should consider three areas. First, a more thorough examination of the link between political and economic opinion is needed, particularly across time. Second, studies should examine the factors that are related to a lack of support for the transformation to a market economy. As is done with democracy and its alternatives (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998), opinions about alternatives to the market should be considered. While support for the market may not be overwhelming, understanding it in relation to possible alternatives would be illuminating for scholars and policy makers. Finally, the public base of support needs to be

examined. Specifically, the presences of groups or categories within these countries that proved the base of support for the market reforms needs to be examined. A general summary and conclusion of all of the chapters and more ideas for future research will be suggested in the next and final chapter.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

A number of expected and unexpected conclusions can be drawn from research conducted for this dissertation. In this chapter, several general conclusions are discussed that address the questions presented in the first chapter will be discussed. This is followed by a general discussion of some of the methodological and conceptual implications of this project including general limitations of this project. Finally, potential directions for future research will be presented.

The Research Questions Revisited

The first research question considered the degree of public opinion concerning satisfaction with democracy and support for the transition to the market economy. This question is addressed in Chapter 4. Based on the research conducted for this dissertation, it can be concluded that in most countries, less than half of the population was satisfied with democracy. This was consistent with other research on popular opinion about democracy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Grey et al. 1995 and Wyman 1994).

The actual percentage of the population satisfied with democracy varied a great deal between countries. For example, in 1996, the percentage of the population that was satisfied with democracy varied seventy percentage points between the countries of Bulgaria and Albania. While there was a great deal of difference between countries with regard to their public's reported satisfaction with democracy, in most cases, public satisfaction with democracy was generally stable from year to year within a given country. Therefore, based on the findings in this dissertation, it can be said that less than half of the population in the sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe were satisfied with democracy in their country and that this level of satisfaction was relatively stable across the five year time period included in this study.

The other half of the first question posed in Chapter 1 addressed the level of public opinion about the transformation to a market economy. In general, public support for their country's transformation to a market economy was higher than satisfaction with democracy. Further, it was noticeably higher in the countries seeking membership in the European Union than in the countries not seeking membership in the European Union. In all of the countries seeking membership in the European Union, more than half of the population supported the transition to a market economy in at least three of the five years included in this study. In five of the ten countries seeking European Union membership, in a least one year, support for the transformation to a market economy was above two-thirds of the populations. Clearly, support for the transition to a market

economy was high in the countries seeking membership in the European Union. In the six countries not seeking membership in the European Union, with the exception of Albania, support for the transition to a market economy was much lower than in the countries seeking membership in the European Union. Only in Macedonia did support for the transition to a market economy reach fifty percent of the population. In general, with regard to the first question posed in this dissertation, it can be concluded that support for the transition to a market economy was relatively high in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in the countries seeking membership in the European Union.

The second question posed in this dissertation explored whether there was a difference in public opinion about democracy and the market economy between the countries seeking and not seeking membership in the European Union. From the frequency distributions of satisfaction with democracy, there did not appear to be a difference between the two groups of countries. On the other hand, when examining support for the market economy, a clear difference emerged between the two groups of countries. In the case of public support for the market economy, support was much higher overall in the countries that were seeking membership in the European Union compared to the countries not seeking membership in the European Union.

In order to answer this second question more definitively, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was conducted to test if these two groups, in fact, represented distinct populations. The results of the Kolomogrov-Smirnov tests confirmed that

public opinion regarding satisfaction with democracy does not differ between the two groups of countries. Likewise, support for the transition to a market economy does differ between the countries that are seeking membership in the European Union and those countries not seeking membership in the European Union.

The answers to these two questions suggest that the real difference between these two groups of countries lies not in the satisfaction with democracy, but rather in the support for the market economy. The implications of the importance of the market over that of democracy are profound, particularly in light of the connections between politics and economics.

One of the most important implications for the presence of a single population with regard to public opinion about democracy and two distinct populations with regard to public opinion about the market economy has to do with concerns about the relationship between public opinion on politics and economics. As Przeworski (1991) has argued, the link between politics and economics means that one may be held responsible for the other. Specifically, democracy may suffer due to disapproval of the economic conditions. Since public satisfaction with democracy was so low in many of the countries and support for the market economy much higher, particularly in the countries seeking entry into the European Union, it is conceivable that democracy may be sacrificed in order to maintain the development of the market as was the case in Latin America as O'Donnell (1979) discussed. The problem is that democracy is seen as the single legitimate form of governing recognized by the international

community (Zakaria 1997). To reject democracy for some other form of governing is to lose legitimacy in the international community. Further, for the countries seeking membership in the European Union, to reject democracy would result in the denial of integration into the European Union.

One of the challenges the link between public opinion on democracy and the market economy presents is to understand the factors that help to frame public opinion on democracy and the market economy. This leads to the next question, what attitudinal factors contribute to public opinion about democracy and public opinion about the market economy? This question was addressed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Based on a general review of the literature, political, economic and foreign relations variables were included in a model of attitudinal factors to examine public opinion on democracy and public opinion on the market economy. The models were essentially mirror images of each other. This was done in order to understand if public opinion on democracy and the market economy affected each other and were affected by the same attitudes. Tables 18 and 19 show the patterns of significant predictor variables as well as the Nagelkerke R^2 for each country.

Starting with public opinion on satisfaction with democracy (Table 18), the results of the analysis in this dissertation suggest that attitudes about human rights and attitudes about economic conditions were the most important in predicting public opinion about democracy. Perception of human rights, support

for the market economy and future microeconomic expectations were important in most of the countries included in this dissertation. Past microeconomic experience was more important in the countries that were not front-runners for membership in the next European Union expansion. Perceived future with the European Union was most important for the countries expecting to be integrated into the European Union during the second wave of enlargement.

The variables that were most often important to public opinion about support for the transition to the market economy were perception of human rights, satisfaction with democracy and future microeconomic expectations. Additionally, household economic experience over the past 12 months was important to public opinion about support for the market economy in the countries that were not seeking membership in the European Union. Public opinion on the perceived future of their country with the European Union was more important to support for the market economy in the countries seeking membership in the European Union than in the countries not seeking membership in the European Union.

Based on the findings of this dissertation, and specifically in answering the third research question, it can be concluded that some of the same factors that are important to public opinion about democracy were important to the public opinion about the market economy. Perceptions of human rights conditions and future short-term household economic expectations are important to both satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy. Based on the

results of the analysis, it is clear that political opinions and economic opinions influence each other. Finally, again based on the research presented in the pervious chapters, it is clear that a great deal is still not known about which attitudinal factors influence public opinions on democracy and the market economies. The low Nagelkerke R^2, especially with regard to explaining support for the market economy suggests that there are other variables that should be included in the model in order to have a more complete understanding of the situation. One such factor that needed to be more thoroughly examined is that of the status of the country in seeking membership in the European Union. That is addressed in the final research question guiding this dissertation.

The final question asks if the status of seeking membership in the European Union accounts for the differences in attitudinal factors that contribute to opinions about democracy and about the market economy. The answer to this question is difficult, especially when the countries were pooled into the respective categories. What is clear is that some patterns did emerge when the analysis was conducted on each country individually. The two variables that seemed to be found in one set of countries but not the others were perceived future with the European Union and household economic experience over the past 12 months. The perceived future of one's country with the European Union was most often significant statistically in the countries expecting to be granted membership in the European Union in the second enlargement when the predicted variable was satisfaction with democracy. In the models of support for the market economy,

household economic experiences over the past 12 months were more likely to be significant statistically in the countries not seeking European Union membership. Beyond, those two variables, one in each model, there did not appear to be a pattern that differed from one group of countries to the next.

General Conclusions and Implications

There were a number of observations that could be drawn from the research presented in this dissertation. First and foremost, there is support of the argument that there is a link between politics and economics in the minds of the citizens of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Specifically, in the case of this dissertation, there is a clear link between public opinion on democracy and the market economy.

Perceptions of human rights conditions were found to be important to public opinion of democracy and the market economy. The importance of perceptions of human rights probably lies in the fact that the improvements in human rights conditions have been some of the fastest and most appreciable differences between regimes. For example, loosening restrictions on the press, multiparty elections and the removal of travel restrictions can be readily seen by the public. The importance of perceptions of human rights to understanding and monitoring public opinion could lie in using it as a barometer of the changing conditions in these countries. Clearly, the importance of this factor requires further examination.

Another point that must be made about this dissertation pertains to the framework used to categorize the countries. The framework of categorizing the countries based on the status of their membership with the European Union was useful although the patterns that emerged were not as clearly distinctive as expected. The most striking finding was the difference between countries with regard to support for the market economy. Clearly, that has been a point of contention for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Further examination of a number of economic factors should include the status of the countries with regard to the European Union.

Limitations

There are a number of limitations in this study of public opinion. I will start by discussing the limitations that I have imposed upon the dissertation. These include the selection of countries and years, as well as the focus on attitudes and opinions rather than behaviors. In the second section, I will discuss some of the inherent limitations to any study such as this, including the limitations associated with secondary data collection and public opinion research in countries with relatively recent histories of repression.

The first limitation is that of the selection of countries to be included in this dissertation. I have included sixteen countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The countries are divided based on the status of their seeking membership in the European Union. The first category is that of the ten countries seeking membership in the European Union. This category is subdivided into the five

countries most likely to be granted full membership status in the first wave of European enlargement and the five countries most likely to achieve membership in the second wave of European Union Enlargement. The second category is composed of the countries that are not seeking entry into the United Nations. Table 7 lists the countries based on status of seeking membership in the European Union.

The selection of countries was based on three conditions. First, as many countries as possible were included so as to get a variety of countries undergoing the political and economic transformations away from socialism as had it been know to new forms of political economy. Second, data on the country had to be available for all of the years in the study. Finally, effort was made to ensure that countries in each category based on the status of seeking European Union membership was included to allow for the basic theoretical argument to be tested between the countries that are seeking European Union membership and the countries that are not seeking European Union Membership.

The second limitation imposed upon this dissertation project is the years included. This project considers public opinion in the sixteen countries over a five-year period from 1992-1996. These years were selected because they include the longest time-span available that include the maximum number of countries.

This dissertation is limited to the hypotheses testing of attitudes and opinions only. I have purposely avoided hypotheses in which attitudes and/or

opinions are examined in relationship to a behavior. Although the linking of attitudes and opinions to behaviors is frequently done in the social sciences, there are significant reservations associated with doing so.

There are limitations imposed by the use of secondary data. There are a limited number of questions and the questions are not necessarily worded in a manner that is conducive to the research questions asked. The limited number of questions means that variables in this study are represented by a single question. The wording of the available questions means that the best approximations available have to be used. These limitations are found in all secondary research work.

Finally, there are inherent limitations to the use of survey data, and especially survey data in countries with a history of repressive regimes. Research conducted this early in the transformation period in many of these countries may be affected by ideological and practical conditions within these countries prior to the start of the transformation processes. That being stated, the very problem becomes one of the project's strengths. The conditions in Central and Eastern Europe provide an opportunity to explore public opinion on democracy and capitalism in countries whose recent history consists of neither. Despite all of these limitations, this study provides an important baseline from which to examine the future trends in public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, it offers a useful theoretical framework from which to

understand patterns of public opinion regarding the political and economic transformations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Future Research

A great deal of research on the political economy transformations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe needs to be undertaken. While the possibilities of research on public opinion and public conditions in Central and Eastern Europe is almost limitless, based on the research presented in this dissertation, future research is especially important in some areas. First, since the political and economic reforms take time to implement as well as time to feel the consequences of the reforms, studies must be done that better include time as an important factor within the models examined. In the future, as more time passes, enough time points of data will become available to conduct various types of time series analyses. This will increase the depth of understanding of public opinion and the political and economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.

The second focus of research should examine the existence of supporters and detractors of the political and economic transformations. As with any political and/or economic change, people from various social classes, occupations, and places of residences, etc. are affected differently. As this is the case, the social costs of the economic reforms will not be carried evenly throughout the citizenry of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Likewise, the benefits of the political transformation to democracy may not be totally inclusive, leaving certain

segments of society without access to power. In both of these cases, social unrest is a possibility.

Related to the first and second areas for future research is another area in need of further examination. Since public opinion does not occur within a void, the relationship between the political and economic reforms and public opinion needs to be examined. It may be done in a number of ways but ideally it would be done in a manner that captures the public perceptions and reactions to structural adjustments, political and economic, over short and long time periods.

Overall, public opinion research in Central and Eastern Europe is an important and potentially fruitful endeavor. The situation and conditions in Central and Eastern Europe offer an unprecedented opportunity to examine political, social and economic change. The social costs of the transformation have been very high. Understanding the people sentiments and concerns about the changing conditions may provide insights into the dynamics of the political economy changes beyond artificial institution building and toward the establishment of stable democracies and efficient, functioning market economies.

Table 1

Number of Respondents by County, 1992 – 1996

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Albania	1312	1198	1045	1098	1035
Czech Republic	924	817	1062	1075	1021
Estonia	1000	1011	1002	1001	1071
Hungary	1000	972	1018	1004	1002
Latvia	1000	992	1000	1094	1017
Lithuania	1000	1020	1008	1003	1012
Poland	999	1004	1004	1000	1004
Romania	100	1176	1281	1141	1195
Slovakia	734	684	995	1137	1066
Slovenia	1063	1000	1086	1164	1114
Albania	1049	1054	1034	1003	1013
Armenia	918	1000	1000	1000	1000
Belarus	1030	1143	1099	1021	1061
Macedonia	1002	1097	1000	1000	1000
Russia	1000	1377	1000	1178	1065
Ukraine	1400	1171	1200	1199	1200
Total Number	*16,431*	*16,716*	*16,834*	*17,219*	*16,876*

Table 2

Central and Eastern European Countries and Their Status on Membership in the European Union

Countries Seeking Membership	Not Seeking Membership
Czech Republic	Albania
Estonia	Armenia
Hungary	Belarus
Poland	Macedonia
Slovenia	Russia
Bulgaria	Ukraine
Latvia	
Lithuania	
Romania	
Slovakia	

Table 3

Percentage of Respondents Satisfied with Democracy, 1992-1996

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Seeking Membership					
Czech Republic	39.6	49.7	45.1	48.1	42.0
Estonia	29.9	41.0	35.7	39.6	42.2
Hungary	24.1	21.4	27.6	20.6	22.0
Poland	36.0	44.0	27.4	56.8	48.5
Slovenia	49.9	36.8	35.0	38.2	43.8
Bulgaria	39.9	23.1	4.0	14.3	6.2
Latvia	17.5	33.7	27.0	30.6	28.8
Lithuania	51.7	38.1	35.9	27.2	33.3
Romania	29.3	34.4	31.0	38.4	56.1
Slovakia	24.1	20.7	17.3	28.5	23.0
Not Seeking Membership					
Albania	43.3	41.7	34.3	61.7	76.5
Armenia	14.3	6.4	10.0	19.6	19.7
Belarus	12.2	16.2	13.4	15.4	20.3
Macedonia	51.1	46.8	35.8	39.7	40.9
Russia	13.0	17.0	8.0	6.6	8.6
Ukraine	20.9	16.9	18.0	17.1	20.8

Table 4

Percentage of Respondents Supporting a Market Economy, 1992 – 1996

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Seeking Membership					
Czech Republic	62.8	59.1	57.3	54.8	52.5
Estonia	62.4	68.1	58.7	62.1	62.9
Hungary	75.6	64.8	65.3	54.4	55.6
Poland	69.6	72.0	68.9	81.2	75.4
Slovenia	73.9	52.9	62.3	55.2	55.2
Bulgaria	73.4	65.6	48.2	55.0	58.8
Latvia	46.7	55.4	48.7	52.3	56.4
Lithuania	78.2	73.2	59.5	63.9	57.4
Romania	73.0	68.6	77.5	77.3	85.2
Slovakia	57.3	50.0	50.9	50.1	51.1
Not Seeking Membership					
Albania	78.3	77.4	72.0	83.3	83.5
Armenia	39.6	25.4	26.3	44.2	26.4
Belarus	38.2	38.0	34.9	42.3	47.3
Macedonia	36.9	38.6	40.7	52.5	52.4
Russia	49.4	36.6	27.0	23.4	29.6
Ukraine	47.1	37.6	38.9	30.2	32.4

Table 5

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test on Satisfaction with Democracy Between Countries Seeking and Not Seeking European Union Membership, 1992-1996

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Most Extreme Differences					
Absolute	0.567	0.667	0.467	0.567	0.567
Positive	0.133	0.133	0.100	0.167	0.167
Negative	-0.567	-0.667	-0.467	-0.567	-0.567
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z	1.097	1.129	0.904	1.097	1.097
Asump. Sig. (1-tail)	0.180	0.071	0.388	0.180	0.180

Table 6

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test on Support for a Market Economy Between Countries Seeking and Not Seeking European Union Membership, 1992 - 1996

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Most Extreme Differences					
Absolute	0.733	0.833	0.833	0.667	0.773
Positive	0.167	0.167	0.067	0.167	0.067
Negative	-0.733	-0.833	-0.833	-0.667	-0.733
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z	1.420	1.614	1.614	1.291	1.420
Assump. Sig. (1-tail)	0.018	0.006	0.006	0.036	0.018

Table 7:

Central and Eastern European Countries' Status on European Union Membership

Candidates for Membership	Seeking Membership	Not Seeking Membership
Czech Republic	Bulgaria	Albania
Estonia	Latvia	Armenia
Hungary	Lithuania	Belarus
Poland	Romania	Macedonia
Slovenia	Slovakia	Russia
		Ukraine

Table 8

Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	Perceived Human Rights	Market Economy Support	Future Household Economic Expectations	Past Household Economic Experiences	Perceived Future with European Union
Perceived Human Rights	1.000* (16,219)				
Market Economy Support	0.233* (13,695)	1.000* (13,988)			
Future Household Economic Expectations	0.182* (14,678)	0.247* (12,820)	1.000* (15,123)		
Past Household Economic Experiences	0.206* (16,062)	0.197* (13,892)	0.373* (15,034)	1.000* (16,656)	
Perceived Future with European Union	0.151* (14,777)	0.220* (13,023)	0.111* (13,792)	0.107* (15,036)	1.000* (15,177)

* $p. < 0.001$
N indicated in parentheses

Table 9

Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy in the Countries Expecting Membership in the European Union During the First Wave Enlargement, 1996

	Czech Republic			Estonia			Hungary			Poland			Slovenia		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.611***	.209	.073	-1.985***	.177	.137	-2.530***	.249	.080	-1.965***	.250	.140	-1.394***	.166	.248
Perceived Human Rights	1.228***	.175	3.414	1.496***	.155	4.463	.913***	.236	2.492	1.206***	.184	3.341	1.209***	.154	3.349
Market Economy Support	1.266***	.180	3.545	.654***	.167	1.922	.833***	.243	2.299	1.334***	.239	3.795	.520***	.158	1.682
Future Household Economic Expectations	.445*	.209	1.560	.500**	.170	1.649	.595*	.255	5.426	.818***	.213	2.266	.358*	.166	1.430
Past Household Economic Experiences	.853***	.211	2.346	.763***	.179	2.144	.671	.395	1.955	.980***	.242	2.664	.566**	.227	1.762
Perceived Future with European Union	.585***	.176	1.795	.173	.155	1.189	-.019	.221	.981	-.101	.185	.904	.156	.164	1.169
Model Chi-Square	233.656 / 5 d.f. ***			202.218***			55.860***			156.025***			121.796***		
Percent Correctly Predicted	74.6			71.3			78.1			71.8			67.6		
Nagelkerke R^2	.357			.275			.141			.294			.184		
N	755			833			579			627			821		

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 10

Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy in the Countries Expecting Membership in the European Union During the Second Wave Enlargement, 1996

	Bulgaria			Latvia			Lithuania			Romania			Slovakia		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Constant	-3.876***	.440	.021	-2.561***	.216	.077	-1.872***	.215	.154	-1.426***	.241	.240	-2.611***	.209	.073
Perceived Human Rights	.300	.354	1.349	1.369***	.191	3.930	2.313***	.295	10.104	1.824***	.172	6.197	1.946***	.199	6.998
Market Economy Support	.835*	.424	2.305	1.084***	.212	2.956	.602**	.224	1.826	.836***	.221	2.307	.576**	.199	1.778
Future Household Economic Expectations	1.201***	.361	3.324	.751***	.223	2.119	.424	.240	1.528	1.824***	.172	6.197	.231	.214	1.260
Past Household Economic Experiences	.922	.522	2.514	.757**	.253	2.132	.597*	.297	1.818	.524**	.167	1.689	.895***	.209	2.446
Perceived Future with European Union	-.331	.360	.718	.113	.197	1.119	.610**	.215	1.840	.734***	.179	2.084	-.400*	.193	.670
Model Chi-Square	23.039***			145.427***			127.433***			210.204			180.022***		
Percent Correctly Predicted	94.1			73.8			75.0			67.8			74.2		
Nagelkerke R^2	.100			.276			.303			.225			.304		
N	628			673			511			1000			776		

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 11a

Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy in the Countries Not Seeking Membership in the European Union, 1996

	Albania			Armenia			Macedonia		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.955***	.381	.052	-2.784***	.171	.062	-1.881***	.176	.153
Perceived Human Rights	2.178***	.250	8.830	1.82***	.196	4.402	1.586***	.169	4.885
Market Economy Support	.871**	.302	2.390	1.068***	.198	2.911	.748***	.171	2.112
Future Household Economic Expectations	1.310***	.312	3.706	.731***	.206	2.078	.384**	.174	1.468
Past Household Economic Experiences	1.403***	.274	4.069	.561**	.218	1.752	.864***	.250	2.372
Perceived Future with European Union	.347	.242	1.414	-.082	.435	.922	.100	.169	1.105
Model Chi-Square		338.574			184.127			180.346***	
Percent Correctly Predicted		88.8			82.8			72.2	
Nagelkerke R^2		.536			.299			.285	
N		816			876			758	

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 11b

Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy in the Countries Not Seeking Membership in the European Union, 1996

	Belarus			Russia			Ukraine		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.514***	.229	.081	-3.765***	.300	.023	-2.314***	.171	.099
Perceived Human Rights	1.533***	.237	4.631	1.420***	.316	4.137	1.055***	.228	2.872
Market Economy Support	.378	.237	1.459	1.782***	.340	5.940	.842***	.211	2.321
Future Household Economic Expectations	.638**	.253	1.894	.405	.354	1.500	.564**	.231	1.758
Past Household Economic Experiences	.395	.274	1.484	.719	.383	2.052	.599*	.300	1.821
Perceived Future with European Union	-.754	.481	.470	-.215	.411	.807	.787***	.246	2.197
Model Chi-Square		65.965***			83.638***			96.802***	
Percent Correctly Predicted		81.1			90.6			79.8	
Nagelkerke R^2		.183			.269			.213	
N		551			628			648	

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 12

Logistic Regression of Satisfaction with Democracy for Countries Pooled Based on Status of Seeking Membership with the European Union, 1996

	Frontrunner Countries Seeking Entry into the European Union			Countries Seeking Entry into the European Union			Countries Not Seeking Entry into the European Union		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Constant	-1.988***	.085	.137	-2.387***	.097	.092	-2.855***	.083	.058
Perceived Human Rights	1.141***	.075	3.131	1.176***	.080	3.241	1.756***	.085	5.791
Market Economy Support	.866***	.080	2.378	.972***	.094	2.642	.983***	.087	2.672
Future Household Economic Expectation	.540***	.085	1.716	.959***	.082	2.609	.823***	.092	2.278
Past Household Economic Experience	.851***	.097	2.342	.820***	.099	2.270	.986***	.097	2.679
Perceived Future with European Union	.301***	.075	1.351	-.114	.080	.892	.576***	.094	1.778
Model Chi Square	753.005***			749.555***			1889.095***		
Percent Correctly Predicted	70.3			73.5			81.2		
Nagelkerke R^2	.250			.261			.494		
N	3665			3588			4277		

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 13

Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	Perceived Human Rights	Satisfaction with Democracy	Future Household Economic Expectations	Past Household Economic Experiences	Perceived Future with European Union
Perceived Human Rights	1.000* (16,219)				
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.388* (15,408)	1.000* (15,782)			
Future Household Economic Expectations	0.182* (14,678)	0.302* (14,370)	1.000* (15,123)		
Past Household Economic Experiences	0.206* (16,062)	0.302* (15,646)	0.373* (15,034)	1.000* (16,656)	
Perceived Future with European Union	0.151* (14,777)	0.161* (14,413)	0.111* (13,792)	0.107* (15,036)	1.000* (15,177)

Table 14

Logistic Regression on Support for the Market Economy in the Countries Expecting Membership in the European Union During the First Wave Enlargement, 1996

	Czech Republic			Estonia			Hungary			Poland			Slovenia		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Constant	-1.290***	.150	.275	-.314***	.127	.731	-.547***	.148	.579	.319	.171	1.376	-.831***	.148	.436
Perceived Human Rights	.767***	.172	2.152	.474**	.157	1.606	.521***	.179	1.684	.221	.222	1.248	.483**	.158	1.621
Satisfaction with Democracy	1.262***	.180	3.532	.645***	.167	1.906	.843***	.232	2.323	1.349***	.240	3.853	.520***	.159	1.683
Future Household Economic Expectations	.596**	.207	1.814	.266	.171	1.305	.774**	.258	2.168	.216	.262	1.242	.490**	.166	1.633
Past Household Economic Experiences	.276	.212	1.318	.259***	.189	1.732	.209	.436	1.233	.131	.299	1.140	.350	.235	1.418
Perceived Future with European Union	.591***	.197	1.806	.451**	.150	1.569	.498**	.187	1.645	.503**	.171	1.376	.720***	.155	2.055
Model Chi-Square	179.617***			84.442***			55.467***			61.144***			85.236***		
Percent Correctly Predicted	71.1			67.2			62.7			78.3			61.4		
Nagelkerke R^2	.283			.125			.122			.143			.132		
N	755			883			579			627			821		

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001

Table 15

Logistic Regression on Support for the Market Economy in the Countries Expecting Membership in the European Union During the Second Wave Enlargement, 1996

	Bulgaria			Latvia			Lithuania			Romania			Slovakia		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Constant	-.067	.140	.935	-.525***	.127	.591	-.141***	.140	.869	.663***	.193	1.940	-.723***	.128	.485
Perceived Human Rights	.310	.175	1.363	.573**	.183	1.774	.829**	.307	2.292	.563*	.264	1.756	.150	.170	1.111
Satisfaction with Democracy	.874*	.428	2.396	1.066***	.212	2.903	.598**	.225	1.818	.826***	.223	2.285	.580**	.199	1.786
Future Household Economic Expectations	-.265	.204	.767	.088	.221	1.092	.443*	.225	1.557	.582**	.212	1.790	.916***	.191	2.498
Past Household Economic Experiences	.324	.428	1.383	.720**	.277	2.054	.366	.297	1.442	-.119	.225	.887	.343	.194	1.409
Perceived Future with European Union	.989***	.173	2.688	.646***	.179	1.909	.177	.197	1.193	.862***	.211	2.368	.740***	.154	2.095
Model Chi-Square	45.546***			92.060***			40.323***			62.022***			83.407***		
Percent Correctly Predicted	61.6			66.0			64.6			87.6			63.7		
Nagelkerke R^2	.094			.172			.103			.114			.136		
N	628			673			511			1000			776		

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 16a

Logistic Regression on Support for the Market Economy in the Countries Not Seeking Membership in the European Union, 1996

	Albania			Armenia			Macedonia		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Constant	-.354	.231	.702	-1.800***	.123	.165	-.846***	.139	.429
Perceived Human Rights	.582*	.299	1.789	.962***	.180	2.617	.452**	.167	1.571
Satisfaction with Democracy	.847**	.303	2.333	1.065***	.197	2.901	.741***	.172	2.099
Future Household Economic Expectations	1.160***	.294	3.190	.374*	.186	1.453	.440**	.163	1.553
Past Household Economic Experiences	.162	.301	1.176	.460**	.195	1.584	.806***	.252	2.239
Perceived Future with European Union	.203	.219	1.225	-.028	.381	.941	.353*	.157	1.424
Model Chi-Square	107.396***			129.789***			91.943***		
Percent Correctly Predicted	86.6			75.9			64.5		
Nagelkerke R^2	.217			.199			.152		
N	816			876			758		

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 16b

Logistic Regression on Support for the Market Economy in the Countries Not Seeking Membership in the European Union, 1996

	Belarus			Russia			Ukraine		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Constant	-.210	.120	.810	-1.455***	.126	.234	-1.314***	.121	.269
Perceived Human Rights	.012	.205	1.012	.741**	.253	2.097	.642**	.218	1.900
Satisfaction with Democracy	.370	.236	1.448	1.743***	.339	5.715	.809***	.212	2.246
Future Household Economic Expectations	.022	.201	1.023	.903***	.243	2.468	.607**	.205	1.835
Past Household Economic Experiences	-.070	.220	.932	.924***	.289	2.518	.375	.292	1.454
Perceived Future with European Union	.777**	.308	2.175	.439	.251	1.552	.335	.234	1.398
Model Chi-Square	9.172			102.877***			67.740***		
Percent Correctly Predicted	56.1			74.8			69.8		
Nagelkerke R^2	.022			.212			.138		
N	551			628			648		

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 17

Logistic Regression of Support for the Market Economy for Countries Pooled Based on Status of Seeking Membership with the European Union, 1996

	Frontrunner Countries Seeking Entry into the European Union			Countries Seeking Entry into the European Union			Countries Not Seeking Entry into the European Union		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Constant	-.529***	.063	.589	-.285***	.061	.752	-1.223***	.051	.294
Perceived Human Rights	.484***	.075	1.623	.261**	.084	1.298	.619***	.082	1.857
Satisfaction with Democracy	.868***	.080	2.382	.956***	.095	2.600	.982***	.087	2.671
Future Household Economic Expectation	.429***	.088	1.535	.804***	.085	2.234	.591***	.081	1.806
Past Household Economic Experience	.370***	.104	1.448	.176	.113	1.192	.616***	.090	1.851
Perceived Future with European Union	.514***	.072	1.673	.693***	.077	1.999	.606***	.084	1.833
Model Chi-Square		437.363***			452.303***			1063.902	
Percent Correctly Predicted		66.4			69.4			71.2	
Nagelkerke R^2		.153			.164			.294	
N		3665			3588			4277	

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 18

Significance and Nagelkerke R^2 of the Predictor Variables on Satisfaction with Democracy

	R^2	Perception of Human Rights	Market Economic Support	Household Economic Expectation	Household Economic Experience	Perceived Future with the EU
First Wave for Membership						
Czech Rep.	35.7	X	X		X	X
Estonia	27.5	X	X	X	X	
Hungary	14.1	X		X		
Poland	29.4	X	X	X		
Slovenia	18.4	X	X	X		
Second Wave for Membership						
Bulgaria	10.0		X			
Latvia	27.6	X	X	X	X	X
Lithuania	30.3	X	X	X	X	X
Romania	22.5	X	X	X	X	X
Slovakia	30.4	X	X		X	
Not Seeking Membership						
Albania	53.6	X	X	X	X	
Armenia	29.9	X	X	X	X	
Belarus	18.3	X				
Macedonia	28.5	X	X	X	X	
Russia	26.9	X	X			
Ukraine	21.3	X	X	X	X	

Table 19

Significance and Nagelkerke R^2 of the Predictor Variables on Support for the Market Economy

	R^2	Perception of Human Rights	Satisfaction with Democracy	Household Economic Expectation	Household Economic Experience	Perceived Future with the EU
First Wave for Membership						
Czech Rep	28.3	X	X	X		X
Estonia	12.5	X	X		X	X
Hungary	12.2	X	X	X		X
Poland	14.3		X			X
Slovenia	13.2	X	X	X		X
Second Wave for Membership						
Bulgaria	9.4		X			X
Latvia	17.2	X	X		X	X
Lithuania	10.3	X	X	X		
Romania	11.4	X	X	X		X
Slovakia	13.6		X	X		X
Not Seeking Membership						
Albania	21.7	X	X	X		
Armenia	19.9	X	X	X	X	
Belarus	15.2					X
Macedonia	2.2	X	X	X	X	X
Russia	21.2	X	X	X	X	
Ukraine	13.8	X	X	X		

APPENDIX A

DETAILS OF SAMPLING PROCEDURES

The Central and Eastern European Barometer is a nationally-representative survey conducted each year in a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Like its counterpart, the Eurobarometer, the Central and Eastern European Barometer, is conducted with person-to-person with people 15 years or older in their homes in the country-appropriate language. In this study, data from the countries of Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine from 1992 to 1996 (Central and Eastern European Barometers 3 – 7) included in the analysis. In this appendix, the specific sampling procedure for each year and each country will be discussed.

The Central and Eastern European Barometer 3 was conducted from October 30 to November 17, 2001. Multistage national probability samples were employed in of Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. In each country the sample was representative of the adult population age 15 years and older. The total number of respondents interviewed from the eight selected countries is 16,431.

Central and Eastern European Barometer 4 was conducted for 10 days to 2 week periods from November 1 to November 27 in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The survey was a fully representative national sample using a multi-stage random probability

sample for each country. In each country, there were slight variations in the sample design to account for its individual characteristics and population structures. The sample was representative of the adult population age 15 years and older. The total number of respondents interviewed from the eight selected countries was 16,716.

Central and Eastern European Barometer 5 was conducted for 10 days to 2 week periods in November in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The survey was a fully representative national sample using a multi-stage random probability sample for each country. In each country, there were slight variations in the sample design to account for its individual characteristics and population structures. The sample was representative of the adult population age 15 years and older. The total number of respondents interviewed from the eight selected countries was 15,000.

The Central and Eastern European Barometer 6 was conducted from November 2 to November 28 in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The survey was a fully representative national sample using a multi-stage random probability sample for each country except Russia and Estonia. In the case of Russia, the Far North and inaccessible regions of Siberia were omitted. The islands of Saarema and Hiiumma in Estonia were omitted also. In each country, there were slight

variations in the sample design to account for its individual characteristics and population structures. The sample was representative of the adult population age 15 years and older. The total number of respondents interviewed from the eight selected countries was 17,219.

Central and Eastern European Barometer 7 was conducted from November 1 to November 29 in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The survey was a fully representative national sample using a multi-stage random probability sample for each country. In each country, there were slight variations in the sample design to account for its individual characteristics and population structures. The sample was representative of the adult population age 15 years and older. The total number of respondents interviewed from the eight selected countries was 16,876.

APPENDIX B

FREQUENCIES OF SELECTED VARIABLES

Appendix B. Table 1

Question: On the whole are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing?

	Very satisfied		Fairly satisfied		Not very satisfied		Not at all satisfied	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Albania								
1992	101	(9.8)	344	(33.5)	421	(41.0)	162	(15.8)
1993	85	(8.2)	347	(33.5)	477	(46.0)	128	(12.3)
1994	74	(7.3)	276	(27.1)	484	(47.5)	186	(18.2)
1995	112	(11.2)	506	(50.5)	267	(26.7)	116	(11.6)
1996	343	(34.1)	427	(42.4)	149	(14.8)	88	(8.7)
Armenia								
1992	29	(3.3)	98	(11.0)	328	(37.0)	432	(48.7)
1993	11	(1.2)	48	(5.2)	392	(42.3)	476	(51.3)
1994	11	(1.2)	84	(8.8)	371	(38.9)	488	(51.2)
1995	6	(.6)	186	(19.0)	427	(43.5)	362	(36.9)
1996	13	(1.3)	180	(18.3)	413	(42.1)	376	(38.3)
Belarus								
1992	11	(1.2)	100	(11.0)	467	(51.4)	330	(36.3)
1993	11	(1.1)	145	(15.1)	535	(55.6)	272	(28.2)
1994	8	(.8)	120	(12.6)	502	(52.6)	324	(34.0)
1995	4	(.5)	127	(14.9)	385	(45.2)	336	(39.4)
1996	13	(1.5)	160	(18.7)	404	(47.3)	277	(32.4)
Bulgaria								
1992	52	(4.4)	417	(35.5)	417	(35.5)	290	(24.7)
1993	9	(.8)	243	(22.3)	378	(34.6)	462	(42.3)
1994	5	(.5)	35	(3.5)	452	(45.1)	510	(50.9)
1995	26	(2.6)	119	(11.7)	495	(48.8)	375	(36.9)
1996	15	(1.6)	44	(4.6)	410	(42.9)	486	(50.9)
Czech Rep.								
1992	21	(2.4)	332	(37.7)	439	(49.3)	99	(11.1)
1993	17	(2.2)	376	(47.6)	306	(38.7)	91	(11.5)
1994	32	(3.1)	436	(42.9)	426	(41.1)	143	(13.8)
1995	34	(3.3)	464	(44.8)	420	(40.6)	117	(11.3)
1996	18	(1.8)	400	(40.2)	440	(44.2)	138	(13.9)

Appendix B Table 1 continued on next page

Slovakia								
1992	11	(1.5)	161	(22.5)	420	(58.8)	122	(17.1)
1993	11	(1.7)	126	(19.0)	380	(57.3)	146	(22.0)
1994	15	(1.6)	152	(15.7)	548	(56.7)	251	(26.0)
1995	23	(2.1)	282	(26.3)	552	(51.4)	214	(20.0)
1996	23	(2.3)	212	(20.8)	498	(48.8)	288	(28.2)
Estonia								
1992	13	(1.4)	259	(28.5)	403	(44.3)	234	(25.7)
1993	24	(2.7)	340	(38.3)	385	(43.4)	138	(15.6)
1994	13	(1.4)	318	(34.3)	395	(42.7)	200	(21.6)
1995	28	(2.9)	351	(36.6)	430	(44.9)	149	(15.6)
1996	20	(1.9)	418	(40.3)	474	(54.7)	126	(12.1)
Hungary								
1992	16	(1.7)	212	(22.4)	440	(46.4)	280	(29.5)
1993	22	(2.4)	175	(19.0)	430	(46.8)	292	(31.8)
1994	16	(1.8)	233	(25.8)	419	(46.5)	234	(25.9)
1995	19	(2.0)	181	(18.6)	462	(47.5)	311	(32.0)
1996	11	(1.2)	195	(20.8)	400	(42.6)	332	(35.4)
Latvia								
1992	8	(.9)	156	(16.6)	551	(58.7)	223	(23.8)
1993	16	(1.8)	291	(31.9)	447	(49.1)	157	(17.2)
1994	9	(1.0)	246	(26.9)	460	(48.6)	231	(24.4)
1995	19	(1.8)	296	(28.7)	524	(50.9)	191	(18.5)
1996	18	(1.8)	264	(27.0)	457	(46.7)	240	(24.5)
Lithuania								
1992	41	(4.4)	436	(47.3)	395	(42.8)	50	(5.4)
1993	29	(3.1)	328	(35.0)	442	(47.2)	138	(14.7)
1994	18	(1.9)	321	(34.0)	442	(46.9)	162	(17.2)
1995	12	(1.3)	242	(25.9)	488	(52.3)	191	(20.5)
1996	6	(.7)	298	(32.6)	466	(51.0)	144	(15.8)
Macedonia								
1992	92	(9.5)	403	(41.6)	250	(25.8)	223	(23.0)
1993	91	(8.9)	389	(37.9)	309	(30.1)	237	(23.1)
1994	44	(4.4)	310	(31.3)	365	(36.9)	270	(27.3)
1995	56	(6.0)	316	(33.8)	399	(42.6)	165	(17.6)
1996	41	(4.2)	354	(36.6)	497	(51.4)	74	(7.7)
Poland								
1992	22	(2.2)	299	(33.6)	387	(43.7)	181	(20.3)
1993	34	(3.9)	346	(40.0)	389	(45.0)	95	(11.0)
1994	9	(1.0)	235	(26.3)	464	(52.0)	184	(20.6)
1995	53	(6.0)	451	(50.8)	299	(33.7)	85	(9.6)
1996	43	(4.8)	396	(43.8)	350	(38.7)	116	(12.8)

Appendix B Table 1 continued on next page

Romania								
1992	37	(3.8)	251	(25.6)	434	(44.2)	260	(26.5)
1993	20	(2.0)	329	(32.4)	505	(49.7)	162	(15.9)
1994	18	(1.4)	371	(29.5)	618	(49.2)	249	(19.8)
1995	11	(1.0)	411	(37.4)	550	(50.0)	127	(11.6)
1996	30	(2.6)	623	(53.5)	459	(39.4)	53	(4.5)
Russia								
1992	9	(.1)	105	(12.0)	419	(47.9)	342	(39.1)
1993	22	(1.8)	181	(15.1)	563	(47.0)	431	(36.0)
1994	2	(.2)	72	(7.8)	399	(43.2)	450	(48.8)
1995	5	(.5)	66	(6.1)	482	(44.6)	527	(48.8)
1996	5	(.5)	77	(8.0)	462	(48.2)	414	(43.2)
Slovenia								
1992	32	(3.1)	479	(46.7)	447	(43.6)	67	(6.5)
1993	22	(2.3)	329	(34.5)	472	(49.4)	132	(13.8)
1994	17	(1.7)	339	(33.3)	498	(48.9)	164	(16.1)
1995	22	(1.9)	411	(36.3)	547	(48.3)	153	(13.5)
1996	37	(3.4)	433	(40.4)	492	(45.9)	111	(10.3)
Ukraine								
1992	15	(1.2)	239	(19.7)	582	(47.9)	378	(31.1)
1993	15	(1.5)	158	(15.5)	342	(33.5)	506	(49.6)
1994	15	(1.5)	170	(16.6)	370	(36.1)	470	(45.9)
1995	25	(2.4)	153	(14.7)	333	(32.0)	530	(50.9)
1996	27	(2.6)	187	(18.1)	405	(39.3)	412	(40.0)

Appendix B. Table 2

Question: Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that is largely free from state control, is right or wrong for (our country?

	Right		Wrong	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Albania				
1992	769	(78.3)	213	(21.7)
1993	738	(77.4)	216	(22.6)
1994	693	(72.0)	270	(28.0)
1995	789	(73.3)	158	(16.7)
1996	769	(83.5)	152	(16.5)
Armenia				
1992	325	(39.6)	496	(60.4)
1993	227	(25.4)	666	(74.6)
1994	224	(26.3)	682	(73.7)
1995	434	(44.2)	548	(55.8)
1996	253	(26.4)	704	(73.6)
Belarus				
1992	348	(33.8)	562	(61.8)
1993	348	(30.4)	568	(62.0)
1994	311	(34.9)	581	(65.1)
1995	335	(42.3)	457	(57.7)
1996	372	(47.3)	415	(52.7)
Bulgaria				
1992	738	(73.4)	268	(26.6)
1993	623	(65.6)	326	(34.4)
1994	415	(48.2)	446	(51.8)
1995	443	(55.0)	362	(45.0)
1996	474	(58.8)	332	(41.2)
Czech Rep.				
1992	509	(62.8)	301	(37.2)
1993	423	(59.1)	293	(40.9)
1994	516	(57.3)	385	(42.7)
1995	470	(54.8)	387	(45.2)
1996	458	(52.5)	415	(47.5)

Appendix B Table 2 continued on next page

Slovakia				
1992	371	(57.3)	277	(42.7)
1993	288	(50.0)	288	(50.0)
1994	434	(50.9)	418	(49.1)
1995	452	(50.1)	451	(49.9)
1996	252	(51.1)	433	(48.9)
Estonia				
1992	497	(62.4)	300	(37.6)
1993	542	(68.1)	254	(31.9)
1994	490	(58.7)	345	(41.3)
1995	561	(62.1)	342	(37.9)
1996	611	(62.9)	361	(37.1)
Hungary				
1992	556	(75.6)	179	(24.4)
1993	449	(64.8)	244	(35.2)
1994	449	(65.3)	139	(34.7)
1995	405	(54.4)	339	(45.6)
1996	556	(55.6)	309	(44.4)
Latvia				
1992	395	(46.7)	451	(53.3)
1993	463	(55.4)	356	(44.6)
1994	398	(48.7)	420	(51.3)
1995	475	(52.3)	443	(47.7)
1996	455	(56.4)	352	(43.6)
Lithuania				
1992	658	(78.2)	183	(21.8)
1993	623	(73.2)	228	(26.8)
1994	508	(59.5)	346	(40.5)
1995	497	(63.9)	281	(36.1)
1996	413	(57.4)	306	(42.6)
Macedonia				
1992	303	(36.9)	519	(63.1)
1993	348	(38.6)	554	(61.4)
1994	352	(40.7)	512	(59.3)
1995	403	(52.5)	365	(47.5)
1996	435	(52.4)	395	(47.6)
Poland				
1992	556	(69.6)	243	(30.4)
1993	575	(72.0)	224	(28.0)
1994	518	(68.9)	234	(31.1)
1995	642	(81.2)	149	(18.8)
1996	637	(75.4)	208	(24.6)

Appendix B Table 2 continued on next page

Romania				
1992	656	(73.0)	243	(27.0)
1993	600	(68.5)	275	(31.4)
1994	921	(77.5)	268	(22.5)
1995	816	(77.3)	240	(22.7)
1996	959	(85.2)	166	(14.8)
Russia				
1992	406	(49.4)	416	(50.6)
1993	423	(30.7)	732	(36.6)
1994	232	(27.0)	627	(73.0)
1995	235	(23.4)	770	(76.6)
1996	262	(29.6)	622	(70.4)
Slovenia				
1992	702	(73.9)	248	(26.1)
1993	445	(52.9)	396	(47.1)
1994	557	(62.3)	337	(37.7)
1995	537	(55.2)	436	(44.8)
1996	518	(55.2)	420	(44.8)
Ukraine				
1992	542	(47.1)	608	(52.9)
1993	361	(37.6)	398	(62.4)
1994	360	(38.9)	565	(61.1)
1995	275	(30.2)	637	(69.8.)
1996	306	(32.4)	637	(67.6)

Appendix B. Table 3

Question: To what degree to you believe that there is respect for individual human rights in (our country)?

	A lot of respect		Some respect		Not much respect		No respect at all	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Albania								
1992	139	(13.9)	146	(46.7)	296	(29.5)	99	(9.9)
1993	87	(8.5)	484	(47.2)	345	(33.6)	110	(10.7)
1994	139	(14.0)	434	(43.8)	311	(31.4)	108	(10.9)
1995	223	(22.5)	549	(55.3)	152	(15.3)	68	(6.9)
1996	229	(23.3)	499	(50.8)	169	(17.2)	85	(8.7)
Armenia								
1992	30	(3.6)	162	(19.6)	176	(21.3)	459	(55.5)
1993	9	(0.9)	165	(16.5)	247	(24.9)	517	(57.7)
1994	6	(0.6)	151	(15.3)	273	(27.6)	559	(56.5)
1995	22	(2.2)	247	(24.8)	340	(34.2)	385	(38.7)
1996	14	(1.4)	267	(26.9)	298	(30.8)	415	(41.8)
Belarus								
1992	25	(2.6)	279	(29.4)	348	(36.7)	296	(31.2)
1993	26	(2.3)	428	(37.5)	483	(42.4)	203	(17.8)
1994	11	(1.0)	249	(23.0)	443	(40.9)	380	(35.1)
1995	6	(0.6)	348	(25.4)	354	(36.2)	369	(37.8)
1996	27	(2.7)	389	(28.8)	367	(36.5)	322	(32.0)
Bulgaria								
1992	195	(17.6)	550	(49.7)	243	(22.0)	118	(10.7)
1993	96	(8.8)	466	(42.9)	331	(30.5)	194	(17.8)
1994	75	(7.8)	365	(37.9)	335	(34.8)	189	(19.6)
1995	120	(12.3)	359	(36.8)	351	(36.0)	146	(15.0)
1996	72	(7.6)	347	(36.6)	330	(34.8)	200	(21.1)
Czech Rep.								
1992	54	(6.5)	450	(54.3)	278	(33.5)	47	(5.7)
1993	57	(7.1)	391	(49.6)	297	(37.7)	44	(5.6)
1994	56	(5.5)	499	(48.6)	404	(39.4)	67	(6.5)
1995	45	(4.4)	484	(47.7)	406	(40.0)	79	(7.8)
1996	35	(3.6)	440	(45.0)	394	(40.3)	108	(11.1)

Appendix B Table 3 continued on next page

Slovakia								
1992	195	(29.1)	272	(40.5)	155	(23.1)	49	(7.3)
1993	130	(19.8)	291	(44.4)	151	(23.0)	84	(12.8)
1994	213	(22.6)	441	(46.8)	198	(21.0)	91	(9.7)
1995	51	(4.8)	441	(41.4)	447	(41.9)	127	(11.9)
1996	28	(2.8)	387	(38.2)	455	(44.9)	144	(14.2)
Estonia								
1992	107	(12.4)	309	(35.8)	274	(31.7)	174	(20.1)
1993	119	(12.4)	442	(45.9)	291	(30.2)	111	(11.5)
1994	49	(5.0)	393	(40.3)	383	(39.3)	149	(15.3)
1995	82	(8.3)	427	(43.4)	350	(35.5)	126	(12.8)
1996	72	(6.8)	462	(43.6)	418	(39.4)	108	(10.2)
Hungary								
1992	127	(14.2)	481	(53.7)	202	(22.5)	86	(9.6)
1993	113	(12.2)	488	(52.8)	224	(24.2)	100	(10.8)
1994	112	(12.2)	529	(57.6)	211	(23.0)	66	(7.2)
1995	102	(10.5)	503	(51.9)	256	(26.4)	108	(11.1)
1996	67	(7.1)	458	(48.8)	278	(29.6)	135	(14.4)
Latvia								
1992	75	(8.1)	320	(34.7)	376	(40.7)	152	(16.5)
1993	64	(6.6)	375	(38.9)	361	(37.4)	165	(17.1)
1994	46	(4.8)	347	(35.8)	373	(38.5)	202	(20.9)
1995	59	(5.6)	407	(38.4)	435	(41.0)	160	(15.1)
1996	50	(5.0)	331	(33.3)	432	(43.5)	181	(18.2)
Lithuania								
1992	34	(3.8)	338	(38.2)	403	(45.5)	110	(12.4)
1993	16	(1.6)	187	(19.1)	483	(49.2)	295	(30.1)
1994	14	(1.4)	229	(23.4)	472	(48.3)	262	(26.8)
1995	8	(0.8)	165	(17.3)	482	(50.5)	300	(31.4)
1996	3	(0.3)	163	(17.0)	521	(54.4)	270	(28.2)
Macedonia								
1992	223	(24.1)	296	(32.0)	217	(23.5)	188	(20.3)
1993	217	(21.3)	354	(34.7)	250	(24.5)	200	(19.6)
1994	99	(10.0)	364	(36.7)	291	(29.4)	237	(23.9)
1995	104	(11.0)	434	(45.9)	250	(26.5)	157	(16.6)
1996	70	(7.2)	390	(39.8)	314	(32.1)	205	(20.9)

Appendix B Table 3 continued on next page

Poland								
1992	28	(3.2)	316	(35.9)	384	(43.6)	153	(17.4)
1993	25	(2.7)	366	(39.5)	387	(41.8)	148	(16.0)
1994	19	(2.1)	284	(31.1)	440	(48.2)	169	(18.5)
1995	23	(2.5)	426	(45.4)	374	(40.7)	96	(10.4)
1996	37	(2.8)	374	(39.5)	428	(45.1)	119	(12.6)
Romania								
1992	147	(15.7)	394	(42.1)	232	(24.8)	162	(17.3)
1993	94	(8.7)	402	(37.2)	398	(36.8)	187	(17.3)
1994	35	(2.8)	311	(24.6)	624	(49.3)	296	(23.4)
1995	25	(2.3)	297	(27.0)	619	(56.4)	157	(14.3)
1996	28	(2.4)	358	(30.5)	649	(55.2)	140	(11.9)
Russia								
1992	8	(0.9)	212	(23.9)	323	(36.4)	345	(38.9)
1993	36	(2.7)	252	(18.9)	427	(32.7)	611	(45.7)
1994	2	(0.2)	137	(14.0)	321	(32.9)	516	(52.9)
1995	4	(0.3)	147	(12.8)	391	(34.1)	606	(52.8)
1996	5	(0.5)	143	(13.9)	336	(32.7)	543	(52.9)
Slovenia								
1992	138	(14.0)	486	(49.4)	291	(29.6	69	(7.0)
1993	66	(6.8)	379	(39.1)	410	(42.3	114	(11.8)
1994	38	(3.6)	366	(34.4)	513	(48.2	147	(13.8)
1995	67	(5.8)	484	(42.1)	475	(41.3	123	(10.7)
1996	73	(6.7)	407	(37.3)	485	(44.4	127	(11.6)
Ukraine								
1992	9	(0.7)	367	(29.6)	479	(38.7	383	(30.9)
1993	11	(1.0)	183	(16.7)	330	(30.1	573	(52.2)
1994	15	(1.3)	206	(18.0)	379	(33.2	543	(47.5)
1995	9	(0.8)	166	(14.5)	334	(29.1	638	(55.6)
1996	23	(2.0)	212	(18.8)	329	(29.2	564	(50.0)

Appendix B Table 4

Question: Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will . . . ?

	Get a lot better		Get a little better		Stay the same		Get a little worse		Get a lot worse	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Albania										
1992	194	(19.5)	523	(52.5)	179	(18.0)	67	(6.7)	33	(3.3)
1993	156	(16.6)	463	(49.2)	218	(23.1)	62	(6.6)	43	(4.6)
1994	98	(10.9)	472	(52.4)	226	(25.1)	62	(6.9)	42	(4.7)
1995	259	(26.8)	507	(52.5)	170	(17.6)	20	(2.1)	9	(0.9)
1996	378	(41.2)	387	(42.2)	118	(12.9)	22	(2.4)	12	(1.3)
Armenia										
1992	43	(5.7)	125	(16.6)	143	(19.0)	161	(21.4)	279	(37.2)
1993	11	(1.3)	157	(18.8)	160	(19.1)	143	(17.1)	365	(43.7)
1994	14	(1.6)	146	(16.7)	208	(23.8)	218	(25.0)	287	(32.9)
1995	25	(2.6)	303	(31.9)	306	(32.2)	167	(17.6)	148	(15.6)
1996	28	(2.9)	260	(27.3)	329	(34.6)	129	(13.6)	205	(21.6)
Belarus										
1992	12	(1.3)	140	(15.7)	251	(28.2)	245	(27.6)	241	(27.1)
1993	16	(1.6)	117	(12.0)	315	(32.3)	323	(33.1)	204	(20.9)
1994	32	(3.6)	187	(21.3)	241	(27.5)	222	(25.3)	195	(22.2)
1995	17	(2.1)	157	(19.6)	337	(42.1)	198	(24.8)	91	(11.4)
1996	29	(3.6)	189	(23.7)	308	(38.6)	177	(22.2)	95	(11.9)
Bulgaria										
1992	54	(4.8)	392	(34.7)	316	(27.9)	155	(13.7)	214	(18.9)
1993	18	(1.7)	204	(19.2)	311	(29.2)	275	(25.8)	257	(24.1)
1994	20	(2.1)	242	(25.8)	282	(30.1)	189	(20.1)	205	(21.9)
1995	39	(4.0)	345	(35.6)	388	(40.0)	121	(12.5)	77	(7.9)
1996	9	(1.0)	199	(21.5)	238	(25.7)	160	(17.3)	321	(34.6)
Czech Rep.										
1992	19	(2.1)	203	(22.9	335	(37.9)	214	(24.2)	114	(12.9)
1993	22	(2.8)	202	(25.7	304	(38.6)	192	(24.4)	67	(8.5)
1994	19	(1.9)	228	(22.9	450	(45.3)	227	(22.8)	70	(7.0)
1995	26	(2.6)	257	(25.6	456	(45.4)	217	(21.6)	49	(4.9)
1996	21	(2.2)	205	(21.6	463	(48.8)	196	(20.7)	63	(6.6)

Appendix B Table 4 continued on next page

Slovakia										
1992	15	(2.1)	131	(18.4)	165	(23.2)	224	(31.5)	176	(24.8)
1993	10	(1.5)	156	(23.7)	186	(28.3)	202	(30.7)	103	(15.7)
1994	20	(2.1)	208	(21.9)	396	(41.7)	236	(24.8)	90	(9.5)
1995	21	(2.0)	245	(23.6)	449	(42.9)	242	(23.3)	86	(8.3)
1996	17	(1.7)	236	(23.4)	406	(40.2)	254	(25.2)	96	(9.5)
Estonia										
1992	21	(2.6)	199	(24.2)	261	(31.8)	173	(21.1)	167	(20.3)
1993	28	(3.4)	247	(29.7)	304	(36.6)	177	(21.3)	75	(9.0)
1994	19	(2.3)	271	(32.5)	328	(39.3)	158	(18.9)	58	(7.0)
1995	30	(3.2)	260	(27.8)	418	(44.7)	157	(16.8)	70	(7.5)
1996	38	(3.8)	289	(28.6)	488	(48.4)	140	(13.9)	54	(5.4)
Hungary										
1992	10	(1.1)	124	(13.4)	263	(28.5)	311	(33.7)	216	(23.4)
1993	19	(2.1)	146	(16.4)	272	(30.5)	281	(31.5)	173	(19.4)
1994	8	(0.9)	146	(16.1)	235	(25.9)	292	(32.1)	228	(25.1)
1995	11	(1.2)	95	(10.1)	197	(21.0)	339	(36.1)	297	(31.6)
1996	6	(0.6)	139	(14.9)	261	(27.9)	308	(32.9)	222	(23.7)
Latvia										
1992	25	(3.1)	157	(19.4)	212	(26.2)	183	(22.6)	232	(28.7)
1993	10	(1.2)	227	(28.3)	330	(41.1)	153	(19.1)	82	(10.2)
1994	24	(2.9)	186	(22.2)	422	(50.4)	139	(16.1)	67	(8.0)
1995	18	(1.9)	198	(20.5)	454	(46.9)	250	(20.7)	97	(10.0)
1996	18	(1.9)	179	(19.2)	457	(49.0)	189	(20.3)	90	(9.6)
Lithuania										
1992	15	(1.7)	192	(21.7)	286	(32.4)	275	(31.1)	115	(13.0)
1993	9	(1.0)	149	(16.3)	392	(42.9)	167	(29.2)	97	(10.6)
1994	10	(1.1)	184	(20.2)	383	(42.0)	235	(25.8)	99	(10.9)
1995	13	(1.4)	168	(18.7)	364	(40.5)	252	(28.0)	102	(11.3)
1996	8	(0.9)	200	(22.4)	426	(47.7)	197	(22.0)	63	(7.0)
Macedonia										
1992	40	(4.4)	348	(38.1)	244	(26.7)	151	(16.5)	130	(14.2)
1993	34	(3.3)	299	(29.1)	434	(42.3)	152	(14.8)	108	(10.5)
1994	80	(8.2)	443	(45.4)	253	(25.9)	109	(11.2)	91	(9.3)
1995	51	(5.7)	389	(43.4)	245	(27.3)	110	(12.3)	101	(11.3)
1996	41	(4.4)	325	(34.6)	378	(40.2)	113	(12.0)	83	(8.8)
Poland										
1992	16	(1.9)	171	(20.2)	316	(37.4)	223	(26.4)	119	(14.1)
1993	14	(1.6)	240	(28.3)	362	(42.6)	175	(20.6)	58	(6.8)
1994	9	(1.1)	144	(17.3)	365	(43.9)	229	(27.6)	84	(10.1)
1995	26	(3.2)	229	(27.9)	406	(49.5)	127	(15.5)	33	(4.0)
1996	27	(3.1)	205	(23.3)	429	(48.8)	165	(18.8)	53	(6.0)

Appendix B Table 4 continued on next page

Romania										
1992	117	(12.9)	337	(37.1)	218	(24.0)	152	(16.7)	85	(9.4)
1993	32	(3.0)	380	(35.7)	201	(18.9)	360	(33.8)	91	(8.6)
1994	64	(5.2)	446	(36.3)	393	(32.0)	212	(17.2)	115	(9.3)
1995	40	(3.7)	202	(37.2)	285	(26.2)	253	(23.3)	105	(9.7)
1996	114	(9.8)	754	(64.9)	188	(16.2)	82	(7.1)	23	(2.0)
Russia										
1992	21	(2.7)	171	(22.1)	230	(29.7)	158	(12.4)	194	(25.1)
1993	43	(4.2)	321	(22.7)	326	(32.1)	225	(22.1)	191	(18.8)
1994	12	(1.5)	134	(16.7)	272	(33.8)	196	(24.4)	190	(23.6)
1995	6	(0.7)	194	(21.2)	328	(35.8)	230	(25.1)	157	(17.2)
1996	13	(1.5)	115	(13.7)	335	(39.8)	212	(25.2)	167	(19.8)
Slovenia										
1992	32	(3.3)	396	(40.7)	366	(37.6)	155	(15.9)	24	(2.5)
1993	37	(4.0)	302	(32.5)	376	(40.5)	178	(19.2)	36	(3.9)
1994	32	(3.1)	309	(30.1)	553	(53.8)	119	(11.6)	15	(1.5)
1995	43	(3.8)	364	(32.5)	496	(44.3)	190	(17.0)	27	(2.4)
1996	22	(2.1)	319	(30.6)	478	(45.9)	187	(18.0)	35	(3.4)
Ukraine										
1992	26	(2.4)	291	(27.4)	290	(27.3)	239	(22.5)	217	(20.4)
1993	19	(2.0)	111	(11.6)	196	(20.4)	202	(21.1)	431	(44.9)
1994	18	(2.0)	132	(14.8)	215	(24.1)	222	(24.9)	306	(34.3)
1995	29	(3.0)	161	(16.4)	277	(28.2)	225	(22.9)	291	(29.6)
1996	27	(2.9)	197	(21.0)	296	(31.6)	221	(23.6)	197	(21.0)

Appendix B. Table 5

Question: In the past 12 months, has the financial situation of you household…?

	Gotten a lot better		Gotten a little better		Stayed the same		Gotten a little worse		Gotten a lot worse	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Albania										
1992	147	(14.5)	447	(47.0)	198	(19.5)	129	(12.7)	64	(6.3)
1993	119	(11.4)	518	(49.7)	219	(21.0)	115	(11.0)	72	(6.9)
1994	88	(8.6)	479	(46.6)	290	(28.2)	116	(11.3)	55	(5.4)
1995	207	(20.7)	583	(58.2)	163	(16.3)	28	(2.8)	20	(2.0)
1996	316	(31.8)	454	(45.6)	166	(16.7)	46	(4.6)	13	(1.3)
Armenia										
1992	34	(3.7)	58	(6.4)	110	(12.1)	247	(27.2)	459	(50.6)
1993	9	(.9)	87	(8.7)	169	(16.9)	244	(24.4)	491	(49.1)
1994	13	(1.3)	112	(11.2)	224	(22.5)	259	(26.0)	388	(39.0)
1995	10	(1.0)	246	(24.6)	269	(27.0)	236	(23.6)	237	(23.7)
1996	13	(1.3)	214	(21.4)	315	(31.5)	170	(17.0)	287	(28.7)
Belarus										
1992	18	(1.8)	134	(13.1)	217	(21.2)	325	(31.8)	329	(32.2)
1993	19	(1.7)	85	(7.6)	221	(19.8)	456	(40.8)	337	(30.1)
1994	16	(1.5)	97	(8.9)	197	(18.1)	397	(36.6)	379	(34.9)
1995	22	(2.2)	127	(12.5)	300	(29.6)	256	(25.3)	307	(30.3)
1996	16	(2.5)	179	(17.4)	377	(36.6)	266	(25.9)	181	(17.6)
Bulgaria										
1992	41	(3.2)	210	(16.4)	311	(24.3)	350	(27.3)	369	(28.8)
1993	7	(0.6)	120	(10.1)	284	(23.9)	367	(30.9)	410	(34.5)
1994	12	(1.2)	77	(7.5)	237	(23.2)	304	(29.7)	393	(38.4)
1995	25	(2.4)	187	(17.7)	400	(38.0)	273	(25.9)	169	(16.0)
1996	4	(0.4)	35	(3.5)	152	(15.0)	321	(31.7)	502	(49.5)
Czech Rep.										
1992	40	(4.4)	146	(15.9)	262	(28.5)	286	(31.2)	184	(20.0)
1993	33	(4.0)	149	(18.2)	271	(33.2)	262	(32.1)	102	(12.5)
1994	22	(2.1)	217	(20.6)	396	(37.6)	263	(25.0)	156	(14.8)
1995	42	(4.0)	262	(24.7)	452	(42.6)	213	(20.1)	92	(8.7)
1996	30	(3.0)	211	(21.1)	431	(43.1)	247	(24.7)	82	(8.2)

Appendix B Table 5 continued on next page

Slovakia										
1992	18	(2.5)	106	(14.6)	148	(20.4)	247	(34.0)	207	(28.5)
1993	14	(2.1)	66	(9.7)	188	(27.6)	224	(32.8)	190	(27.9)
1994	22	(2.2)	141	(14.2)	313	(31.6)	317	(32.0)	197	(19.9)
1995	23	(2.0)	225	(20.0)	428	(38.0)	281	(25.0)	168	(14.9)
1996	31	(2.9)	224	(21.3)	386	(36.7)	264	(25.1)	148	(14.1)
Estonia										
1992	15	(1.5)	74	(7.5)	159	(16.0)	301	(30.3)	443	(44.7)
1993	17	(1.7)	218	(21.8)	267	(26.8)	282	(28.3)	214	(21.4)
1994	21	(2.1)	264	(26.5)	325	(32.6)	237	(23.8)	149	(15.0)
1995	31	(3.1)	264	(26.5)	363	(36.4)	230	(23.0)	110	(11.0)
1996	29	(2.7)	257	(24.1)	421	(39.5)	242	(22.7)	118	(11.1)
Hungary										
1992	10	(1.0)	49	(5.0)	224	(22.8)	359	(36.5)	342	(3.8)
1993	7	(0.7)	67	(6.9)	231	(23.9)	371	(38.4)	290	(30.0)
1994	7	(0.7)	73	(7.4)	248	(25.0)	386	(38.9)	279	(28.1)
1995	4	(0.4)	48	(4.8)	169	(16.9)	357	(35.7)	421	(42.1)
1996	5	(0.5)	47	(4.8)	215	(21.8)	341	(34.5)	379	(38.4)
Latvia										
1992	26	(2.6)	81	(8.2)	145	(14.7)	264	(26.7)	471	(47.7)
1993	10	(1.0)	159	(16.2)	280	(28.5)	276	(28.1)	258	(26.2)
1994	31	(3.1)	165	(16.6)	337	(34.0)	257	(25.9)	202	(20.4)
1995	20	(1.8)	145	(13.4)	366	(33.7)	318	(29.3)	237	(21.8)
1996	14	(1.4)	127	(12.6)	358	(35.5)	329	(32.9)	180	(17.9)
Lithuania										
1992	15	(1.5)	93	(9.3)	188	18.9)	436	(43.8)	264	(26.5)
1993	15	(8.5)	112	(11.1)	252	(24.9)	389	(38.5)	253	(25.0)
1994	17	(1.7)	147	(14.7)	347	(34.6)	315	(31.4)	176	(17.6)
1995	15	(1.5)	172	(17.4)	333	(33.7)	300	(30.3)	169	(17.1)
1996	13	(1.3)	127	(12.8)	417	(42.0)	292	(29.4)	143	(14.4)
Macedonia										
1992	12	(1.2)	89	(9.1)	260	(26.5)	302	(30.8)	318	(32.4)
1993	9	(0.8)	145	(13.5)	340	(31.7)	351	(32.8)	226	(21.1)
1994	53	(5.3)	189	(19.0)	388	(39.0)	232	(23.3)	134	(13.5)
1995	7	(0.7)	121	(12.5)	344	(35.6)	317	(32.8)	176	(18.2)
1996	19	(1.9)	113	(11.3)	406	(40.7)	264	(26.5)	195	(19.6)
Poland										
1992	16	(1.6)	101	(10.2)	262	(26.4)	341	(34.4)	272	(27.4)
1993	7	(0.7)	88	(9.0)	320	(32.7)	318	(32.5)	245	(25.1)
1994	17	(1.7)	93	(9.5)	328	(33.5)	343	(35.0)	199	(20.3)
1995	39	(4.0)	172	(17.5)	418	(42.6)	244	(24.8)	109	(11.1)
1996	44	(4.5)	156	(15.8)	403	(40.9)	264	(26.8)	118	(12.0)

Appendix B Table 5 continued on next page

Romania										
1992	45	(4.5)	228	(23.0)	248	(25.1)	257	(26.0)	212	(21.4)
1993	20	(1.7)	102	(8.9)	349	(30.4)	512	(44.6)	164	(14.3)
1994	27	(2.1)	273	(21.4)	359	(28.1)	369	(28.9)	249	(19.5)
1995	20	(1.8)	239	(21.1)	318	(28.0)	362	(31.9)	196	(17.3)
1996	18	(1.5)	247	(20.8)	454	(38.2)	326	(27.4)	145	(12.2)
Russia										
1992	25	(2.5)	148	(15.1)	334	(22.8)	237	24.1)	348	(35.4)
1993	56	(4.1)	242	(17.8)	365	(26.8)	347	(25.5)	350	(25.7)
1994	14	(1.4)	117	(11.8)	311	(31.3)	251	(25.2)	302	(30.4)
1995	18	(1.5)	131	(11.2)	333	(28.4)	321	(27.4)	369	(31.5)
1996	15	(1.4)	100	(9.5)	292	(27.7)	279	(26.4)	369	(35.0)
Slovenia										
1992	15	(1.4)	174	(16.5)	407	(38.6)	354	(33.6)	105	(10.0)
1993	15	(1.5)	177	(11.8)	387	(39.0)	348	(35.0)	126	(12.7)
1994	25	(2.3)	189	(17.5)	530	(49.2)	267	(24.8)	67	(6.2)
1995	21	(1.8)	176	(15.2)	558	(48.1)	312	(26.9)	93	(8.0)
1996	14	(1.3)	138	(12.6)	540	(49.2)	315	(28.7)	90	(8.2)
Ukraine										
1992	288	(2.0)	198	(14.3)	262	(19.0)	394	(28.5)	500	(36.2)
1993	13	(1.1)	39	(3.4)	145	(12.5)	329	(28.4)	634	(54.7)
1994	16	(1.4)	52	(4.4)	181	(15.3)	321	(27.1)	613	(51.8)
1995	20	(1.7)	83	(7.0)	221	(18.6)	287	(24.1)	578	(48.6)
1996	12	(1.0)	91	(7.7)	305	(25.7)	281	(23.7)	498	(42.0)

Appendix B. Table 6

Question: “As things now stand, with which of the following do you see (our country’s) most closely tied up?”

	EU		Other than EU	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Albania				
1992	674	(66.7)	336	(33.3)
1993	623	(59.1)	410	(39.7)
1994	665	(65.9)	344	(34.1)
1995	416	(47.1)	517	(52.9)
1996	526	(54.2)	445	(45.8)
Armenia				
1992	104	(11.3)	814	(88.7)
1993	64	(6.4)	904	(93.4)
1994	41	(4.2)	932	(95.8)
1995	28	(2.8)	964	(97.2)
1996	42	(4.4)	918	(95.6)
Belarus				
1992	158	(16.2)	815	(83.8)
1993	178	(17.7)	827	(82.3)
1994	87	(8.5)	936	(91.5)
1995	77	(8.4)	838	(91.6)
1996	68	(6.9)	919	(93.1)
Bulgaria				
1992	508	(48.8)	533	(51.2)
1993	316	(34.0)	613	(66.0)
1994	344	(39.4)	528	(60.6)
1995	313	(36.8)	537	(63.2)
1996	379	(47.7)	416	(52.3)
Czech Rep.				
1992	424	(49.0)	447	(51.0)
1993	379	(47.9)	412	(52.1)
1994	437	(44.6)	542	(55.4)
1995	421	(46.2)	491	(53.8)
1996	470	(50.8)	456	(49.2)

Appendix B Table 6 continued on next page

Slovakia				
1992	256	(37.0)	435	(63.0)
1993	253	(39.5)	387	(60.5)
1994	347	(37.9)	568	(62.1)
1995	386	(38.8)	608	(61.2)
1996	438	(45.1)	533	(54.9)
Estonia				
1992	138	(14.6)	805	(85.4)
1993	235	(24.9)	710	(75.1)
1994	202	(21.6)	735	(78.4)
1995	456	(47.8)	498	(52.2)
1996	458	(44.4)	573	(55.6)
Hungary				
1992	282	(32.6)	583	(67.4)
1993	228	(28.4)	574	(71.6)
1994	234	(29.9)	549	(70.1)
1995	296	(32.9)	604	(67.1)
1996	278	(32.4)	579	(67.6)
Latvia				
1992	173	(18.8)	748	(81.2)
1993	230	(25.7)	664	(74.3)
1994	257	(29.7)	609	(70.3)
1995	370	(37.3)	623	(62.7)
1996	308	(33.6)	608	(66.4)
Lithuania				
1992	239	(25.3)	705	(74.7)
1993	243	(26.4)	676	(73.6)
1994	267	(30.5)	609	(69.5)
1995	361	(45.4)	435	(54.6)
1996	282	(38.3)	455	(61.7)
Macedonia				
1992	279	(29.8)	656	(70.2)
1993	219	(21.5)	799	(78.5)
1994	405	(41.5)	572	(58.5)
1995	349	(37.1)	592	(62.9)
1996	397	(42.1)	545	(57.9)
Poland				
1992	335	(36.0)	595	(64.0)
1993	394	(45.4)	473	(54.6)
1994	392	(47.3)	437	(52.7)
1995	418	(47.5)	462	(52.5)
1996	478	(53.6)	413	(46.4)

Appendix B Table 6 continued on next page

Romania				
1992	316	(36.1)	559	(63.9)
1993	376	(35.3)	689	(64.7)
1994	525	(45.3)	633	(54.7)
1995	418	(42.3)	570	(57.7)
1996	512	(47.0)	577	(53.0)
Russia				
1992	168	(19.9)	678	(80.1)
1993	186	(15.9)	984	(71.5)
1994	111	(13.0)	743	(87.0)
1995	153	(14.7)	888	(85.3)
1996	138	(14.7)	801	(85.3)
Slovenia				
1992	441	(42.5)	561	(57.5)
1993	431	(46.8)	490	(53.2)
1994	370	(36.8)	635	(63.2)
1995	575	(53.7)	496	(46.3)
1996	641	(61.8)	396	(38.2)
Ukraine				
1992	248	(20.3)	976	(79.7)
1993	291	(28.0)	750	(72.0)
1994	167	(15.7)	896	(84.3)
1995	175	(15.6)	945	(84.4)
1996	157	(13.9)	971	(86.1)

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